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ABSTRACT 
 
Traditionally, the law has largely ‘understood’ and regulated prostitution on the basis of some 
form of moral reflection on the sale of sex. Such a reflection is evident in recent policy efforts 
to criminalise the sale and/or purchase of sex, as outlined in inter alia the so-called 
‘Honeyball Report’. The report suggests that prostitution is a violation of human dignity, 
which leads to a call to action to criminalise the purchase of sex. This study engages with 
this proposition, and poses the question: ‘Does prostitution violate human dignity?  
There are three core themes of dignity identified across the literature, in human rights theory 
and in international human rights law, as well as in Article 3 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR), grounded in an understanding that human dignity is inherent and 
inalienable in all persons. As the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and its associated 
international conventions recognize, this concept of inherent human dignity is the bedrock 
upon which human rights are founded. Modern conceptualisations of human dignity 
constructed by US scholars are appraised and three key descriptive elements of dignity; 
Inherence, Personal Inviolability and Autonomy are drawn together to form a model, called 
‘IPA’ dignity. Thereafter, the idea of dignity violation is explored and examined using the 
jurisprudence of Article 3 ECHR to demonstrate judicial recognition of the idea of violation. 
This ‘violation’ of dignity as expounded examines various ways in which dignity may be 
violated. The model is critiqued, and it is established that in order to answer the hypothesis 
question, a descriptive model of dignity requires some normative framework in order that it 
be utilised to assess the dignity violation of sex workers in prostitution. The model is 
considered in a normative usage, according to the natural law theory of John Finnis in 
Natural Law and Natural Rights, in which Finnis sets out a normative call to action for the 
promotion of certain objective goods, the collective of which amounts to a life ‘worth 
pursuing’.  
To provide a sociological context for the study, the subject of prostitution is introduced as it is 
understood in the academic discipline of sociology, and relevant literature therein is 
reviewed around the central issue of what is termed here ‘the prostitution encounter’; that is, 
the sale/purchase of sexual services. A sociological explanatory model called the Gender 
and Male Violence Model (GMV) is justified as most appropriate for the study. Narratives 
taken from the seminal literature in the sociology of prostitution are analysed using a 
phenomenological method to consider the experiences of the sex worker of the prostitution 
encounter, and an evaluation is made as to potential modes of dignity violation within the 
prostitution encounter. This leads to an indication that the human dignity, modelled as IPA 
dignity and framed with the normative call to action of Finnis which directs that human 
agents should promote human flourishing and, a fortiori dignity, may be violated. Using these 
methods, the study concludes by indicating that prostitution may indeed violate human 
dignity.  
KEYWORDS:  
Prostitution and Sex Work; Human Dignity; Natural Law Theory; John Finnis; Gender and 
Male Violence; Autonomy and Dignity; Decriminalization of Prostitution; Dignity Violation 
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PART ONE 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This thesis is a socio-legal study, adopting philosophical understandings of the concept of 
human dignity to approach the sociological issue of prostitution. The thesis is structured into 
four parts. Part 1 consists of this introduction and the methodology chapter, which will outline 
the methodological justifications and methods used. Part 2 will consist of chapters exploring 
the notions of dignity, its violation and how these might be legally recognised. From this, a 
descriptive model of dignity is constructed. Part 3 utilises the work of John Finnis to provide 
a possible normative framework for the model constructed, and part 4 reviews the literature 
within the academic discipline of the sociology of prostitution, before applying the dignity 
model as per the hypothesis question and concluding. The thesis is now explicated in further 
detail.    
In recent months, research has been conducted which examines the apparent deleterious 
nature of prostitution on the (principally) female population who are engaged in it. This has 
led to political developments towards the criminalisation of the process of selling and/or 
purchasing sex.1 It is this process which central to prostitution itself, and is the focal point of 
this study. It is termed ‘the prostitution encounter’ throughout the thesis. There have been 
recent moves by the UK Parliament to instigate policy which criminalises clients of 
prostitution. This approach is colloquially known as the ‘Swedish’ or ‘Nordic’ model, after the 
Swedish legislation introduced in 19992 which criminalises clients of prostitution, whilst 
making not criminalising the act of selling sex itself. Behind these measures and proposed 
legislation are influential reports which have indicated that prostitution and human trafficking, 
(which it is often conflated with), amount to serious violations of human dignity. This study 
considers one particularly relevant and influential European Parliament report, led by Mary 
Honeyball, Labour MEP, on behalf of the Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender 
Equality.3 The report sets out concerns about prostitution, sexual exploitation and gender 
                                                          
1 I.e. For official reports see APPG Shifting the Burden (2014) All-Party Parliamentary Group on Prostitution and 
the Global Sex Trade; Rhoda Grant, ‘Criminalisation of the Purchase of Sex (Scotland) Bill (2)’ (2012) Scottish 
Parliamentary Consultation Papers. For recent academic comment, see Jane Scoular, Anna Carline, ‘A critical 
account of a ‘creeping neo-abolitionism’: Regulating prostitution in England and Wales’ (2014) 14(5) Criminology 
and Criminal Justice 608; Sarah Kingston, Terry Thomas, ‘The Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 
2014: implications for sex workers and their clients’ (2015) Policing and Society 1 
2 The Act on Violence Against Women 1999. Norway and Iceland also adopt similar legislative approaches to 
prostitution. 
3 Mary Honeyball, Report on sexual exploitation and prostitution and its impact on gender equality 
(2013/2103(INI) European Parliament Report (3rd February 2014) 
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inequality. Its overarching recommendations are that there be a consensus among EU 
Member States that measures be adopted to tackle sexual exploitation through the 
criminalisation of the purchase of sex, aligning with the Swedish/Nordic model approach. It 
therefore recommends that policies direct towards the criminalisation of clients of 
prostitution. After its publication, a critique of the report was also published, with 
contributions from many esteemed sex work researchers, sociologists and sex workers.4  
In particular, this thesis is concerned with parts of the so-called ‘Honeyball’ Report which 
identify a discernible relationship between prostitution and the somewhat undefined concept 
of human dignity. The preamble to the report provides that ‘prostitution is a form of slavery 
incompatible with human dignity and international human rights’,5 and further on, in the 
Explanatory Statement section of the report, the author writes: ‘Prostitution is a very obvious 
and utterly appalling violation of human dignity…’.6 It is plain that the report suggests then, 
that both prostitution and sex trafficking together are harmful and violate the dignity of the 
women involved. Both the voluntary and involuntary sale of sexual services (both of which 
are difficult to define exactly) amount to a ‘very obvious’ and an ‘utterly appalling’ violation of 
human dignity. It is not difficult to see the problems that such statements raise. It is a theme 
which reflects the law’s attempts to ‘understand’ prostitution - mainly based on a moral 
reflection on the purchase/sale of sex, which is evidenced in the use of overtly moral 
language in criminal offences which target acts ancillary to prostitution. Honeyball’s report 
appears to align therefore with a traditional criminal legal stance towards prostitution in 
England and Wales. What then is the problem with the assertions made in the report?  
It makes two assumptions which are very hard to quantify or prove/disprove. Firstly, by 
speaking of human dignity in this way, as a measure of the experiences of sex workers, the 
report assumes that human dignity exists, that it is appreciable by those involved in 
prostitution, and secondly, that prostitution violates that dignity in a particularly severe 
manner. These are problematic assumptions, because they are utilised to direct policy on 
the issue of prostitution. Policy is called to be enacted on the basis of an assertion that 
dignity is violated, without any systematic understanding of dignity being set out. It is 
perhaps unsurprising then that the report is controversial, and academic critique which 
followed the publishing of the report from very experienced researchers in the different 
                                                          
4 ‘A Critique of the “Report on Prostitution and Sexual Exploitation and its Impact on Gender Equality” by Mary 
Honeyball, MEP 
http://www.nswp.org/sites/nswp.org/files/A%20Critique%20of%20the%20Report%20on%20Prostitution%20and%
20Sexual%20Exploitation%20and%20its%20Impact%20on%20Gender%20Equality%20by%20Mary%20Honeyb
all%20MEP.pdf accessed August 2015 
5 Ibid 6 
6 Ibid 15 
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academic disciplines is aimed at the alleged methodological deficiencies and accusations of 
bias on the part of the makers of the report.7 Leaving aside the problem of the report 
conflating the issues of prostitution and sex trafficking, which will not be explored here,8 the 
academic critique also suggests a distinct lack of objectivity, and critics have thus called for 
objectivity through an evidentially-based analysis of prostitution from which a proportionate 
legislative response can be determined. The critique does not necessarily focus ultimately 
on the inconsiderate use of the language of dignity, however.  
This thesis suggest that the latter of the two statements from the report that are mentioned 
above, (which appears upon review of the entire report to underpin the author’s reasoning 
throughout), presents some conceptual difficulties for those interested in the welfare of those 
working in prostitution, and those making very far-reaching decisions about the regulation of 
the issue. It is in part to a call for objectivity over the issue of regulating, criminalising or 
decriminalising prostitution that this thesis has been targeted, with a focus on the issue of 
prostitution and human dignity therein. Objectivity is not necessarily possible where the 
language of dignity is undefined, within specific normative boundaries. And so, it is here 
asserted that where the language of dignity is used the concept ‘dignity’ must be adequately 
modelled if it is going to be used as a measure by which the normative rights or wrongs of a 
particular course of action, such as the prostitution encounter, can be discerned.  
But what is dignity, and why utilise it to measure the rights or wrongs of prostitution? The 
unfettered use of the term seems to be abundant in modern society. Apparently there is 
dignity in dying, dignity in speech, dignity in sexual orientation, dignity in abortion or in 
religious belief. It is arguably a well-worn term. As this study will indicate, it has historical, 
philosophical, religious and legal implications as a concept or a cluster of concepts. What is 
meant when we speak of dignity can therefore be a mixture of potential sub-concepts with 
perhaps conflicting normative meanings. Dignity might be understood commonly as a value 
or a virtue, present in, or bestowed upon humanity. It may be to do with respect or honour. It 
may also be the philosophical grounding for the existence of various rights and/or 
obligations. It is due to the fact that when we speak of dignity we may be speaking of 
different ideas under the same heading that there exists such a problem with the language of 
                                                          
7 Ibid; ‘[the Report is] based largely on inaccurate and/or misrepresentative data. The sources cited are either 
studies which have been discredited, or are selected to relate to specific circumstances which do not reflect the 
experiences of many people working as sex workers. Nor does the Report consider the extensive evidence from 
peer-reviewed academic studies demonstrating the problems associated with the model proposed.’ The report 
also conflates forced and voluntary prostitution, which is an issue that is discussed later in Chapters 10. 
8 The reader is directed to the work of Jo Doezema and others who examine this conflation and determine it to be 
detrimental to resolving the substantive issues affecting the women involved. See J Doezema, ‘Ouch! Western 
Feminists’ ‘Wounded Attachment’ to the ‘Third World Prostitute’’ (2001) 67 Feminist Review 16 
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dignity used in the Honeyball Report to condemn prostitution. Dignity is not necessarily one 
distinct concept which can be used as a definitive normative yardstick.  
This might leads us to right off the report completely, convinced that its comments have no 
authority, or no objective standing. But what if human dignity was in fact modelled, based 
around the conceptions of dignity presented in the literature and the law, and what if that 
model of dignity could be framed in a normative way, so as to provide a call to action which 
demanded its preservation, protection or perhaps even its promotion? If dignity were 
modelled in such a way, the report might be given sufficient objective weight to allow it make 
a more measured analysis of prostitution. If the report’s ultimate aim is to protect the welfare 
of sex workers, this would be an arguably useful effort. This thesis takes on this task, under 
the hypothesis question: ‘Does prostitution violate human dignity?’ 
In order to address this question, the thesis models human dignity in a way that it can be 
used to determine dignity violation in prostitution. First, then the study must model human 
dignity, and secondly, produce a sound understanding of the complex subject matter of 
prostitution from the sociological academic discipline, and apply the model to it. The 
approach used to address the hypothesis question is now explained.  
This thesis considers that human dignity should be fleshed out more clearly by forming a 
‘model’ of dignity based upon a review of the literature in law, philosophy and the social 
sciences. The model which is constructed in this thesis is based upon three core ‘themes’ of 
dignity recognised in the law and the wider literature which frequently arise, and therefore, 
as a kind of lexicography of dignity, present human dignity as it is perhaps most widely 
understood. It does so with some caution. For instance, this study does not ‘essentialise’ the 
concept of dignity, so that it is not seeking to say exactly what dignity is. To do so is perhaps 
not possible, or runs the risk of being too prescriptive.9 Equally, dignity is not reduced to 
similar terms, such as ‘equality’, ‘honour’ and so on. To do that would be to prevent dignity 
from having its own presence altogether. As will be seen later, some scholars have 
attempted to deal with dignity in both ways, without providing much clarity. Instead, this 
thesis adopts an approach akin to Leslie Meltzer Henry, which considers dignity using a 
Wittgensteinien method, and examines the family resemblances of the language used to 
describe dignity and to apply it – in her case within a judicial context vis-à-vis judgments of 
the US Supreme Court. Thus, in this study, a model is adopted which is based upon three 
ascertained themes of dignity (which it is acknowledged are in themselves open to 
theorisation).  
                                                          
9 This is an approach adopted by, inter alia Christopher McCrudden in C McCrudden, ‘Human dignity and judicial 
interpretation of human rights’ (2008) 19(4) European Journal of International Law 655 
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Firstly, human dignity is identified as inherent and inalienable, operating as the bedrock of a 
normative framework of human rights. Dignity is also recognised as two additional elements, 
which are autonomy and personal inviolability. A person utilises autonomy by determining in 
their own mind the direction in which they wish to steer their life. And that person, by virtue of 
their inherent dignity is personally inviolable, that is, they must not be violated against their 
will. The possession of both autonomy and personal inviolability provide a kind of ratio 
essendi for the existence of inherent human dignity. This will be explored in detail in part 2 of 
the thesis, where this descriptive model will be constructed. The model which is constructed 
is called ‘IPA dignity’, named after the three themes which make up its constituent elements.  
It might reasonably be said that there exist two possible alternative positions in relation to 
their human dignity. The first position is that the person has their human dignity respected, 
promoted or preserved. We should explore these in turn. To respect one’s dignity is to 
recognise it, and to appreciate it. To respect one’s dignity is to show regard to it, to admire it 
and to wish it to be so regarded by others also. To promote one’s dignity is to go a step 
further, and to actively advocate for the benefit of the person and their dignity. To preserve 
one’s dignity is to take some protective measure to ensure it is not negatively impacted 
upon. The second position involves the negative impact that can be had on a person’s 
human dignity. The term used for this is violation. Dignity as it stands as inherent cannot be 
diminished, or removed from a person. But dignity can be violated – that is by some specific 
measure taken, activity towards or treatment of an individual which results in their autonomy 
being denied them, or their personal inviolability being diminished. The study explores this 
second position with an analysis of dignity violation from a sociological and also a judicial 
perspective, the latter by considering the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human 
Rights pertaining to Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). By 
doing this, the thesis builds upon the descriptive analysis of human dignity presented in the 
IPA model, to consider how that dignity may be violated, and what sociological and judicial 
language is used to determine such a violation. Various modes of dignity violation are 
presented.  
At this stage the IPA model is constructed to give us a clear understanding of the core 
themes of dignity, so we can better understand it as a concept. However, there is a problem 
if we now want to continue to address the hypothesis question. The problem surrounds the 
descriptive, rather than normative nature of the IPA dignity model which is constructed. It will 
not do to examine the issue of the prostitution encounter using a descriptive model, if we are 
seeking to apply human dignity as an objective form of normative yardstick to the prostitution 
encounter as Honeyball and others seek to do. This is so even if that descriptive model is 
couched in normative language. That is to say, even if prostitution is claimed to violate 
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human dignity, what normative reference do we use to account for how dignity is actually 
violated and, from this, offer a principled objective reason and direction for the law’s 
engagement with prostitution? It is one thing to explain that dignity may be inherent, and be 
represented as autonomy and personal inviolability, and yet another to suggest that because 
of this we ought to preserve, protect, respect or otherwise not negatively impact upon it. We 
can state how dignity is understood and applied (descriptive analysis) and then we also 
consider and suggest what dignity – or more appropriately its promotion, protection, respect 
etc. ought to be (normative analysis). 
The question then arises – what is a suitable normative framework for IPA dignity that the 
law can engage with? Public opinion or perceptions of the rights and wrongs of prostitution 
provide one perspective but are naturally prone to the weaknesses of subjectivism, as the 
critics of Honeyball point out. A proposed answer to this question that can provide an 
objective basis for normative evaluation lies in the epistemological framework of this study, 
which is based in natural law theory. Natural law theory essentially ties together two things: 
the ‘is’ to the ‘ought’. It does this by insisting that there are identifiable intrinsic values or 
‘goods’ that we, as rational beings, and the law as a construction should recognise and 
reflect. This study utilises a natural law approach to indicate what sort of goods might be 
being affected in the prostitution encounter and how these relate to an overall objective of 
ensuring and promoting human flourishing. It is this notion of human flourishing that grounds 
the normative call for action. This idea of human flourishing is akin to human dignity, since it 
is essentially about the promotion or and positive action towards a life which is full, 
successful and fulfilling. The most influential theory of the past century on practical reason to 
promote human flourishing in the natural law theory school is arguably that of John Finnis. In 
his 1980 (and 2011 postscript) seminal work, Natural Law and Natural Rights Finnis sets out 
seven objective goods – that is ‘goods’ which all human agents would objectively seek after 
to achieve the cumulative effect of ‘human flourishing’. The way in which we might achieve 
any or all of these goods is through the use of practical reasonableness. The use of practical 
reasonableness to promote the objective goods is deemed to be an objectively moral course 
of action. Finnis holds that a morally right course of action is not necessarily one which is 
inherently ‘good’; instead, we act morally when we pursue the objective goods through a 
practically reasonable course of action. It follows that a course of action with offends the 
objective goods because it is practically unreasonable, will be an immoral course of action. 
How does this relate to the dignity as I have presented it here to be a foundational concept 
for all humanity? There needs to be an establishment of a link between the preservation and 
even promotion of human dignity and a course of moral action which results in human 
flourishing (i.e. with Finnis, a practically reasonable course of action which promotes (and 
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therefore does not offend) the objective goods). This link is established by exploring IPA 
dignity. Dignity is inherent – seemingly beyond reasonable dispute, and that inherent dignity 
is presented and exhibited through the exercise of autonomy and personal inviolability. The 
elements of the IPA model can be linked to the objective goods of Finnis. The preservation 
or promotion of those goods, accordingly with an exercise of practical reasonableness, is the 
normative framework which acts as the ‘call to action’ to preserve, promote and respect 
human dignity. 
Thus far we have set out the three elements of IPA dignity in a descriptive analysis. Then, 
we have married a normative theory by John Finnis to the IPA model. We can now see that 
dignity may be respected, promoted or preserved, as per the first position above, or it may 
be violated, as per the second position. Now we must continue to state why the first position 
is brought about by morally correct action, and the second position is brought about by 
morally incorrect action. Why is it morally right to respect, promote or preserve IPA dignity, 
and not morally right to violate it? This is where we must turn to practical reasonableness 
and the objective goods. Measures, activity or treatment which violates inherent dignity 
through either autonomy or personal inviolability, are not practically reasonable courses of 
action. They do not promote human flourishing, and thus are, according to Finnis, immoral. 
Thus, to violate human dignity, as constituted in IPA dignity is immoral, and we have 
ascribed normative value to the model. This will conclude part 3. 
Part 4 will apply the IPA dignity model to the prostitution encounter in order to address the 
hypothesis question. It will do so by asking specifically, does the central prostitution 
encounter violate dignity, as is asserted by Honeyball et al? In order to apply the model 
however, some concrete features of the prostitution encounter need to be shown. The issue 
of prostitution might be approached academically in criminology, although this focuses on 
the criminal aspects of prostitution, as opposed to the sociological, which are ultimately far 
wider in scope. Therefore the thesis examines the sociology of prostitution in order to 
highlight the prostitution encounter within.  A thorough review of the sociology of prostitution 
is presented, and various ‘explanatory models’ are identified within that academic discipline. 
Of the models which explain prostitution in sociology, the Gender and Male Violence (GMV) 
Model is considered to be the most suited to the instant study. The Honeyball report certainly 
takes from the GMV model, which as will be explained, represents sharply divided views for 
and against prostitution. The GMV model is also adopted in this thesis because its literature 
apparently represents the clearest focus on the prostitution encounter, which, as mentioned, 
is the central issue to consider in the analysis. The literature is reviewed, and narratives of 
sex workers are acknowledged which provide insight into their experiences. 
Page 21 of 232 
 
Once the sociology of prostitution has been reviewed, the application section of the thesis 
applies the normative IPA dignity model to the prostitution encounter. In order to do this, the 
thesis adopts a phenomenological approach to consider the narratives of sex workers from 
seminal studies which involve interviews with sex workers from different backgrounds and 
markets of prostitution. The analysis considers the language used in the narratives, and 
identifies language which appears to align with modes of dignity violation which are 
discussed in the latter part of the first half. Where language is used in the narratives which 
align with modes of dignity violation, it is asserted that human dignity, as modelled in IPA, is 
violated in the experiences of those narrating. This leads to a conclusion as to the 
hypothesis question, and the wider relevance of the study. This thesis provides an original 
contribution to knowledge in the fields of law, legal theory and sociology by providing 
therefore a novel ‘lens’ through which prostitution can be viewed, and it is also intended that 
it will spark academic interest in examining the dignity of human beings in socio-legal issues 
beyond prostitution. This introduction has considered the Honeyball report as potentially 
unhelpful in the pursuit of the promotion of welfare of those in prostitution. The ensuing study 
provides an analysis and application which examines the strong claims made to help the 
reader make a more informed decision as to whether prostitution really is an utterly appalling 
violation of human dignity, or not.  
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2. METHODOLOGY, OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE 
 
This chapter sets out and justifies the methodologies used in this thesis, and also identifies 
issues that the study of the sociology of prostitution raises. The sex worker-client exchange 
of sexual services, is introduced and referred to as ‘the prostitution encounter’ throughout. 
This chapter identifies the present gaps in knowledge, the substantive original contribution to 
knowledge, and establishes the scope and objectives of the study. 
This will be a cross-disciplinary study. It combines sociological study with jurisprudence, and 
constructs descriptive and normative models by which an essential issue located in the 
sociology of prostitution is assessed to address the hypothesis question; does prostitution 
violate human dignity?  
 
Original Contributions to Knowledge 
Upon review of the literature, various broad concepts of human dignity are identified, but few 
legal models of dignity. Whilst some legal models of dignity, which are presented in Chapter 
6, have been recently constructed, they are only descriptive and do not necessarily 
demonstrate the pragmatic application of a model of dignity, to, for example a social problem 
such as prostitution. Equally, the literature in the law and sociology of prostitution 
demonstrates that the law has traditionally understood prostitution through a criminological 
lens, centred on the usage of moral language - the law has approached prostitution by 
seeking to control it through criminalisation of the prostitution encounter and various ancillary 
acts. To date, prostitution has not been considered vis-a-vis the human dignity of the sex 
worker in the prostitution encounter in socio-legal research. The Honeyball report demands 
that an analysis be pursued which considers why prostitution is wrong from a human dignity 
perspective. If it violates human dignity, why is that ‘wrong’? 
As will become clear, it is problematic that a specific legal understanding of dignity is not 
agreed, especially since human dignity is a foundational concept underpinning international 
law. Chapter 4 outlines how much substantive international human rights law uses the 
language of dignity. Although some academics have claimed it cannot be a legal concept, 
this thesis will propound that a model of dignity can be formed which can then be presented 
as a framework for individual dignity, which may be violated. 
Some attempts to create descriptive models of human dignity have been conducted in the 
USA, and, in Chapter 6 reference is made to their work. In particular, the esteemed work of 
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Leslie Meltzer Henry is considered in forming the IPA model of this study, albeit with some 
key distinctions. The incompatibility of collective dignity with inherent dignity separates 
Henry’s model from that constructed here. The study then extends beyond the work of Henry 
et al, to consider the violation of dignity. This study provides an original contribution to the 
literature in human dignity and prostitution, by modelling human dignity descriptively, and 
then framing it around a normative expression of human flourishing according to John Finnis 
to apply it to the social issue of prostitution and determine if prostitution violates human 
dignity according to the IPA model.  
The study is of further originality through the means by which the hypothesis is addressed; to 
indicate the potential violation of dignity by prostitution, using the IPA model constructed. 
The violation of human dignity according to the IPA model will be considered using 
taxonomy of dignity violation, and considering various, ‘modes of dignity violation’.  
The application will involve the consideration of the research and narratives from the 
literature in the sociology of prostitution, from within a particular explanatory model, and 
identifying dignity violation from that material using a phenomenological analysis. The dignity 
violation will relate to IPA in accordance with the methods of Finnis, and will lead to 
conclusions as to whether, in the sample used, prostitution may violate human dignity. 
Utilising the methods explicated in the remainder of this chapter, this thesis contributes to 
knowledge in socio-legal studies and the legal theory of human dignity. 
 
Research Scope and Objectives 
This section will define and justify the scope of the study in the two key areas of research for 
this thesis; human dignity and the sociology of prostitution.  
 
Human Dignity 
The study of human dignity is highly fragmented.10 As such, this thesis will approach it firstly 
from an analysis of the literature to ascertain what the recurring themes of dignity are from 
the modern, quasi-legal literature, consider international legal reference to dignity and then 
construct a descriptive model of dignity. I present the concept firstly as it presents itself in 
essentially non-legal and quasi concepts, to locate it in the key disciplines, before moving to 
a legal discussion of human dignity in international human rights law. Following this, an 
                                                          
10 There are numerous approaches, and numerous eras in which the concept could be studied. For instance, one 
might consider entirely an approach based on a Roman understanding of dignity. 
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explication of recently constructed models of dignity will lead into the construction of the IPA 
model as distinct from these. One of the central objectives of this part of the thesis is to 
identify dignity, and reinforce the claim that it has legal utility. Thus the emphasis is on 
justifying the legalisation of dignity, by demonstrating inter alia that human dignity is 
fundamental in international law. Through a review of the quasi-legal perspectives of human 
dignity, seminal works were identified. Some of these will be referred to now. 
Kretzmer and Klein’s 2002 work11 contains a number of separate chapters detailing 
conceptualisation of dignity within a human rights framework. It was deemed relevant to this 
study, since contributors in Kretzmer and Klein consider dignity from a quasi-legal, 
philosophical and theological perspective. It is a text which is cited in many other works, and 
paints a broad picture of human dignity, its recognition through humiliation, its utility as a 
concept and its purpose. Beyleveld and Brownsword’s 2001 work12 is also frequently 
referred to in many articles on dignity, including the work of Christopher McCrudden, which 
plays a significant part in the modelling of IPA dignity.13 Their work represents a leading 
authority in the determination of concepts of human dignity, particularly in the field of 
bioethics, but, importantly for this study, in the consideration of dignity as it relates to 
autonomy. From a perspective of politico-legal science and philosophy, George Kateb’s 
2011 work, which chronicles human dignity and human nature and characteristics was 
reviewed.14 This work presented a further deviation on the conceptualisation of dignity, and 
provided further ideas for the production of a model of dignity later on. Furthermore, the 
concepts of human nature and characteristics are embedded in the study of dehumanization, 
as propounded principally by Nick Haslam.15 Other key texts were also reviewed.16  
Aside from the limitations and scope set out here, it is pertinent to indicate the limitations of 
the ensuing review of the literature on human dignity. The research for this thesis was 
divided into two halves, one in human dignity and the other in the sociology of prostitution, 
                                                          
11 David Kretzmer, Eckart Klein (eds), The Concept of Human Dignity in Human Rights Discourse (The Hague: 
Kluwer Law International 2002) 
12 Deryck Beyleveld, Roger Brownsword, Human Dignity in Bioethics and Biolaw (OUP 2001) 
13 Christopher McCrudden, ‘Human dignity and judicial interpretation of human rights’ (2008) 19(4) European 
Journal of International Law 655 
14 George Kateb, Human Dignity (The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press 2011) 
15 For example, Nick Haslam, ‘Dehumanization: An Integrative Review’ (2006) 10(3) Personality and Social 
Psychology Review 252 
16 Charles Foster, Human Dignity in Bioethics and Law (Hart: Oxford and Portland, Oregon 2011); Marcus 
Düwell, Jens Braarvig, Roger Brownsword, Dietmar Mieth (eds), The Cambridge Handbook of Human Dignity: 
Interdisciplinary Perspectives (Cambridge University Press 2014); Christopher McCrudden (ed), Understanding 
Human Dignity (OUP 2013)  
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with equal research devoted to each. As such, and due to the multitude of ideas and 
philosophical, political, ethical and anthropological ideals of human dignity, it was not 
possible to chronicle the entire literature. For the purposes of this study, neither was an 
exhaustive review of the literature on dignity necessary to construct a model of dignity. 
Instead, four agreed themes of dignity in the literature have been identified across the key 
texts and articles. These are the subject of concern in the ensuing chapters.  
 
The Sociology of Prostitution 
This study considers prostitution only through the academic discipline of sociology. It will not 
consider the myriad of other disciplines in which the issue of prostitution lies, such as 
criminology or anthropology, for example.17 
In respect of the literature reviewed, it is restricted to female prostitution. Although it is 
documented that there are a large number of male sex workers, the main body of academic 
literature pertaining to prostitution, the sale of sexual services and violence in prostitution 
relates predominantly to female prostitution and female sex workers. It is recognised that the 
issues discussed in this study relate to both sexes, but to focus the study on male 
prostitution would be problematic, in that the volume of material dedicated to the study of 
male prostitution is much smaller, and more specialised.18 Equally, child prostitution is not 
specifically considered, although, once again, child prostitution, (male and female), is a large 
problem in the United Kingdom, because the voluntary nature of adult male or female 
prostitution is removed with child prostitution.  
Various explanatory models will be acknowledged, and from these models, one particular 
model, the Gender and Male Violence (GMV) model will be adopted. The GMV model 
informs the ensuing study vis-à-vis ‘prostitution’, so interpretations of what prostitution is, 
and how it operates are informed specifically and exclusively by literature which conforms to 
the ideals of this model.19 The key issue which will be assessed in accordance with IPA 
dignity later in the study will be the exchange of sexual services, termed ‘the prostitution 
encounter’. Other factors in prostitution, as will be identified in the sociology of prostitution, 
                                                          
17 There are many academic disciplines that consider prostitution as a quasi-sociological issue. See Chapter 11 
which refers to other material in this respect. A sociological discipline was chosen principally as this is a socio-
legal study, which is explained in this chapter. 
18 For example, the material in male prostitution tends to explore HIV/AIDS and related issues, which go beyond 
the scope of this study. Equally, transgender prostitution is not considered in this research. 
19 In Chapter 11, where this model is examined and its use justified in further detail, it will be seen that the 
decision to use this model exclusively finds support in its inherently balanced position; its acceptance of views for 
and against prostitution.  
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will not be considered according to IPA dignity as they exceed the constraints of this thesis. 
These include physical and psychological health and wellbeing,20 and labour rights of the 
sex worker.  
 
Referencing System 
The Oxford University Standard for the Citation of Legal Authorities (OSCOLA) referencing 
system is used throughout. It is the principal legal referencing system in academic 
institutions in the United Kingdom. Consideration was given to the use of the Harvard 
referencing system, however, whilst it is acknowledged that most sociological studies adopt 
that particular system, OSCOLA is the referencing system in which I am most proficient and 
is certainly appropriate for a socio-legal study of this nature.  
 
Jurisdictional Discussion 
There are two jurisdictional concerns in this thesis – that of the legal aspect and that of the 
sociological aspect. The sociological aspect of the study will essentially be situated within 
the United Kingdom. Whilst there is clearly no ‘jurisdiction’ on the subject of prostitution, the 
prostitution-orientated sociological literature reviewed is predominantly UK based, with 
empirical studies conducted in cities in the UK. Some of the material reviewed relates to data 
collected from sex workers outside of this jurisdiction, such as France and the USA.21 Some 
appropriate references are made to other jurisdictions, including Canada.  
The common law and statutes of England and Wales, in as much as they apply to domestic 
criminal and civil law will be considered in the thesis. European Union law and international 
conventions will be addressed as to the extent to which they apply to the United Kingdom as 
a Member State of the European Union, or as they might affect policy on prostitution in any 
state. The thesis will also refer to cases of other jurisdictions as appropriate. Whilst not a 
comparative study, the thesis will consider common law cases that are relevant to the 
hypothesis.  
The study relies on judgments of the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg 
(ECtHR) because it is an internationally recognised judicial body, and its international 
standing also complements this study’s consideration of the universal nature of prostitution. 
                                                          
20 Including also sexual health, not considered in this study. A review of the literature in this area reveals a 
quantity of research on male prostitution centring on the issue of HIV/Aids in male sex work. 
21 See Appendix C 
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In interpreting the ECHR Articles, this study uses purposive and teleological approaches of 
interpretation, commonly used in civil law jurisdictions, and adopted by the European Union 
in its drafting of legislation.22 
 
Methodological Discussion 
Throughout this discussion on methodology, I have made reference to the well-respected 
texts on research methods and strategies, by Martyn Denscombe.23 
This study will use a mixed-methods approach, and will be a qualitative, socio-legal study of 
the quasi-legal concepts of human dignity and human rights law as they relate to the 
institution of prostitution. In contrast, a quantitative approach is usually utilized for larger 
groups of numerical data than those employed in this study. Qualitative methods are 
generally used where a study is less based in obtaining and analysing vast swathes of 
numerical data, but has an approach lending itself to a more theoretical, philosophical angle. 
In this study, qualitative methods appear the most appropriate given that these consider 
issues, (be they social or human), from a variety of perspectives, whereas a quantitative 
methodology would analyse data-sets and rely heavily on numerical data, statistics etc. In 
support of this assertion, this thesis examines the socio-legal issues surrounding prostitution, 
and, whilst it is at times helpful to refer to numerical data to give an overall picture of the 
issue and its magnitude, the thrust of this thesis is towards a more theoretical legal 
approach. 
 
Ontological Context - Natural Legal Theory and John Finnis 
In a legal study it is important to set out the perspective through which law is understood. 
There are many legal theories, but two central theories underpin our understanding of the 
law and its purpose; natural legal theory and legal positivism. This study will be based upon 
a natural law epistemology. Natural law theory may be said to ‘provide a name for the point 
of intersection between law and morals.’24 As such a natural legal epistemology is 
particularly appropriate to consideration of the concept of human dignity if it is to be used as 
a practical foundational legal/moral concept. 
                                                          
22 For further explanation of these approaches to interpretation, see Gary Slapper, David Kelly, The English Legal 
System: Fourteenth Edition 2013-14 (14th edn Routledge 2013) 97 
23 Martyn Denscombe, The Good Research Guide (4th edn Open University Press 2010); The Good Research 
Guide (5th edn Open University Press 2014) 
24 Raymond Wacks, Understanding Jurisprudence (4th edn OUP 2015) 14 
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Natural legal theory has been said to consist of an attempt to resolve the tension between 
that which ‘is’ and that which ‘ought’ so to be.25 Says Wacks, its ‘principal claim, put simply is 
that what naturally is, ought to be’.26 This is a theme enunciated historically by John Locke, 
who says that ‘the State of Nature has a Law of Nature to govern it, which obliges every 
one’.27 Natural law is based on an essence of law which is not created by man, but exists in 
spite of him. One of the most famous natural legal philosophers was Saint Thomas Aquinas, 
who wrote the seminal Summa Theologiae in the fifteenth century. Aquinas identifies four 
categories of law, in descending hierarchy as Lex Aeterna (eternal law); Lex Naturalis 
(natural law); Lex divina (divine law) and finally Lex humana (humanly posited law). Natural 
law, says Aquinas is derived from the eternal law, as God’s plan for the universe – his 
reason beyond human knowledge and understanding. Says Aquinas, we are bound to follow 
what comes natural to us, in a knowledge of what is necessarily ‘good’, because we are 
naturally aware of what is good, and what is not. Natural law theory according to Aquinas is 
therefore based upon the premise that law is designed on the basis of a God-given universal 
morality that motivates us to act, and also to legislate.28  
The natural law therefore binds us as human beings, since we are guided towards them by 
human nature, and they ‘point us toward the good, as well as to certain specific 
goods…These principles are known to us by virtue of our nature’.29 Aquinas provides us with 
an example of natural legal thought based on religious belief, but Finnis adopts an approach 
which is not founded in a religious belief per se. For Finnis, religion is an objective good, only 
in-so-much as it is important for human flourishing that human agents have the option of 
choosing whether or not to believe in a deity. Finnis examines moral thought towards human 
flourishing from a point of moral realism, so that morality exists outside of the mind of the 
individual. For Finnis, what is the right thing to do is not based on a God-given objective or 
mandate, but it is that which leads the individual towards human flourishing through practical 
reasonableness.  
In this study, a model of dignity is developed from the literature as a descriptive model of 
dignity. In this sense, the thesis begins by developing a model of dignity which declares what 
it ‘is’ or what it appears inductively speaking to be from the literature, based on core themes 
of dignity therein. However, the hypothesis question of this work demands that the issue of 
dignity as it may or may not be violated by prostitution, represented in the prostitution 
encounter according to the Gender and Male Violence Model, is adequately dealt with to 
                                                          
25 ibid 14ff 
26 Ibid 
27 John Locke Two Treatises of Government (1680-90) 271 
28 In contrast, Legal positivism instead dictates that law is not the child of morality or moral reasoning, but legal 
positivists state that law is realised from sovereign authority.   
29 Ibid 17 
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produce some conclusion in reference to the Honeyball report’s concerns. In order to 
conduct this analysis, it must be established what a dignity violation is. A model of dignity 
which simply indicates how dignity has been understood and even applied does not, in and 
of itself, provide an adequate account of what might constitute its violation due to a lack of 
the normative grounds on which to base an objective evaluation. Moreover, it has the 
potential to clash with such a normative consideration. As such, the model of dignity is 
approached in two ways, firstly by considering the ‘is’ descriptive and modelling dignity as 
IPA in the chapters that follow in Part 2. Then, in Part 3, a normative grounding is offered by 
reference to the normative framework of practical reasonableness, per Finnis. Natural legal 
thought in the school of Finnis is therefore utilised in this thesis to provide the normative 
framework for IPA dignity.       
 
Interpretation of Language 
The interpretation of language is specifically relevant to the modelling of human dignity into 
the IPA model, and in determining modes of dignity violation in Chapter 8. Ludwig 
Wittgenstein’s interpretive method of considering words and concepts as being part of a 
particular family with certain ‘family resemblances’ will be utilized in considering the concept 
of human dignity and how it is violated, and then in the application with phenomenological 
analysis of sex worker narratives. For example, a family of words relating to the word 
‘violation’ might consist of ‘breach’, ‘diminishment’, ‘demeaning’ and so on. 
As such, in line with Leslie Meltzer Henry’s methods for formulating a model of dignity,30 the 
model produced for the purposes of this thesis will be neither reductionist, nor essentialist in 
its approach to the naturally ambiguous concept of human dignity. This will enable the model 
to be more fluid and non-permanent, allowing for diverse, context-specific applicability and 
flexibility when applied to complex sociological issues such as prostitution.  
Socio-legal research 
This section will set out the meanings of ‘socio-legal’ research, a term which is referred to 
throughout this thesis. The term ‘socio-legal’ is difficult to define. As the former director of 
Oxford University’s Socio-legal Centre stated; ‘[T]here is no agreed definition of socio-legal 
studies: some use the term broadly to cover the study of law in its social context… [or] to the 
study of the law and legal institutions from the perspectives of the social sciences’.31 For the 
                                                          
30 Leslie Meltzer Henry, ‘The Jurisprudence of Dignity’, (2011) 160(169) University of Pennsylvania Law Review 
169 
31 D Harris, ‘The Development of Socio-Legal Studies in the United Kingdom’ (1983) 2 Legal Studies 315 
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interrelation between sociology and law, which is too great a digression to be examined 
here, see Luhmann, who presents a thorough review of the classical underpinnings of the 
sociology of law.32 Alan Bradshaw provides a useful further description of socio legal 
research: 
Socio-legal research takes legal study outside the legal ‘office’, with office used broadly 
in its multiple senses. First, socio-legal research considers the law and the process of 
law (law-making, legal procedure) beyond legal texts – i.e. the socio-politico-economic 
considerations that surround and inform the enactment of laws, the operation of 
procedure, and the results of the passage and enforcement of laws. Second, in studying 
the context and results in law, socio-legal research moves beyond the academic, the 
judicial and the legislative office, chamber, library and committee room to gather data 
wherever appropriate to the problem. In summary, in both topic and locus of study, socio-
legal research moves beyond legal text to investigate law-in-society.33 
Firstly, sociology is defined in the Oxford English Dictionary as ‘the study of the 
development, structure and functioning of human society’. It might be proposed that an 
application of legal study to the sociological results in socio-legal study. It is perhaps, the 
study of law ‘in context’ – examining law as it sits within the society it regulates. In 
recognition of cultural relativism, socio-legal studies will differ dependent upon the society at 
the centre of the study.   
Socio-legal research explores the impact of the law in the social context. The social context 
is very important therefore to the research for this thesis. In the ensuing study, data is 
gathered from wherever appropriate to the issue, as Bradshaw provides above. Research 
will be conducted by means of an examination of existing literature, and documentary 
analysis of books, journal articles, case law, government reports, working papers and 
newspaper articles, websites and webpages. To summarise, therefore, in the ensuing piece 
of research, the reader will identify that the study considers how the law impacts upon, and 
how it might be beneficial towards, a sociological issue or issues. The conclusion to this 
thesis explains that there are further explorations to be made using the IPA model of dignity. 
 
 
 
                                                          
32 Niklas Luhmann, A Sociological Theory of Law (Routledge & Kegan Paul 1985) 9 
33 Alan Bradshaw, ‘Sense and Sensibility: Debates and Developments in Socio-Legal Research Methods’, in P 
Thomas (ed), Socio-Legal Studies (Dartmouth 1997) 99 
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Limitations of the Sociological Element 
In spite of the discussion above regarding socio-legal research, it is important to note that 
this study is not purely a sociological one. The key aims of this study are to consider a new 
legal approach to an existing sociological issue. As such, whilst prostitution is examined and 
the principal issues expounded, it is not the sole intention of this study to present a critical 
analysis of prostitution as a social issue, but to assess the prostitution encounter as a central 
issue of prostitution with the IPA dignity model and seek to provide an answer to the 
hypothesis. This study is one of inter alia jurisprudence, exploring the sociological issues 
through a ‘natural law’ lens. Also, the study will not extend to pure psychological, 
anthropological or criminological analysis, because to do so would be too great a task for 
one thesis to adequately and efficiently address.  
 
Comparative Studies 
The study considers various legal models of dignity developed by scholars of US 
constitutional law. This decision is made on the basis that, at the time of conducting research 
for this thesis, these were the prominent legal models of dignity in the literature. Also, in part 
4 of the thesis, occasional reference is made to a Canadian constitutional case which 
considered the laws surrounding prohibition of prostitution or ancillary acts.34 The United 
States and Canada are both common law jurisdictions with similar ‘juristic styles’ to England 
and Wales.35 In order to classify a legal system, Zweigert and Kotz recommend that a 
number of considerations should be made.36 Firstly, the historical background and 
development of the system is important. The US, Canada and England and Wales share 
common law jurisdictional legal systems, ‘wherein a large body of rules founded on an 
unwritten customary law evolved and developed throughout the centuries with pragmatism, 
strong monarchs, and unwritten constitution and centralised courts being [their] typical 
features’.37 These jurisdictions also share characteristic (typical) modes of thought; 
‘Common lawyers think in terms of the parties and their particular legal relationship’.38 
All three share distinctive institutions, with parliamentary institutions, appeal court systems 
and a supreme court of appeal. Also they share types of legal sources and treatment 
                                                          
34 Bedford v Canada (Attorney General) [2010] ONSC 4264 (Ontario Superior Court of Justice) 
35 Konrad Zweigert, Hein Kötz, An Introduction to Comparative Law (North Holland 1997) 
36 As quoted in Peter De Cruz, Comparative Law in a Changing World (3rd edn Routledge-Cavendish 2007) 38 
37 Ibid 
38 Ibid 38-39 
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thereof. They share similar ideology; for example, in respect of human rights, the Canadian 
Charter of Fundamental Freedoms is akin to the Human Rights Act 1998 of England and 
Wales. Therefore, in acknowledgement of the comparisons between England and Wales, the 
US and Canada as democratic societies sharing common law jurisdictions, and law reporting 
conventions, there appears to be no clear reason why these cannot reasonably be 
compared.39  
 
Documentary Analysis 
When analysing documents, Denscombe suggests that four criteria are used to evaluate the 
documents reviewed. I have included Denscombe’s suggested criteria verbatim, as follows: 
i. Authenticity 
Test the authenticity of the document – is it genuine? Has it been forged etc.? 
ii. Representativeness 
 
Is the document typical of its type? Does it represent a typical instance of the 
thing it portrays? Is the document complete? Has it been edited? Is the 
extract treated ‘in context’? 
 
iii. Meaning 
Is the meaning of the words clear and unambiguous? Are there hidden 
meanings? Does the document contain argot and subtle codes? Are there 
meanings which involve ‘what’s left unsaid’ or ‘reading between the lines’? 
iv. Credibility 
Is it accurate? Is it free from bias and errors? This will depend on factors like:  
 What purpose was the document written for? 
 Who produced the document? What was the status of the author and 
did he or she have a particular belief or persuasion that would colour 
the version of things? 
 If it reports on events, was it a first-hand report directly witnessed by 
the author? How long after the event was the document written? 
                                                          
39 Save for obvious differences, such as federal governance in the US and Canada, which will be identified if and 
when necessary. 
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 When was the document produced? In what social context and 
climate?40 
 
Types of Document 
It is now necessary to consider the types of documentary evidence used in this thesis, with 
reference to these suggested criteria. 
 
Books – 
In the sociological aspect of the thesis, a number of seminal sources have been chosen to 
provide narratives from former and current (at the time of the source’s production) sex 
workers and clients. The account sources are predominantly books containing collections of 
accounts, gathered through empirical research. Any known bias is highlighted, but as a 
general point, much of the narrative data is produced by female sex workers who profess to 
have feminist viewpoints. There is a mix of eras, geographical sources and known bias. The 
eras and decades are not imperative to the proving or disproving of the thesis, but drawing 
attention to them will enable the reader to take into account relevant socio-political factors at 
the time and in the place the sex worker was working.  
 
Journal articles - 
Typically, journal articles will have been peer reviewed prior to entry into the official journal, 
and therefore, their authenticity will be less challengeable. Equally, the representativeness of 
journal articles will not likely be in issue. Where an article has been edited, reference is 
made in the citation to the document. There are three main types of article used; legal, 
philosophical and sociological articles. Legal articles are least likely to have hidden 
meanings, codes or ambiguity in the form of the document. Legal scholarship is principally 
concerned with the interpretation of language, yet legal articles imply and seek legal 
certainty, since the discipline of legal writing is consistent with certainty and concise writing.  
Philosophical articles are much harder to categorize as such and must be judged on an 
individual basis under stricter scrutiny, since the nature of philosophical theory is that there 
are few boundaries, and multiple interpretations. Sociological articles used in this study are 
                                                          
40 Taken from Martin Denscombe The Good Research Guide (5th edn Open University Press 2014) 221-222 
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frequently a combination of quantitative and qualitative research, with much empirical data 
used and interpreted within.  
The authenticity of all articles is verified by obtaining all articles through established 
databases such as Sage, Taylor Francis, Westlaw and Lexislibrary, all of which scrutinize 
their own content before it is available publicly or to subscribers. With sociological articles, 
meaning is more certain, and less ambiguous. Feminist sociological/legal articles are clearly 
based in feminist epistemology, and are overtly or subtly so. In evaluation of articles, where 
they may be weighted towards a feminist epistemology, I account for this. 
In judging the credibility of articles of the type I review, context is very important. No article 
should be read out of context, and my suggestion is that context consists of: the time/age in 
which it was written; the state it/its writer originates from; the prevailing political climate; 
recent major historic and legal events (i.e. 9/11; abolition of homosexuality prohibition etc.). 
Therefore each article is reviewed having had regard to the criteria stated. 
 
Case Law and Legislation 
Case-law and legislation was researched using a combination of online legal databases, but 
predominantly using Westlaw, Lexis Library and the European Court of Human Rights’ own 
database; HUDOC41.  
 
Working Papers and Theses- 
Working papers and theses are more problematic in that they have not been peer-reviewed 
and so are open to scrutiny. Where reference is made to working papers or theses 
throughout this study, appropriate weight should be given to the evidential value of those 
documents. Working papers and theses will not form the sole basis of any substantive 
assertions made, unless they can be verified with further documentary evidence. Meaning is 
generally unambiguous because working papers tend to be in plain terminology, with a 
degree of certainty and clarity. As stated, context is very important in the review of working 
papers, particularly the state/s from which the work was/is being generated. 
 
 
                                                          
41 http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/Pages/search.aspx# accessed on 9th, 10th and 11th September 2013 
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Interviews 
Interviews have not been carried out specifically for this study, for two reasons: firstly 
because they have been deemed unnecessary for the purposes of this particular thesis, 
since recent, existing information is readily available. Secondly, interviewing sex workers in 
the course of their work raises ethical issues that are difficult to overcome. Also, being a lone 
male researcher, with no social work experience would have exacerbated these difficulties. 
This type of research extends beyond the author’s academic field of knowledge and range of 
skills.42 
Therefore, the decision was made to rule out conducting interviews with sex workers or 
clients of prostitution. This decision is not ultimately problematic for the authority of this 
study. Given that ample material is available from existing research, the study derives from a 
range of, as far as is possible, objectively obtained and focused material from experts in the 
sociological/criminological field of prostitution and narratives from sex workers. The material 
used is located in accordance with the methodological and ethical issues described above, 
and has been obtained through secure and reliable methods by professionals in the field. In 
the same vein, existing research data that is used for the narratives in Chapter 13 has been 
peer reviewed, unlike any interviews that would be conducted ‘afresh’ for this individual 
study. This adds to the evidential weight that can be attached to the narratives used. 
  
Doctrinal Method 
Very little of this study will incorporate a doctrinal, or ‘black letter’ method that traditional 
legal studies might use. Such an approach reviews the law by its letter, and its interpretation. 
It is a very traditional legal methodology. Morris and Murphy provide that ‘it does not 
subscribe to any overarching theoretical perspective, nor does it concern itself with policy 
interests. Instead…[it] focuses almost entirely on law’s own language of statutes and case 
law to make sense of the legal world.’43 In places, the doctrinal method will be loosely 
utilized to explore inter alia, the case law of the ECHR with respect to cases dealing with 
inhuman and degrading treatment under Article 3 ECHR and the protection of the right to a 
private and family life under Article 8 ECHR. 
 
                                                          
42 It is not reasonable to have acquired social work skills such as interviewing sensitive and vulnerable persons 
for the purposes of this research. Ethically, this would have been unsound. 
43 Caroline Morris, Cian Murphy, Getting a PhD in Law (Hart 2011) 30,31 
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Charts 
In some chapters, charts will be used to illustrate the relevant claims in the substantive 
thesis. Pie charts and bar charts will be used to this end. The use of charts will not be prolific 
in the study, but only used where appropriate to visually demonstrate a point or idea.  
This chapter has so far considered the core methodological issues, and defined the scope of 
the thesis. The next section of this chapter explores the methods specifically used to study 
the sociology of prostitution.  
 
Methods Used In the Study of the Sociology of Prostitution 
The sociology of prostitution is complex and multi-faceted. Alternative approaches might be 
based in criminology or in anthropology, as two examples.44 It should be noted that, at the 
time of writing, most sociological studies are qualitative, based upon empirical data, usually 
comprising interviews with sex workers and/or clients. Since this is a similarly qualitative, yet 
predominantly legal approach to prostitution, it is important to recognise and account for the 
fact that law as an academic discipline struggles to deal with the intricacies of sex work, 
migration and exploitation.45 Even so, perhaps the favoured approach to a socio-legal study 
of prostitution is to avoid the temptation to try to ‘solve’ prostitution and its associated issues. 
This approach towards prostitution in this thesis is theoretical, but relevant, as mentioned in 
the introduction chapter.  
The choice of approach is important and the methods by which it is studied need to be 
ascertained. As such, we now turn to consider the methods that will be used in this thesis to:  
1) examine prostitution; 
2) examine accounts from sex workers, and; 
3) consider the ancillary problem of sex trafficking and its relationship with prostitution  
It is imperative to addressing the hypotheses in this study, that the reader understands the 
lens through which prostitution, as a key issue under examination in this thesis is viewed by 
the author. Since the author’s expertise is situated within law and legal practice, and not in 
sociology, it has been necessary to study prostitution and the methods sociologists use to 
                                                          
44 An example of alternative area of academic interest regarding prostitution is Michel Foucault’s focus on 
sexuality and power in society. This thesis however, does not focus specifically on sexuality and power, or 
sexuality and society, as per Foucault’s main areas of concern. For more information to that end, see Michael 
Foucault, ‘The Subject and Power’ (1982) 8(4) Critical Inquiry 777 
45 See Chapter 11  
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study it. This has led to a decision to consider prostitution, as mentioned, from the GMV 
model perspective.46 
 
Motivations for Study and Research Topic Choice 
In social science research, in particular, it is important that critical consideration is given to 
the researcher’s background, and purposes or motivations for the study conducted, in order 
to understand the epistemological framework of the research. The initial motivation for this 
study was centred on sex trafficking, particularly in women and children. Following a review 
of the literature in this area, it became evident that it would be very difficult to locate a gap in 
the knowledge, suitable to the author’s skill areas. As research into the area of sex trafficking 
continued, the socio-legal status of prostitution was further explored, and the issue of dignity 
and rights within prostitution from a legal perspective was deemed to be an important area 
upon which knowledge could be expanded. 
Whilst they are debated, the links between prostitution and sex trafficking are highly likely, 
and demonstrable in some recent studies.47 It will be borne in mind that prostitution can be 
voluntary or forced through some explicit or implicit means, such as financial need. Although 
this study does not seek to prove or disprove such links; its focus is to engage with 
prostitution via-a-vis the prostitution encounter, and have regard to its impact on the 
individual human dignity and rights of the sex worker.    
As a result of this research, and to be in keeping with the standards set out in international 
law and a fortiori into domestic legislation protecting the rights of individuals, UK policy might 
be geared around educational and other changes to the legality of prostitution. Many efforts 
on a variety of legal and charitable fronts are currently being made to end the abuse of 
women and children trafficked into prostitution, with Parliament considering, and enacting 
specific legislation to combat trafficking, in 2015 with the Modern Slavery Act.48  
 
Legal Definitions of Prostitution 
For the sake of brevity and to limit the scope of the study, definitions of what constitutes 
‘prostitution’ and how it and the sex worker are defined in the common law and in statute will 
                                                          
46 This is explained in further detail in Chapter 11. 
47 See Cho, Seo Young, Axel Dreher, Eric Neumayer, ‘Does Legalized Prostitution Increase Human Trafficking? 
(2013) 41 World Development 67 
48 Modern Slavery Act 2015 
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be restricted to the twentieth century onwards. As such, the earliest case that considers 
prostitution and defines it is given in a 1918 case, R v De Munck.49  
 
Feminist Theory in Prostitution and Pornography 
The principal debate in feminist thought that alludes to prostitution and pornography, is 
contained in the issues of gender and sexuality, in sexual politics and male dominance 
narratives, and objectification theory.  Save that the GMV model is inherently based in 
feminist theory, and straddles the line between abolitionism and pro-sex work, this thesis 
does not explicitly adopt a feminist epistemology. It does, however, recognise that the issues 
that are explored in the instant study are, at least in part situated within modern and historic 
feminist thought. As such, some references will be made to feminist theory where 
appropriate, whilst no explicit examination or application of feminist theory or feminist legal 
theory will be made.  
 
Terminology 
This section clearly dictates the terminology that will be used throughout the study. There is 
firstly an important assertion observed in this thesis, that prostitution and sex work are not 
necessarily one and the same thing. As stated when referring to the GMV model and 
feminist debates in prostitution, the term ‘sex work’ has some alignment with pro-prostitution 
lobby groups, and as such is not entirely objective. Conversely, prostitution is 
uncontroversial as a term to describe the vocation of sex workers and the sale of sexual 
services. In this thesis, the vocation of selling sexual services will be referred to in the main 
as ‘prostitution’, or as ‘sex work’ only where discussion relates to that context of prostitution. 
The specific central exchange of sexual services between sex worker and client will be 
referred to throughout as the ‘prostitution encounter’. 
Care must be taken to acknowledge the diversity of the experiences of those selling sexual 
services, and for some, their trade is sexual services, and they make a free choice, under no 
coercion to do so. In this light, it is here asserted that the use of the term ‘prostitute’ is highly 
stigmatised and morally charged. Since this study intends to move beyond a traditional 
moral-legal approach to prostitution, those who sell sexual services will be referred to as ‘sex 
                                                          
49 [1918] 1 KB 635 
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worker’, rather than ‘prostitute’, with the caveat that there are points in the thesis where the 
term ‘prostitute’ is used in context.50  
As this is a study focused upon female prostitution, the female gender will be used for the 
sex worker; i.e. ‘her’, ‘she’ etc. Those who purchase sexual services will be referred to as 
‘the client’ and will be referred to in the male gender; ‘he’, ‘his’ etc.51  
 
Modes of Dignity Violation  
As mentioned, the study will explore a number of different modes of dignity violation.52 This 
classification is unique to this study, and, coupled with IPA dignity, adds to this study’s 
original contribution to knowledge. Included in this will be Martha Nussbaum’s taxonomy of 
objectification which is arguably to be found in relation to the Gender and Male Violence 
explanatory model.53 Nick Haslam also positively refers to Nussbaum’s taxonomy of 
objectification in his key article on dehumanization which serves to support the use of the 
taxonomy of objectification coupled with Haslam’s two measures of dehumanization (UH and 
HN) in identifying the diminishing of dignity.54 Following phenomenological analysis of sex 
worker narratives, respective modes of dignity violation are identified, and this will lead to an 
indication as to any violation of human dignity that the prostitution encounter causes.  
 
Analysis of the Sex Worker 
Before we begin to study prostitution, it is important to understand issues raised by those 
with significant experience in sex work research, relating to the ethically challenging nature 
of this type of research. In their joint article on ethical dilemmas in sex work research, 
Stephanie Wahab and Lacey Sloan indicate several areas of concern:  
a) Population and samples chosen for research; and dangers of non-random sampling 
methods, including a focus on street-work prostitution over other, high end escort 
work;  
                                                          
50 Or in quotes from other material, for example. 
51 Some academics, such as Monto refer to the client as ‘the customer’; i.e. Martin Monto, ‘Female Prostitution, 
Customers, and Violence’ (2004) 10 Violence Against Women 160 
52 A full explication of this concept is set out in Chapter 8 
53 Martha Nussbaum, ‘Objectification’ (1995) 24(4) Philosophy & Public Affairs 249 
54 Nick Haslam, ‘Dehumanization: An Integrative Review’ (2006) 10(3) Personality and Social Psychology Review 
252 
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b) Class discrimination; focusing on street-level work, conducted by generally middle-
class social researchers and ignoring escort and high end prostitution causes a so-
called ‘studying down’ phenomenon; 
c) Gender discrimination; Making male and transgendered sex workers ‘invisible’ and 
generating the image that female sex workers are ‘the problem’; 
d) Theoretical bias; portrayal of sex workers as victims, promoting the notion that all sex 
workers require therapeutic intervention as a result of their involvement in the sex 
industry, obscuring issues of agency and free will, and sex work as legitimate work. 
e) Relationship to research participants; objective observers becoming solely 
responsible for defining the realities of those being studied, which in turn denies sex 
workers the right to be experts in their own lives. Detachment between researcher 
and research subject breeds negation of the sex worker’s take on the issues subject 
to research.55 
 
The recommendations of that article for sex work research are particularly useful for first-
time sex work researchers to consider before undertaking any face-to-face research. They 
recommend that56: 
1) Researchers must collaborate with the sex workers they seek to study – all aspects 
of the study design, theoretical framework, methods and dissemination should be 
shared; 
2) Researchers should be aware of social, political, economic and personal power 
issues, and seek to equalise power relationships with the sex workers they study. 
Due deference should be accorded to sex workers’ own expertise in this field for 
example; 
3) Researchers must bring the results back to the sex workers they study to ensure that 
the researcher’s interpretation of the data is accurate; 
4) Sex workers and sex work organisations are encouraged to hire their own 
researchers and initiate research themselves.57 
 
                                                          
55 Stephanie Wahab, Lacey Sloan, ‘Ethical Dilemmas in Sex Work Research’ (2004) 7 Research for Sex Work 3 
56 Ibid 5 
57 For example, see Carol Jenkins, ‘Cambodian Sex Workers Conduct Their Own Research’ (2005) 8 Research 
for Sex Work 3 
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Whilst in this study no face-to-face interviews will take place, it is important to consider that 
material gathered should satisfy ethical considerations, in the same manner as if the 
research was directly extracted by the author. Care has been taken not to identify only with 
one market of prostitution, particularly as street work is the most likely to be encapsulated in 
research about violence in prostitution.58 The existing data used is sourced from well-
renowned researchers, who are academically recognised for their adherence to the ethical 
criteria set out above.  
 
The Client 
There will be some limited mention of the issues faced by clients in prostitution, in order to 
give a reasonably balanced understanding of the prostitution encounter. The data from 
clients is sparser than that concerning the sex worker. Also, as the literature indicates, 
reliability is at issue often because clients are secretive and at times, uncooperative in 
providing accounts of their experiences of prostitution.59 The focus of most studies of the 
client centres on several key factors, as identified by academics in this field, such as 
ethnography, studies of attitudes and behaviours as well as philosophical/psychological 
studies. 
The key reference for this data is Teela Sanders 2008 work, an empirical study of 50 
interviews with male clients, 37 face-to-face and 13 telephone interviews.60 This section 
refers to the results of this study, and therefore is restricted to the methodological restrictions 
therein. It is not intended that this section be exhaustive of the issues associated with all 
clients of all backgrounds, and no assertion is so made. 
 
Methods Specific to the Application 
Sex Worker Narratives 
The study will rely upon narratives taken directly from sex workers who were interviewed 
about their experiences of the prostitution encounter and violence in prostitution. As 
previously stated, consideration was given to conducting interviews and/or questionnaires of 
current or former sex workers. The potential benefits to this research versus the ethical 
risks/harms were considered. This type of data collection was precluded on the grounds that 
                                                          
58 This will be clearer later on in the review of the sociology of prostitution, Chapter 11 
59 I.e. Teela Sanders, Paying for Pleasure: Men who Buy Sex (Willan 2008) 
60 Ibid 
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the data that would be gained from conducting interviews or questionnaires with current and 
former sex workers would be of no greater evidential value or quality than that which is 
presently available, save that appropriate weight must be accorded to material found in 
mainstream published works, media sources etc. Empirical data obtained through ethically 
sound methods, by skilled social workers has been favoured in this study.61 It is intended 
that other scholars may take the models used in this thesis to expand on the area of human 
dignity research in prostitution, and also into other key areas of sociological interest. 
 
How is the Material Selected from the Literature? 
Appendix B sets out a table which outlines the sources of narratives. Where narratives are 
taken from empirical studies, drawn predominantly from interview-focused evidence 
gathering, and in order to provide the maximum feasible accuracy and evidential soundness, 
a number of decisions are made and justified regarding the choice of material for this 
analysis. 
It is important to select narratives which represent as expansive a selection of viewpoints as 
is possible from the range of materials chosen within the substantive literature. An important 
classification of the literature is that work which could be objectively claimed to reside within 
the GMV model would be used exclusively to provide narratives.62 It was also important to 
consider that all ‘markets’ of prostitution could be included, and so accounts ranging from 
street prostitutes, through to brothel workers and to escort workers are utilised, thus 
reflecting the range of safe practice, money earned, quality of work, clients etc. It is also vital 
that those who openly object to sex work are balanced with those who oppose that view.63 
All the sources used share common themes of analysis, including the health and wellbeing 
of those interviewed, but most importantly all consider the sale of sexual services at the 
heart of prostitution. The texts adopted are from both poles of the GMV scale; some are 
overtly abolitionist, and others are pro-sex work in their general ethos. 
As with comparative legal studies, judging from ‘when’ in time accounts should be taken is 
important. Issues that will have a potential influence on accounts will be; the legislative 
                                                          
61 And, as mentioned above, peer reviewed studies are essentially more reliable. 
62 This is in keeping with the methodological scope of the work, to consider prostitution from the GMV 
perspective. 
63 As is explained more fully in Chapter 11, the GMV model encompasses two central positions, one for 
prostitution as legitimate trade and a recognition of the rights of women to sell sex, and an opposing ‘abolitionist’ 
position, which postulates prostitution as ‘violence against women’. The GMV model allows both viewpoints, and 
this makes it an objectively more balanced approach.  
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‘climate’ relevant to prostitution at the time of the experiences reflected upon; the 
government in place at the time and its social policies on prostitution; the media’s portrayal 
of sex work; education and social research in sex work at the time, and so on. It is perhaps 
impossible to account for all potential material influences upon the experiences of sex 
workers in a given place and era, but attempts must be made to mitigate any clear and 
obvious factors that may have influenced those experiences which are then used to assess 
modes of dignity violation and subsequent conclusions as to dignity violation. The narratives 
are drawn collectively from data collected between the early 1980s and 2000. 
It will be of equal importance where the events catalogued have taken place. Narratives will 
largely originate from the United Kingdom where possible, to reflect the author’s 
geographical sphere of socio/political and legal knowledge, but there will be accounts and 
material also from the USA and Canada.64 The choice of narratives against which analysis of 
the concepts of objectification and dehumanization can be made is crucial. This will 
unavoidably be an assessment of mine, based upon interpretations in phenomenological 
analysis as to any perceivable objectification and dehumanization, or other modes of dignity 
violation found therein. 
After screening the material via the stages above, the material is summarised with any 
pertinent points highlighted in the literature review. The focus of analysis will be on 
narratives which suggest modes of dignity violation, according to those expounded in 
Chapter 8. The various modes of dignity violation will be related to these narratives, and the 
reader can observe and reflect upon the accounts given, to provide a considered opinion on 
the nature of the experiences reviewed. Once this has been completed, the violation of 
human dignity can be identified.  
Having given consideration to the above in selecting the material that the narratives will be 
taken from, certain texts will be used to provide narratives, which are seminal, GMV oriented 
works based upon empirical research.65 See Appendix C which sets out in further detail the 
dataset for the narratives used. 
 
 
                                                          
64 Because some sources provide accounts from these jurisdictions. These are common law jurisdictions, also.  
65 Cecile Høigård, Liv Finstad, Backstreets: Prostitution, Money and Love (Cambridge: Polity 1992); Joanna 
Phoenix, Making Sense of Prostitution (Palgrave 1999); Karen Sharpe, Red Light, Blue Light: Prostitutes, punters 
and the police (Ashgate1998); Eileen McLeod, Women Working: Prostitution Now (London: Croom Helm 1982); 
Frédérique Delacoste, Priscilla Alexander, (eds), Sex Work: Writings by Women in the Sex Industry (2nd edn 
Cleiss Press1998) Claude Jaget (ed) Prostitutes, our life (Bristol: Falling Wall Press 1980) 
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Prostitution Encounter or Prostitution Vocation Narratives? 
In the texts adopted as sources of narratives, there are essentially two types of narrative 
discernible from the chapter structure.66 Some narratives relate to the sex worker’s 
experience of working as a prostitute, which includes issues that are ancillary to the sale of 
sex, (i.e. health concerns, issues of pimps, making money, market-specific issues). These 
narratives are hereafter termed as Prostitution Vocation narratives (PV). This study is 
concerned however with the alternate type of narrative, which describes the sex worker’s 
experience of the Prostitution Encounter, and these ‘PE’ narratives are used to address the 
hypothesis. Why, then, are the PV narratives not used? It is the purpose of this study to 
interrogate dignity violation in prostitution, but specifically in the core aspect of prostitution, 
that being the sale of sexual services.67  
Owing to this distinction in the material used, the analysis in Chapter 13 only considers 
modes of dignity violation as recognised within the prostitution encounter, on behalf of the 
sex worker. It does not consider some other key factors in the prostitution vocation, such as 
the general and sexual health and wellbeing, or labour rights of sex workers.68 Of course, 
there are very important considerations to be made in relation to these other issues in 
prostitution. Within this area, we find, inter alia, the emotional integrity and psychological 
welfare of the sex worker as an important consideration in any discussion on human dignity, 
an example of which is research which explores bodily dissociation in the sex worker.69 
Teela Sanders identifies strategies to manage emotions in sex work. She says that:  
In the context of prostitution, emotion work is carried out on feelings in private. Women 
work on their internal feelings to separate, change and revise one set of feelings that 
are appropriate during sex work while reserving another set of emotions or feelings for 
private interactions.70 
 
 
                                                          
66 Sections relevant to the sale of sexual services and experiences pertaining thereto were reviewed for 
narratives. 
67 It is clear from the ‘Honeyball’ report mentioned in the Introduction, that the fundamental issue in public policy 
on prostitution is the sale of sexual services, and this emphasis is followed in this study in its analysis of dignity 
violation in the prostitution encounter.  
68 It is hoped that this research will lead into further applications of IPA to these ancillary areas of the prostitution 
vocation.  
69 This is frequently addressed in the literature. Numerous examples can be found of comments relating to bodily 
dissociation, i.e. ‘…this body isn’t the same body – the one the client gets isn’t the real one, it’s not mine…’ C 
Jaget, Prostitutes – Our Life (Bristol: Falling Wall Press 1980) 151, quoted in Høigård & Finstad (Polity 1992) 63 
70 Teela Sanders, ‘”It’s Just Acting”: Sex Workers’ Strategies for Capitalizing on Sexuality’ (2005) 12(4) Gender, 
Work and Organization 2005, 325 
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The Use of Phenomenology as a Method to Study Sex Worker Narratives 
Phenomenological studies place particular emphasis on individuals’ views and personal 
experiences.71 To study phenomenology is to study the experience of a person, and the 
meanings the persons ascribes to their experience/s. Denscombe describes the method as 
an appropriate method to understand how something is experienced.72 Since this is a study 
of human dignity vis-a-vis prostitution, the thoughts, emotions and experiences of human 
beings are essential to it. In keeping with this as a socio-legal study, a phenomenological 
approach will be used to examine narratives of sex workers within the context of the 
prostitution vocation.  
By using this approach, the study will demonstrate how, through the narratives of those 
involved in prostitution, modes of dignity violation occur which indicate the violation of IPA 
dignity. It is essential to observe the task of the phenomenologist, which, as stated by 
Denscombe is: ‘…to present the experiences in a way that is faithful to the original….to 
provide a description of matters that adequately portrays how the group in question 
experiences the situation’.73 In considering the narratives that follow, we must remain true to 
the text of the narrative, exploring meaning and allowing for the nuances of subjectivity 
therein.  
Specifically, the study will incorporate the North American school of phenomenology, of 
Alfred Shutz,74 which is concerned with the ways people interpret social phenomena.75 In the 
application chapter of this study, how sex workers interpret the prostitution encounter will be 
essential to understanding whether human dignity is likely to have been violated by any 
identifiable modes of dignity violation. Dignity violation will be indicated precisely by this 
analysis of the experiences of the sex worker, taken from the narratives. 
A phenomenological method is appropriate in qualitative social science research to explore 
how people experience certain phenomena. In this study, the phenomenon is the prostitution 
encounter for the sex worker. In the encounter on behalf of the sex worker, issues will be 
apparent from the narratives. Using the phenomenological method, the application chapter 
will analyse narratives from the sex worker to address the hypothesis. The IPA model of 
dignity will be utilised to determine the answer to that central hypothesis question. Therefore, 
                                                          
71 Martin Denscombe The Good Research Guide (4th edn Open University Press 2010) 94 
72 Ibid 
73 Ibid 95 
74 Alfred Shutz, The Phenomenology of the Social World (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press 1967)  
75 Martin Denscombe The Good Research Guide (5th edn Open University Press 2014)101 
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in the narratives that follow, attention is particularly paid to experiences that suggest violation 
of human dignity through the modes of dignity violation as expounded.  
Firstly, the narrative is set out that presents an experience of the sex worker, and then the 
experience is analysed to identify language which points toward dignity violation. Respective 
modes are identified, and related to IPA dignity. This leads to an indication as to violation of 
IPA dignity.  
 
Summary and Next Chapter 
This chapter set out the methodology, scope and objectives of the study. It presented the 
general methods used, and those used in the sociological aspect of the research. It 
considered ethical issues in sex worker research, and important concerns therein. There 
was a discussion about the knowledge gap, and the substantial contribution to knowledge 
that this study makes. The concept of ‘modes of dignity violation’, which, like IPA, is original 
to this study, was introduced.  
As this chapter has established, this will be a mixed-methods socio-legal study. The thesis is 
divided hereafter into three further parts. The next, part 2 explores the core themes of 
human dignity, the violation of dignity and outlines the different approaches to the subject 
before constructing the descriptive IPA model of dignity. Part 3 addresses the need for a 
normative framework for IPA in order for it to be applied to address the hypothesis, and 
presents the work of John Finnis, vis-à-vis practical reasonableness. Part 4 thereafter 
explores the sociology of prostitution, which will be represented in as much detail as is 
necessary in order to present the predominant issues and locate the key issues for analysis 
in the GMV model, and ends with the application and conclusion to this work.  
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PART TWO 
3. CORE THEMES OF HUMAN DIGNITY 
 
This chapter initiates part 2 of the thesis, the purpose of which is to introduce human dignity, 
and explicate its different descriptive interpretations, leading to the construction of the IPA 
model. The purpose of this chapter is to discover human dignity in the literature, and identify 
what will be termed the core themes of dignity in quasi-legal academic disciplines, and 
explain the method through which these themes are deduced. The chapter will lead from 
these themes of human dignity, into the next chapter, which focuses on the concept of 
dignity in international human rights law. The process and ultimate purpose of part 2 will be, 
therefore, a refining of human dignity from the central themes in the literature to three 
elements in a legal model of dignity which has relevance for addressing prostitution.   
 
 
Introducing Human Dignity 
 
The invocation of the term ‘dignity’ may be tantamount to speaking of important human 
values or human nature itself. The word dignity, in a personal sphere is synonymous with 
self-respect, self-worth and pride. It can also relate to royalty, nobility, decorum and 
grandeur.76 Historically, some concepts date back to early Greek philosophy.77 The modern 
English word ‘Dignity’ derives from the Latin dignitas, which referred to honourable status in 
the ancient Roman world.78 In Roman history, dignitas was accrued by those with social 
status, as opposed to an inherent concept, possessed by all. Dignity can be communitarian 
or it can be individualistic.79 So, as a concept it has very ancient roots and is well 
established, and, given its roots, one might consider there to be little controversy over its 
                                                          
76 McCrudden C, ‘Human dignity and judicial interpretation of human rights’ (2008) 19(4) European Journal of 
International Law 655 
 
77 As will be seen in Chapter 6, Leslie Henry identifies this type as ‘personal integrity as dignity’ in her work; L 
Henry, ‘The Jurisprudence of Dignity’, (2011) 160(169) University of Pennsylvania Law Review 169 
 
78 I.e. Jürgen Habermas, ‘The Concept Of Human Dignity And The Realistic Utopia Of Human Rights’ (2010) 
41(4) Metaphilosophy 464, 474; McCrudden C, ‘Human dignity and judicial interpretation of human rights’ (2008) 
19(4) European Journal of International Law 655 
 
79 For example, Kantian dignity, as mentioned here, is arguably individualistic, whereas the Jewish Kavod is 
probably more aligned with a communitarian idea of dignity, since the Jewish Torah and Christian Bible both 
present a relationship and rules between God and the people of Israel as a community or nation. See the books 
of Genesis and Exodus which describe this relationship in detail. In the main, this study concentrates on the latter 
type of human dignity, and certainly IPA dignity is an individualistic notion. 
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cross-disciplinary academic use. But dignity more recently comes under fire from a number 
of scholars as being ‘squishy’ and ‘subjective’ and ‘hardly up to the heavyweight moral 
demands assigned to it’,80 indeterminate,81 ‘hopelessly vague’82 or a restatement of the right 
to autonomy.83 It is a subject that might be called kitsch, or sentimental.84 It is also apparent 
that it is not merely one uniform concept, but a number of separate ideals which rest under 
one heading. 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to identify core themes human dignity. There are many 
disciplines to choose from, but as this study is a legal one, this review concentrates on 
certain concepts evident from seminal texts on quasi-legal applications of dignity.85 In 
determining the broad themes of dignity, we are assisted by an inductive analysis of dignity 
suggested by Dietrich Ritschl, which breaks human dignity up into four specific notions, and 
introduces the idea of dignity as a ‘frame-concept’. Dietrich Ritschl proposes that dignity is a 
‘frame-concept’, and as such it ‘embraces sub-concepts which may or may not always be 
part of what is meant when the term is used’.86 He describes four notions of human dignity 
as it might be applied within ethical maxims.  
 
The analysis draws comparisons between legal and associated study areas by theologians 
and lawyers, observing the similarity of approaches to understanding concepts like dignity. 
Ritschl states that lawyers and theologians understand concepts like dignity in similar ways; 
‘…they work with given texts to which they ascribe certain degrees of normativity…they both 
                                                          
80 Steven Pinker, ‘The Stupidity of Dignity’ (2008) May 12 2008 The Richard Dawkins Foundation for Reason and 
Science http://richarddawkins.net/article,2567,The –Stupidity-of-Dignity, Steven-Pinker, 1 
81 T Khaitan, ‘Dignity as an Expressive Norm: Neither Vacuous Nor a Panacea’ (2012) 32(1) Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies 1, 1 
82 R Macklin, ‘Dignity is a useless concept’ (2003) 327 British Medical Journal 1419, 1420 
83 Ibid 1419 
84 Avishai Margalit, ‘Human Dignity between the Kitsch and Deification’ (2004-5) Essay given at Litowitz Lecture, 
Yale University October 14th 2004 
85 Texts include Deryck Beyleveld, Roger Brownsword, Human Dignity in Bioethics and Biolaw (OUP 2001) which 
examines bioethical and legal applications of dignity; David Kretzmer, Eckart Klein (eds), The Concept of Human 
Dignity in Human Rights Discourse (The Hague: Kluwer Law International 2002) presenting theistic and legal 
perspectives on human dignity and its position in human rights law; Patrick Capps, Human Dignity and the 
Foundations of International Law (Hart: Oxford and Portland, Oregon 2009), which considers dignity in 
international law and legal theory, as well as concepts of morality, such as practical reasonableness, which ties 
with some reference to the work of John Finnis in this study, see John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights 
(OUP 1980); Christopher McCrudden, ‘Human dignity and judicial interpretation of human rights’ (2008) 19(4) 
European Journal of International Law 655 which presents a legal and historical account of human dignity. 
McCrudden makes reference to Kretzmer and Klein in this article.  
 
86 D Ritschl, ‘Can ethical maxims be derived from theological concepts of human dignity?’, In David Kretzmer, 
Eckart Klein (eds), The Concept of Human Dignity in Human Rights Discourse (The Hague: Kluwer Law 
International 2002) 87ff 
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work with concepts, clusters of concepts and theories.’87 As such, he highlights a possible 
flaw in the approach used by lawyers when attempting to make sense of human dignity, that 
by its very nature, it is in his opinion impossible to quantify. In fact, Ritschl presents a strong 
argument against attempting to model dignity on this basis,88 and if dignity is to be measured 
at all, it should only be measured by impartation; i.e. the way people treat others imparts in 
them human dignity, a suggestion that is not unique to Ritschl.89  
 
Ritschl’s assertion is that the concept of human dignity is derived from inductive, as opposed 
to deductive reasoning.90 Thus, the notions of dignity he sets out within the frame-concept 
are used to provide an account of dignity generally.91 In the same way, this chapter reviews 
some of the key literature on dignity and determines what dignity ‘is’ utilising an inductive 
method of reasoning. Therefore, from the literature, there are two recurring themes in 
respect of dignity, and through the lens of these, dignity is construed. These themes are, 
firstly, dignity is inherent to all humanity; and secondly, dignity is related to, and at times 
conflated with autonomy. Before we explore these, the next section briefly summarises some 
major and minor themes of dignity in the literature. 
 
 
Ancillary Themes of Dignity 
 
Firstly, and as will be demonstrated in others’ concepts of dignity expressed further on, the 
notion of inherent dignity is possibly the most widely held and broadly accepted of all 
concepts of dignity. This is in secular as well as theological thought.92 The idea of dignity as 
                                                          
87 Ritschl Ibid at 88. This link between the legal and theological reasoning is helpful in that it draws a link between 
the theistic understandings of dignity, as will shortly be considered in this chapter, and legal ones, which are 
considered in the ensuing chapters of this Part Two. 
88 It appears that his main concerns relate to the impression that dignity is too broad a concept to be defined, and 
is only ascertained through inductive reasoning.  
89 What he describes is what is termed by others as collective dignity which is imparted on others. This type of 
dignity is problematic and is not adopted in this thesis, since it appears to be incompatible with the concept of 
dignity as inherent. In a model of dignity therefore, the two elements could not lie side by side. This type of dignity 
is also termed ‘relational dignity’ by Christopher McCrudden, ‘Human dignity and judicial interpretation of human 
rights’ (2008) 19(4) European Journal of International Law 655. 
90 As Paul Tomassi puts this, inductive reasoning, (which he is a particular advocate for) involves ‘reasoning from 
the particular, to the general’; P Tomassi, Logic (Routledge 1999) 
91 As will be presented in the ensuing chapters, this method is used to construct IPA dignity from the broad 
concepts here presented, through to legal ideals of dignity.  
92 I.e. George Kateb, Human Dignity (The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press 2011). Kateb takes a purely 
agnostic approach to dignity in his work, which is typically centred in political science. In spite of this view, he 
considers dignity to be inherent in human beings.  
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intrinsic or inherent is either tied with the biblical tradition, known as the ‘image of God’ 
theory93 in Christian theology94, or as Ritschl indicates, the ‘Physis-Concept’ of dignity is 
based on a Stoic philosophy. Human dignity is also recognised and empowered by means of 
treaty, where dignity is granted to the people under social contract, which is the 
Hobbesean/Lockean approach. This, in tandem with inherent dignity, is the theme of dignity 
that is recognised as foundational to human rights theory and law. As Ritschl outlines, both 
Hobbes and Locke’s version of dignity was a ‘status’ to be protected by the state, with Locke 
introducing the concept of the ‘social contract’, which consisted of the people of a society 
giving up some rights to the state, in order that that state would protect them.95 This type of 
dignity is man-made, and appears akin to a type of dignity discussed later in Chapter 6.96 
Dignity is a pluralistic concept, which ‘encompasses the liberal notion of negative freedom’.97  
 
 
Individual and Communitarian Human Dignity 
Whilst in this study we will construct a model of individual human dignity, it is pertinent that 
we reflect upon communitarian dignity as well, before continuing. Communitarian dignity is 
illustrated perhaps by a discussion of the loss of dignity. If one holds the belief that human 
dignity is inherent to all human beings, then it follows that such dignity cannot be lost. This 
point is suggested by many authors on the subject, evident throughout the literature. In the 
inherent dignity model, which has an individual focus, human dignity cannot be lost, because 
it is self-evidently existent within every person.  
                                                          
93 The Latin term used for this broad concept, and utilised intermittently throughout the thesis is Imago Dei. Key 
literature which considers this concept includes the seminal edited text David Kretzmer, Eckart Klein (eds), The 
Concept of Human Dignity in Human Rights Discourse (The Hague: Kluwer Law International 2002). 
94 Equally, in the Jewish faith we find the term Kavod, which represents the dignity of God. See for example O 
Kamir, ‘Honor and dignity cultures: The case of Kavod and Kavod Ha-Adam in Israeli society and law’ in  David 
Kretzmer, Eckart Klein (eds), The Concept of Human Dignity in Human Rights Discourse (The Hague: Kluwer 
Law International 2002) 231-262 
95 See also Theo Verbeek, ‘Rousseau and human dignity’ in Marcus Düwell, Jens Braarvig, Roger Brownsword, 
Dietmar Mieth (eds), The Cambridge Handbook of Human Dignity: Interdisciplinary Perspectives (Cambridge 
University Press 2014) 117ff. The social contract theory is not expressly presented in this study, but instead the 
focus is on the result of such theory vis-à-vis dignity – human rights theory and substantive law.  
96 Set out by Neomi Rao as ‘substantive conceptions of dignity’; Neomi Rao, ‘Three Concepts of Dignity in 
Constitutional Law’ (2011) 86(1) Notre Dame Law Review 183, 221. Capps observes Hobbes and Locke in their 
estimation of human dignity as being necessarily intrinsically related to autonomy, also citing Gewirth on agency; 
Patrick Capps, Human Dignity and the Foundations of International Law (Hart: Oxford and Portland, Oregon 
2009)105ff. Dignity is demonstrable where human beings are able to achieve their own purposes, unrestrained 
inasmuch as this doesn’t restrict or negatively affect the dignity of others. The conflation of dignity and autonomy 
is discussed in the next section.  
97 Rao ibid 187 
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But this position is very different with a communitarian model however. A communitarian 
focus addresses how members of civilised societies ‘ought’ to behave and ‘ought’ to be 
treated in order to respect the collective dignity of humanity.98 The behaviour of members of 
that community which has a negative impact upon that community will also affect the dignity 
of the whole community:  
Where a communitarian approach is taken, human dignity speaks less to what is special 
about human beings qua human and more to what is special about a particular 
community’s idea of civilized life and the concomitant commitments of its members.99 
 
With a communitarian dignity, the wider community’s needs are deemed to be more 
important than those of the individual.100 In contrast to the above, communitarian dignity 
might be lost altogether. For example, although it would be difficult or impossible to show 
that the entire community has suffered a loss of its dignity, if the community has suffered a 
mass crime, for example, it may be possible to indicate a violation of communitarian dignity. 
In the mass rape and killings of the 1994 Rwandan genocide for instance, where 
approximately 1,000,000 people were murdered, it might be said that the dignity of entire 
communities were, if not lost, at least severely violated and diminished.101  
This is very different to individual dignity, a difference highlighted here by Statman, in his 
account of the relationship between humiliation and dignity. He speaks of humiliation as a 
method of dignity violation, which is said to ‘strip its victims of dignity’, and argues that 
[individual] human dignity, if understood in either a descriptive or normative fashion cannot 
possibly be lost entirely: 
…If we hold a descriptive account of dignity, it is difficult to see how such a loss can 
occur, especially when we bear in mind that the feature that entitles humans to dignity 
belongs to all members of the species, irrespective of their individual capacities or 
                                                          
98 Leslie Meltzer Henry, ‘The Jurisprudence of Dignity’, (2011) 160(169) University of Pennsylvania Law Review 
169, 220-221 
99 Deryck Beyleveld, Roger Brownsword, Human Dignity in Bioethics and Biolaw (OUP 2001) 65 
100 As such, human dignity can be a ‘two-edged sword’ in that ‘there is potentially a tension between human 
dignity in support of autonomy and human dignity as a constraint on autonomy in the context of the tension 
between the dignity of the community, or the state determined dignity of the individual, and the autonomous free 
will of the individual; Ibid 
101 In the particularly dire circumstances of the genocide, mass rape was held to amount to genocide by the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, since it involved the intentional ‘wiping out’ of a culture. In such 
extreme circumstances, dignity is strained to its very core. 
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behaviour. If human beings with limited rational capacities nevertheless possess dignity, 
then one cannot rob human beings of their dignity by injuring their rational capacities102  
 
On an individual basis, according to the inherent dignity element of the model of dignity, 
dignity is intrinsic to all humanity, regardless of the ability to show autonomous, measurable 
human functioning, so that even the severely disabled in body and/or mind share intrinsic 
dignity with those who are fully able in both body and mind. In an individual, dignity being 
inherent, it cannot ever be removed or lost because it exists by the very fact that the person 
is a human being.  
 
This helpfully leads us now into a discussion of two core themes of human dignity discernible 
from the literature, beginning with the inherent nature of dignity. Whilst there are many ideas 
of what dignity amounts to, in both an individual and communitarian sense, we will now 
induce from the literature that the two ensuing themes represent a universal bedrock of 
understanding for what dignity is for individuals. 
 
 
Core Theme One: 
Dignity as Inherent  
 
As will become clear as this thesis unfolds, it is notable that much has been written on the 
concept of inherent or intrinsic human dignity which is given as bestowed upon man by God. 
In Judeo-Christian theology, human dignity appears to derive from humanity itself, as 
created by God. In Genesis, Moses records that God created man in his image. Interestingly 
as God comments on his own creation; the earth, oceans and animals, he sees that they are 
‘good’. Only when he has created man does he say that ‘it is very good’.103 Thus, in Judeo-
Christian theology, man is created in the likeness of God, as a special creation, set apart 
from and having dominion over all the creation. Since man is created in the likeness of God, 
and counted separate and distinct from the rest of creation, we are imbued with ‘humanity’ 
as distinct from all other animals. So a person is a human being, who demonstrates 
character, a persona or personality. This alludes to the ancient Greek term nooma, which 
refers to what we might understand in modern culture as a ‘soul’.  
 
                                                          
102 Daniel Statman, ‘Humiliation, Dignity and Self-Respect’ in David Kretzmer, Eckart Klein (eds), The Concept of 
Human Dignity in Human Rights Discourse (The Hague: Kluwer Law International 2002) 211-212 
103 Genesis 1:31 
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A personality is made up of a variety of aspects, including inter alia, voice, temperament, 
experience, education and ‘wisdom’, physical appearance, skill-set and religious beliefs. 
From the creation and throughout the Christian bible, it can be seen that God has a special 
relationship with man as distinct from all other creation, again signalling the connection 
between God and man being a close bond. Whilst man is not God and has faults inherent in 
his character following his ‘fall’ into sin,104 meaning that he is not perfection as God is, man is 
clearly special to God; a theme continued throughout both Testaments of the Bible.  
 
In Jewish thought specifically, it is the Kavod of God which is endowed upon human beings, 
that sets them apart from the rest of the animal kingdom. This Kavod is given - not inherent 
in the human being.105 It is also apparent in the teachings of the Old and New Testament, a 
focus not necessarily on individual needs and concerns, but on the needs and concerns of 
the community, and so perhaps dignity in that sense was more like a community-focused 
model described later. This can be seen in the book of Deuteronomy, where God instructs 
his people Israel to observe his commands and receive blessings in return, or disobey and 
be cursed.  
The Hebrew understanding of the text would have been that the wording in the book related 
to the nation of Israel, and thus, if the nation observed all of God’s commandments the 
nation would be blessed, despite the fact that individuals would still have difficulties at 
times.106 It was not only the Israelites who could benefit from this - throughout the Torah, the 
concept of love for one’s neighbour is abundant, and commandments for Jews towards other 
Jews were conveyed equally towards ‘strangers’.107 
 
Leon Kass is a particularly well-known scholar who focuses upon the biblical connotations of 
human dignity. Kass, who is heavily criticised by Steven Pinker,108 suggests that there exist 
two forms of the concept – human dignity and human dignity; the subtle difference between 
                                                          
104 Genesis 3 
105 Ritschl in Kretzmer and Klein op cit 95 
106 Deuteronomy 28:1ff 
107 Leviticus 19:18-34. For more on the Jewish tradition on dignity, see Yair Lorberbaum, ‘Human dignity in the 
Jewish tradition’ in Marcus Düwell, Jens Braarvig, Roger Brownsword, Dietmar Mieth (eds), The Cambridge 
Handbook of Human Dignity: Interdisciplinary Perspectives (Cambridge University Press 2014) 
108 Steven Pinker, ‘The Stupidity of Dignity’ (2008) May 12 2008 The Richard Dawkins Foundation for Reason 
and Science http://richarddawkins.net/article,2567,The –Stupidity-of-Dignity, Steven-Pinker, 1. Pinker discredits 
Kass, who provided bio-ethical consultation to the White House during the second Bush Administration, for the 
distinctly Catholic moral tone of his writing. See also Leon Kass, Life, Liberty and the Defense of Dignity: The 
Challenge for Bioethics  (Encounter Books: San Francisco 2002)  
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the two being the emphasis on the humanity or the dignity of being human.109 His stance is 
that biblical teaching indicates that dignity deriving from God inheres in man, and is 
identifiable also in emphases on man’s equality with each other.  
 
Of course, this theistic ideal of human dignity only holds if one is not agnostic or atheist. As 
some scholars have sought to demonstrate, inherent dignity may be proved with agnostic 
methods. One non-theological way of distinguishing human nature and thus dignity, is 
through comparison between human beings and animals.110 This approach is adopted by, 
inter alia George Kateb, and Peter Singer, who has written on animal rights.111 Kateb 
concentrates on a version of inherent dignity which is agnostic:  
 
I wish to go to the extent of saying that the human species is indeed something special, 
that it possesses valuable, commendable uniqueness or distinctiveness that is unlike the 
uniqueness of any other species. It has a higher dignity than all other species, or a 
qualitatively different dignity from all of them. The higher dignity is theoretically founded 
on humanity’s partial discontinuity with nature. Humanity is not only natural, whereas all 
other species are only natural. The reasons for this assertion, however, have nothing to 
do with theology or religion.112 
 
Kateb’s position is to consider human dignity as inherent in human beings as special, not 
because we are created by God, but because we exhibit traits and characteristics which 
distinguish us from the rest of the animal kingdom. It is these distinguishable qualities which 
necessitate particularly distinct treatment towards human beings: ‘…the human species 
is…the only animal species that is not only animal, the only species that is partly not natural, 
and that is therefore unpredictable in its conduct despite its genetic sameness from one 
generation to the next.’113 Where Kateb says that we as a species are partly ‘not natural’, he 
                                                          
109 See Kass L, ‘Defending Human Dignity’ (2007) Bradley Lecture at the American Enterprise Institute, February 
5 2007 
110 For example, Tasioulas outlines a ‘human nature ideal’ of dignity in a thorough, non-theistic iteration: ‘The 
idea of human dignity is the idea of an intrinsically valuable status…in broad outline it is to belong to a species 
which is in turn characterised by the possession of a variety of features: a characteristic form of embodiment; a 
finite lifespan of a certain rough magnitude; capacities for physical growth and reproduction; psychological 
capacities, such as perception, self-consciousness, and memory; and specifically rational capacities, such as the 
capacities for language-use, for registering a diverse range of normative considerations (including evaluative 
considerations, prudential, moral, aesthetic, and others besides), and for aligning one’s judgments, emotions, and 
actions with those considerations.’; John Tasioulas, ‘Human Dignity and the Foundations of Human Rights’ in 
Michael Freeman, Lloyd’s Introduction to Jurisprudence (9th edn Sweet & Maxwell 2014) 1331 
111 Peter Singer, Animal liberation (Random House 1995) 
112 George Kateb, Human Dignity (The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press 2011) 5 
113 Ibid 11 
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alludes to the nooma – ‘soul’ element of the human being here, as previously stated. We 
possess as humans an element of ‘person’ which extends beyond the animalistic, and 
perhaps within this soul rests the inherence of dignity.114 
 
This approach is not entirely modern, however. Immanuel Kant identified that human beings 
are distinct from animals because of humanity’s ability to reason.115 Leaving aside obvious 
arguments about evolutionary development vs. creation, it is certainly agreeable that human 
beings differ from animals in as much as humans are accorded, (in legal terms and in 
societies across the globe), a respect and deference not so accorded to animals.116 Even the 
most intelligent animals are unable to demonstrate human characteristics such as 
developing an education, marrying, or choosing a religion, and are not able to enact laws 
and policies as human beings are. In spite of this Western impression of the divide between 
the animal and human kingdoms, in some cultures the worship of animals as sacred or 
deified creatures does reverse this balance, by placing the animal above the human being; 
e.g. sacred cows in India representing wealth and prosperity in Hinduism and 
Zoroastrianism.  
 
And so, human dignity is not only a faith-based notion. It is probably a moral117 and 
philosophical concept as much as it is a theistic one. It is termed by Margalit as a ‘morality of 
ends’, which he states: 
 
…is based on a vision of the place of creatures in the chain of being. Man is the “crown 
of creation,” that is, a creature who must be treated in a special way because of what he 
is. Any treatment that does not accord Man his special place in the chain of being 
constitutes humiliation. This sort of morality is based not on duties or commandments but 
on the personal example of an individual who epitomizes it.118 
 
To adopt an ideal of inherent dignity does not necessitate a theistic approach. Even so, 
some have asserted that secular means by which we can understand the existence of 
                                                          
114 Those seeking an opposing argument are directed to Rachels: James Rachels, Created From Animals: The 
Moral Implications Of Darwinism (OUP 1990) 171 
115 See generally Immanuel Kant, (M Gregor (tr)) The Metaphysics of Morals (CUP 1996) 
116 Or, for the avoidance of ambiguity, at least to a greater extent than animals, since animals clearly have 
protection under various international domestic law. Those laws are enacted on their behalf by human beings, 
who possess the capacity so to do.  
117 Beyleveld and Brownsword hold that dignity is always a moral concern; Deryck Beyleveld, Roger Brownsword, 
Human Dignity in Bioethics and Biolaw (OUP 2001) 66ff 
118 Avishai Margalit, The Decent Society (Harvard 1996) 34 
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human rights, and a fortiori human dignity, should not be the only means by which we 
understand them.119 As R H Tawney stated; 
 
The essence of all morality is this: to believe that every human being is of infinite 
importance, and therefore that no consideration of expediency can justify the 
oppression of one by another. But to believe this it is necessary to believe in God.120 
 
 
We should thus, in that opinion, ensure that we do not discount a theistic approach to 
dignity, even, it might be added, when considering the concept as it could apply legally within 
a pluralist state such as Britain.121  Those venturing into the study of the idea of dignity 
should be under no false pretence that it is a concept which is easy to define, or to actually 
prove the existence of.122 A particular difficulty with dignity is converting it from a descriptive 
and theoretical to a normative concept.123 Nonetheless it remains a topical and prominent 
subject in philosophical, ethical and moral discourse. Perhaps in defining human dignity, we 
must adopt not one approach, but a holistic method, particularly when seeking to define 
human dignity and the theory of human rights and morality.124 The ensuing quote 
summarises what in this section has been expressed, and suggests something of the 
mystery of human dignity: 
 
It is difficult to define what human dignity is. It is not an organ to be discovered in our 
body, it is not an empirical notion, but without it we would be unable to answer the 
simple question: what is wrong with slavery?125 
 
                                                          
119 I.e. Michael J Perry, The Idea of Human Rights: Four Inquiries (OUP 1998) 
120 J M Winter,  D M Joslin (eds), R.H. Tawney's Commonplace Book (1972) 67; quoted in Perry ibid 11 
121 It isn’t beyond comprehension that to assume a purely religious mode of thinking to analyse human dignity as 
a concept based in morality and human rights theory might be problematic. For instance, in his review of Perry op 
cit, Fagan explores Perry’s focus on a religious understanding of the source of human rights, and comments that 
caution to this end is advised; Andrew Fagan, ‘Between God and Democracy’ (2002) 2(2) Human Rights & 
Human Welfare 15, 20-21. This view is agreeable in as much as human dignity, which is arguably central to 
human rights theory, is, as is explored here, found in more than just theological interpretations thereof. 
122 For example see Statman in Kretzmer and Klein op cit 211, who indicates that ascertaining that dignity even 
exists is a significant challenge pertaining to its utility and applicability. 
123 Statman Ibid for example. In recognising dignity as a normative concept, Feinberg has been suggested that it 
is ‘simply the recognizable capacity to assert claims’; Joel Feinberg, ‘The Nature And Value Of Human Rights’ In 
Joel Feinberg, Rights, Justice, And The Bounds Of Liberty, (Princeton University Press 1980) 159, 166 
124 As propounded by Fagan, in Andrew Fagan, ‘Practicing Universality: The Inter-Disciplinary Imperatives of 
Human Rights’ (2003) Vol 3 Human Rights & Human Welfare 95; See also Andrew Fagan, ‘Between God and 
Democracy’ (2002) 2(2) Human Rights & Human Welfare 15 
125 Leszek Kolakowski, ‘What Is Left of Socialism’ (2002) 26 First Things 42 
Page 57 of 232 
 
 
This section has considered inherent dignity in all humans qua human. This is the first core 
theme induced from the literature. It represents a sort of dignity de jure, in that it is almost a 
legal ‘right’ to dignity. Nevertheless, the utility of dignity still comes under scrutiny. One of the 
key criticisms is the conflation of the concept with liberty and autonomy.126 This, as will be 
explained, is particularly so in a bioethical approach to dignity. It is the relationship between 
dignity and autonomy, and their conceptual conflation which forms the second core theme of 
dignity that will now be discussed. 
 
 
Core Theme Two: 
Dignity and Autonomy127  
 
A theme which is consistent across the literature in many disciplines is the idea that dignity is 
recognisable through autonomy – the freedom to make rational choices, and agency - the 
ability of persons to act on those choices. Says Joseph Raz: ‘Respecting human dignity 
entails treating humans as persons capable of planning and plotting their future. Thus, 
respecting people’s dignity includes respecting their autonomy, their right to control their 
future’.128 It would appear from the literature that freedom to choose one’s life-plan is 
essential to the identification of dignity. In the bioethical discipline, it is in discussions over 
morality and in medical ethics that dignity as autonomy often arises. The concept of dignity 
frequently adjoins the idea of autonomy and freedom of choice over treatment, over abortion 
and over death.129  
                                                          
126 Sandra Liebenberg, ‘The Value of Human Dignity in Interpreting Socio-Economic Rights’ (2005) 21(1) South 
African Journal on Human Rights 1, 5 
127 Whilst an exhaustive review of dignity and autonomy is not possible here, the reader is directed to material 
which provides much more thorough analysis of the two concepts. Here will be discussed some ideas from 
Deryck Beyleveld, Roger Brownsword, Human Dignity in Bioethics and Biolaw (OUP 2001), Patrick Capps, 
Human Dignity and the Foundations of International Law (Hart: Oxford and Portland, Oregon 2009) 108 and 
Denise Réaume, ‘Dignity, Choice and Circumstances’ in Christopher McCrudden (ed), Understanding Human 
Dignity (OUP 2013) 539. The reader may also consider for further reading specifically in autonomy, certain works 
that share ideas with those presented here. Further exploration can be made of autonomy in theology and 
philosophy. In Jewish philosophy, autonomy is tied in with relationship to God as creator, and Kenneth Seeskin 
identifies the tensions in the Jewish Torah between the autonomy of individuals, and divine worship of God; K 
Seeskin, Autonomy in Jewish Philosophy (Cambridge University Press 2001). In Chapter 1 of that work, 
Seeskin’s interpretations of autonomy in scripture are also tied in to Kantian philosophy, and he makes reference 
to Kant’s understanding of autonomy throughout his work. 
128 J Raz, The Authority of Law (Clarendon Press: Oxford 1979) 
129 I.e. John Harris, The Value of Life: An Introduction to Medical Ethics (Routledge 1985). See also the so-called 
‘right to die’ arguments in recent jurisprudence; R. (on the application of Nicklinson) v Ministry of Justice [2012] 
EWHC 2381 (Admin); Pretty v United Kingdom (application no. 2346/02) (2002) 35 EHRR 1; R. (on the 
application of Purdy) v Director of Public Prosecutions [2010] 1 AC 345. Bioethical iterations of dignity are termed 
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As mentioned in the first theme, above, dignity is recognisable in human beings as separate 
(or separable) from the animal kingdom, and this is visible in that we possess the freedom of 
agency and autonomous thought which animals lack. This might be termed a dignity of 
empowerment or of capability.130 Our inherent dignity is apparent through our choices 
pertaining to a series of life-options. Capps indicates that we have rights to make 
autonomous choice founded on the dignity of empowerment.131 
 
Charles Foster levels a critique on Beyleveld and Brownsword’s idea of dignity as 
empowerment, which adopts Alan Gewirth’s Principle of Generic Consistency (PGC). This 
theory in itself is based upon agency-facilitation132 Foster goes so far as to label Beyleveld 
and Brownsword ‘the Autonomists’, since, he believes that their work, based on the PGC, is 
ultimately pointing towards a conflation of dignity with autonomy.133 Instead, it might more 
accurately be said that the view of dignity held by Beyleveld and Brownsword equates that 
human beings as agents possess dignity by the very fact that they are vulnerable beings 
with the capacity to make choices (autonomy). Having a capacity for autonomy is on this 
view what a person’s dignity actually consists of.134 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
by Beyleveld and Brownsword as ‘dignity as constraint’, in Deryck Beyleveld, Roger Brownsword, Human Dignity 
in Bioethics and Biolaw (OUP 2001). 
 
130 A particular example of this type of reasoning towards dignity is found in the ‘capability approach’, where 
human dignity is apparently found in the ability to choose certain ‘functionings’ in life. In this approach, it is 
essential to a finding of the presence of dignity that persons have the capability to select choices in life. As a 
proponent of this approach, which is not presented in this study in full, Martha Nussbaum considers that there are 
three notions of dignity; respect, agency and equality. See Martha Nussbaum, Women and Human Development: 
The Capabilities Approach (CUP 2000). Nussbaum (whose theory of objectification is utilised in this study at 
Chapter 8) lists various capabilities, whilst Amartya Sen, declines to do so. See also A Sen ‘Human rights and 
capabilities’ (2005) 6(2) Journal of Human Development 151 
131 Capps propounds that ‘human beings have dignity when they can exercise autonomy’, or where ‘autonomy is 
protected by a series of rights which every human being has because they are a human being’; Patrick Capps, 
Human Dignity and the Foundations of International Law (Hart: Oxford and Portland, Oregon 2009) 108. Capps 
specifically refers to the work of Beyleveld and Brownsword, who describe this form of human dignity thus: 
‘human beings are recognized not only as having the capacity to make their own choices, but also as being 
entitled to enjoy the conditions in which they can flourish as self-determining authors of their own destinies’. 
Quoted by Capps at 108, taken from Deryck Beyleveld, Roger Brownsword, Human Dignity in Bioethics and 
Biolaw (OUP 2001) 
 
132 Foster summarises the PGC thus; ‘The PGC is an agency-facilitating concept. It deems as rights whatever is 
needed to ensure true agency. There is an important reciprocity: unless X accepts the PGC’s proposition that all 
agents have generic rights enforceable against X, X himself will not be entitled to eat the fruits of the PGC: one 
cannot have rights (the corollary of the PGC), without signing up to the PGC.’ Charles Foster, Human Dignity in 
Bioethics and Law (Hart: Oxford and Portland, Oregon 2011) 63  
133 Ibid 62ff 
134 And so inherent dignity is represented by autonomy and agency. 
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However, a conflation of the terms dignity and autonomy, has led to criticism of the use of 
the term dignity by some medical ethicists and medical practitioners.135 The literature 
considers dignity and autonomy to be almost synonymous, but is there any particular 
problem with counting them as exactly synonymous concepts? Neomi Rao, whose legal 
model of dignity is examined in Chapter 6 considers that autonomy and dignity are not one 
and the same, and that they may in fact conflict with each other. She cites Guy Carmi: 
 
Autonomy refers to the ability of persons to create their own identity and in this way to 
define themselves. Dignity, by contrast, refers to “our sense of ourselves as 
commanding (attitudinal) respect.” Unlike autonomy, dignity depends upon 
intersubjective norms that define the forms of conduct that constitute respect between 
persons. That is why modern legal systems so often set autonomy and dignity in 
opposition to each other…136 
If dignity is understood as inherent and also exhibited through autonomous thought or 
action, what then of those who are unable to express autonomy? Willard Gaylin says that 
where autonomy and dignity are conflated, those who are unable to display autonomy 
through disability, infancy etc. have ‘…their position in the moral world [threatened]’.137  
 
A recent debate in constitutional law, between Connor O’Mahony and Emily Kidd White 
illuminates the problems with the conflation of dignity and autonomy.138 O’Mahony concludes 
that autonomy and dignity are separate concepts, explaining that many cases have shown 
that one’s autonomy might be restricted for the benefit of the protection of their dignity.139 
O’Mahony takes an approach which is perhaps minimalist, but an analysis which is perhaps 
more appropriate from the realms of constitutional law, whilst Kidd White addresses 
                                                          
135 I.e. R Macklin, ‘Dignity is a useless concept’ (2003) 327 British Medical Journal 1419 
136 Guy Carmi, ‘Dignity – The Enemy From Within: A Theoretical And Comparative Analysis Of Human Dignity As 
A Free Speech Justification’ (2007) 9(4) University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law; See Neomi 
Rao, ‘Three Concepts of Dignity in Constitutional Law’ (2011) 86(1) Notre Dame Law Review 183, 219 at [n 149]. 
Carmi is saying that dignity and autonomy are at times in opposition to one another, but he is referring to dignity 
as a communitarian iteration, or as a collective dignity. This explanation by Carmi suggests that dignity can have 
a communitarian focus, and is not limited to, or indeed is not essentially, an individualistic concept. Rao moves 
the inherent dignity concept into the communitarian concept by explaining that a number of scholars take this 
view of autonomy being ‘at odds’ with dignity; Ibid 219. Rao identifies that ‘…the inclination in Germany, France 
or South Africa is to separate dignity from autonomy in order to expand the legal conception of dignity and give it 
a more positive, community-based meaning’.  
137 Willard Gaylin, ‘In Defense of the Dignity of Being Human’ (1984) 14(4) The Hastings Center Report 18, 20 
138 Conor O’Mahony ‘There is no such thing as a right to dignity’ (2012) 10(2) International Journal of 
Constitutional Law 551; Conor O’Mahony ‘There is no such thing as a right to dignity: a rejoinder to Emily Kidd 
White’ (2012) 10(2) International Journal of Constitutional Law 585; Emily Kidd White ‘There is no such thing as a 
right to dignity: a reply to Conor O’Mahony’ (2012) 10(2) International Journal of Constitutional Law 575 
139 O’Mahony Ibid (1) 555ff 
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philosophical shortcomings in O’Mahony’s approach. She finds no issue with accepting 
some collusion between the two concepts.  
 
O’Mahony seeks a solidified, unified definition of dignity as an inherent concept, where 
autonomy is clearly separated as not being one and the same as dignity, but a right which 
derives from the presence of inherent dignity in all persons. Kidd White, alternatively, views 
dignity with a philosophical guise; and propounds that dignity does not have to be clearly 
defined as a singular concept, unable to be separable and interfered with. O’Mahony’s 
approach and intention – to enable human dignity to be recognisable as a solid concept, 
without so much fluidity that it is hard to grasp, (for which it is so often criticized), from a 
constitutional law perspective, is in keeping with the methods of this thesis.140 
 
Moreover, in dignity’s relation to autonomy, O’Mahony gives a descriptive statement – that 
dignity is inherent to all persons, with a normative corollary that therefore, every human 
being is entitled to rights ‘on the basis of equal treatment and respect’.141  
 
 
Summary and Next Chapter 
This chapter presented the idea of dignity as it is studied in multiple disciplines, to provide 
two central themes of human dignity. It has also been established in this chapter that dignity 
is often conflated with other terms, particularly with ‘autonomy’. Whilst it is acknowledged 
that autonomy is integral to the concept of human dignity, it is not dignity in isolation. It will 
be asserted that dignity should not be reduced merely to autonomy – the two are separate, 
or rather separable concepts. Given the richness of the idea of dignity, it is asserted that 
dignity must be viewed as more than one concept. It must consist of various elements. As 
such, it has to exist as more than a singular definition. It must be fluid and malleable.  
The two central themes here presented are cumulative in nature vis-à-vis human rights, as 
will be seen in the ensuing chapters; it is because dignity is recognised as inherent, that we 
see the dignity represented in protected autonomous thought and action. As we next explore 
the legal explication of dignity, these two foundational ideas about dignity will be expanded 
                                                          
140 Emily Kidd White, ‘There is no such thing as a right to dignity: a reply to Conor O’Mahony’ (2012) 10(2) 
International Journal of Constitutional Law 575 also seems to champion an understanding of the fluidity and 
generality of the concept of human dignity, which forms the underpinnings for a universalistic foundation of 
human rights, and this is certainly the approach of Leslie Henry, in Leslie Meltzer Henry, ‘The Jurisprudence of 
Dignity’, (2011) 160(169) University of Pennsylvania Law Review 169 
141 Conor O’Mahony ‘There is no such thing as a right to dignity’ (2012) 10(2) International Journal of 
Constitutional Law 551(2) 586 
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upon, and further themes considered. The next chapter identifies the legal usage of human 
dignity in international law and human rights theory and in the chapter following that, 
addresses a specific example of dignity’s application in human rights jurisprudence, in Article 
3 of the ECHR. It will be apparent that although human dignity has always had a somewhat 
ethereal nature, it is also a bedrock idea in human rights theory and in international law.  
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4. HUMAN DIGNITY IN HUMAN RIGHTS THEORY  
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
This chapter will consider human rights theory,142 before exploring the prescriptive nature of 
human dignity in international human rights law. It begins by asking the question ‘what are 
human rights?’ This is an essential question to ask and answer, before specifically locating 
human dignity in legislative provisions, so that we have a core understanding of the ethos 
behind the possession of certain rights and entitlements that are then framed in various 
international conventions. Those conventions, as will be presented, are founded upon the 
idea of human dignity.143 The ultimate purpose of this chapter is to affirm the statement that 
‘…human dignity is the rock on which the superstructure of human rights is built’.144  
 
What are Human Rights? 
Human rights can also be termed as ‘natural’ rights.145 Natural rights ‘are thought to exist 
independently of social recognition and enforcement’, and exist ‘by virtue of our status as 
human beings…independent of particular circumstances and do not depend on any special 
conditions.’ 146 Human rights, whatever they may be descriptively, appear to have an 
emotive, definite appeal, and it might be asserted, possess some innate authority, which is 
almost self-evident. They are the driving force behind domestic legislation, and in the UK, 
the Human Rights Act 1998 provides domestic application of European Convention 
principles of human rights protection. Rights, as will be seen in the international human 
                                                          
142 There will be a non-exhaustive presentation of some central theories of human rights, particularly concerned 
with natural rights, and a natural legal perspective to human rights. 
143 It will be recognised that a number of conventions are borne out of the original Universal Declaration on 
Human Rights of 1948. The subsequent provisions will be included here in order to convey the message that 
dignity founds international efforts to protect human rights, and a fortiori, human dignity. 
144 Deryck Beyleveld, Roger Brownsword, Human Dignity in Bioethics and Biolaw (OUP 2001) 13 
145 Here the terms natural and human rights will be interchangeable. Natural rights are also sometimes termed 
‘moral rights’; i.e. David Lyons, ‘Utility and Rights’ in Jeremy Waldron (ed), Theories of Rights (OUP 1984) 110ff. 
146 Lyons ibid 111-112 
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rights law which follows, transcend cultures and religious groups.147 However, the basis or 
‘nature’ and scope of human rights is an issue of contention.148  
Are human rights a creation of society or law, or do they have an a priori existence? 
Historically, and specifically in Jewish tradition, rights were ‘endowed’ upon individuals. 
Human rights are decreed by God as opposed to the state.149 In line with the Imago Dei 
theory of human dignity, in the Jewish culture, human life is deemed to be sacred, and the 
preservation of human dignity is supplemented by the rules and regulations of the Jewish 
law contained in scripture and other historical writings.150 Such ways of understanding rights 
as being natural rights, not earned but endowed upon humanity align with natural law theory. 
The opposing jurisprudential discipline, legal positivism can be seen in the work of Jeremy 
Bentham, who famously called the idea of rights ‘nonsense upon stilts’.151 Bentham saw 
rights as being ‘a child of the law’; borne out of legislative provision.152 Fagan says: ‘From a 
legal positivist view legitimate human rights are those which have been legally recognised 
and codified. Human rights exist as legal rights or not at all.’153 
HLA Hart posited an opposing view, which ‘…takes the form of seeing human rights as, in 
effect, parents of law: they motivate specific legislations.’154 In Hart’s view, as here 
enunciated by Amartya Sen, human rights can therefore be seen as a product of law, or as a 
motivation for law. Fagan explains the distinction between the two - of legal positivism: 
‘…human rights depend upon law for their existence and their application.’155 Describing the 
contrasting natural law position on human rights: ‘…natural law posits the existence of forms 
of justice and rights which exist independently of any tangible political or legal institution or 
configuration’.156  
                                                          
147 This does not account for cultural relativity, however, which necessarily dictates that not all cultures would 
provide the same protections as others, although maintaining a commitment to the protection of human rights 
generally.   
148 See Andrew Fagan, Human Rights: Confronting Myths and Misunderstandings (Edward Elgar 2009). Fagan 
suggests that some misunderstandings of human rights are borne out of the relation between the basis and 
scope of human rights. 
149 As originally clear from the Torah – the first five books of the bible. 
150 See S Spero, Morality, Halakka and the Jewish Tradition (Yehhiva University Press 1983); N Lamm, The 
Good Society: Jewish Ethics in Action (Viking Press 1974) for further study. 
151 Jeremy Bentham, Anarchical Fallacies (Headline Series: New York 1998) 
152 Ibid 
153 Andrew Fagan, Human Rights: Confronting Myths and Misunderstandings (Edward Elgar 2009) 32 
154 Amartya Sen, The Idea of Justice (Penguin 2009) 363 
155 Andrew Fagan, Human Rights: Confronting Myths and Misunderstandings (Edward Elgar 2009) 30 
156 Ibid 31 
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Therefore we can either believe that human rights exist because a legal provision/s says that 
they exist, and adopt a positivist legal perspective, or, as is preferred in this study, adopt a 
natural law perspective, and consider that the law is created to fulfil a commitment to an 
ideal that both supersedes and pre-dates the written law. In this way, we seek an approach 
to human rights which relies upon an inherent value in humanity which requires protection; 
human dignity.  
 
Rights and Dignity 
How human dignity and human rights relate in a legal sense is the subject of concern in the 
remainder of this chapter. Although we can see that the term human dignity is to be found in 
the letter of the international law, it is important to consider the concepts underlying the 
written law. It would exceed the scope of this thesis to consider the moral and philosophical 
underpinnings of human rights, so there has to be an element of appropriate selectivity in 
how we consider them. This analysis of some concepts of human rights, aimed at identifying 
human dignity within, will enable an understanding of the place human dignity has within the 
written law. We begin by considering two commonly regarded theories of rights, known as 
the Will and Interest theory respectively.157 
In modern legal theory and political science there are principally two theories of rights, widely 
known as Will Theory and Interest Theory. The different theories illustrate the effect that 
rights have between competing parties.158 Will theory (also named ‘choice theory’ in some 
circles)159 operates on the premise that a person possesses a right only if they would have 
the ability to waive it or to exercise it. Interest theory on the other hand propounds that if a 
person has a particular interest that another party be held subject to a duty to protect that 
interest, then they possess the right(s). The two theories are marked by the contrast in 
requirement of human agency in autonomy. In the Will theory, autonomy is vital to a 
realisation of the right, while with the interest theory it matters not whether the person has 
autonomy to determine their own interests and thus their rights – they possess them 
nonetheless. Now how would these theories relate to human dignity – do they support or 
conflict with the idea of dignity?  
                                                          
157 Whilst we do not necessarily require the use of these theories in the application part of this thesis, it is 
pertinent to briefly explain the premise of each. It can be seen that rights call upon dignity for their authority. 
158 A discussion of rights leads to consideration of when rights are in dispute, and this is discussed further on. 
159 I.e. Andrew Fagan, Human Rights: Confronting Myths and Misunderstandings (Edward Elgar 2009) 14ff 
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The various concepts of dignity which have been explored in the preceding chapter, led us to 
an understanding of dignity being inherent in all human beings, and also consisting of 
autonomy. Both theories of rights express and reflect upon what the inherent capacity of 
dignity is which is the source of those rights.  
So far we have talked about rights, but not about duties. This leads to a consideration of a 
theory of rights developed by Hohfeld, who provided a schema of natural rights, and how 
right interrelates with duty. Hohfeld usefully simplified the idea of natural rights in the 
‘Hohfeldian Schema’.160 The schema is helpful to identify where competing interests interact. 
Hohfeld sets out that there are four types of right attributable to human beings; a claim-right; 
a liberty; a power or an immunity. A claim-right consists of a duty of one party to allow the 
other party to do a certain thing. A liberty allows a party to do something, or to not do 
something without a duty being placed on the other party. The possession of a power alters 
the legal rights of the other party. If a party has immunity from that power, this means that 
they are not subject to the former’s power.  
So to assert a right involves a three pronged relationship between a person, an ‘act-
description’ and another person, as per the example in Appendix F.  In the present context of 
the sociology of prostitution, the dignity of the sex worker versus the dignity of the client 
might be considered in future research. In that respect, it could be useful to utilise the 
Hohfeldian schema to indicate which rights each party retains in the prostitution encounter. 
Hohfeld gives us an indication of how rights might be apportioned between persons in an 
exchange of interests.161 Such a discussion may lead us to consider where rights conflict.  
In the context of ECHR rights and the European Court of Human Rights, Alexander Green 
writes on two opposing theories on the meeting of two separate rights in the courtroom, 
known as ‘conflict theory’ and ‘absolute theory’. To view opposing rights as in conflict, is for 
Green the incorrect way to view the theory of human rights – that is ‘conflict theory’. Green’s 
point is that todays ‘language of human rights is abused’162 and that it should be recognised 
that (ECHR) rights cannot conflict. This is the ‘absolute’ theory of rights. The absolute theory 
of rights holds that when two (seemingly) opposing rights meet, they do not technically 
conflict, as each right maintains its own individual importance and validity. No right nullifies 
                                                          
160 Taken from Wesley Hohfeld, ‘Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning (1913) 
23(1) The Yale Law Journal 16 
161 Such an indication may be relevant when considering the exchange of interests between the sex worker and 
the client in the prostitution encounter. 
162 Alexander Green, ‘An Absolute Theory of Convention Rights: Why the ECHR Gives Rise to Legal Rights that 
Cannot Conflict with Each Other’ (2010) 16 UCL Jurisprudence Review 75, 96 
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another right, but some take precedence over others. It is the Court’s job to determine which 
right takes precedence in the situation.  
Green’s argument against a conflict theory is based on the perceived erroneous 
understanding of there being ultimately a right answer to a legal dispute of rights. It is the 
European Court of Human Rights’ focus on achieving the right answer in its analysis of rights 
clashes which is problematic. Green agrees with the integral core of human rights; their very 
nature contending with such a ‘conflict theory’ approach: ‘…ECHR rights are a species of 
moral rights…to talk of a right answer being reached by the ECtHR is to invoke moral 
absolutism’.163 
 
A theory of rights for this study 
In this short encounter with some theories of rights, it has been established that there can 
exist rights, and correlating duties, liberties or powers. Rights can exist independent of 
autonomous thought or action to see them enforced. They are self-evident, natural and 
precede the written law. These premises about human rights inform the ensuing chapter and 
remainder of the thesis. Human rights, as natural and applicable to all human beings, are 
based on the premise of the dignity of the individual.  
In these descriptions of human rights, human beings possess such rights merely by virtue of 
being human. They are not essentially given to people by the state, and they cannot thus be 
removed by the state, or, indeed by any other private individual either.164 This is reminiscent 
of the concept of human dignity, as an inherent aspect of the human race,165 as Steve Foster 
explains the theoretical links between the two concepts, with reference to Article 3 of the 
ECHR; 
…protecting human rights is essential to maintaining the dignity and integrity of the 
human being. Thus human rights uphold the basic dignity of the individual as a human 
being; every human being, because they are human [qua human], is said to deserve 
humane treatment, and they should not, therefore, be subject to torture or other ill-
                                                          
163 Ibid 86 
164 See Carlos Santiago Nino, The Ethics of Human Rights (Clarendon Press Oxford 1991). There is an in-depth 
discussion of the legal enforcement of positive morality where the immorality of an act justifies the state’s 
intervention to prevent it; 129ff 
165 According to the minimum core, this is the ontological claim to dignity; Christopher McCrudden, ‘Human 
dignity and judicial interpretation of human rights’ (2008) 19(4) European Journal of International Law 655, 679; 
or in Henry’s schema, equality as dignity; Leslie Meltzer Henry, ‘The Jurisprudence of Dignity’, (2011) 160(169) 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 169. These are considered in Chapter 6. 
Page 67 of 232 
 
treatment, or to slavery and servitude, as such treatment is an affront to human 
dignity.166 
 
So we can establish that dignity and human rights may have a synonymous existence in 
humanity, as there are inextricable links between the two, beyond the letter of the law, as 
above.167 When we relate human dignity to rights, in the form of natural or human rights, we 
see that it can exist in different ways. It is both recognised and protected in different ways, 
too. Where human dignity is socially and relationally instigated, as in collective virtue as 
dignity or in the relational claim in the minimum core, it is dependent upon the affirmation of 
dignity by other individuals. Says Ritschl, human dignity is ‘a notion which precedes Human 
Rights, i.e.….human rights are a juridical concretization of the more general concept of 
Human Dignity’, in spite of the fact that ‘human dignity as a concept belongs to a pre-ethical, 
pre-political and pre-juridical realm’.168 
 
From Natural to Legal Rights 
 
What codification of rights and dignity achieves is the movement of rights from being natural, 
to legal rights. Law makes prescriptive rights available. In contrast to natural rights, legal 
rights are accrued to individuals by the state. They provide a structure for enforcement that 
natural rights do not present per se: 
…while legal rights have a clear correlate in the world, in legal texts and the willingness 
of legal officials to enforce them through various enforcement procedures, no such clear 
correlate exists for moral rights.169  
 
Thus, rights can be made ‘legal’ by the introduction of legislative protection: 
…legal rights may be thought of as a variety of moral rights: they are the moral rights that 
we have as a result of the existence of legal institutions such as bodies of publicly 
ascertainable rules and courts committed to the principle of formal justice.170  
                                                          
166 Steve Foster, Human Rights & Civil Liberties (2nd edn Pearson Longman 2008) 11 
167 Glensy has also discussed the idea that there is a right to dignity, with several different approaches to the 
theory; an affirmative and negative approach, a proxy approach and a rhetorical approach; Rex Glensy, ‘The 
Right To Dignity’ (2011) 43(65) Columbia Human Rights Law Review 142 
168 Ritschl in Kretzmer and Klein op cit 92 
169 Brian Bix, Jurisprudence: Theory and Context (Thomson Sweet & Maxwell) 125-126 
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As Simmonds suggests, rights may ‘possess peremptory force’. He provides the example of 
the notion that all people should have paid holidays: ‘If people have a Right to a paid 
holiday, it matters not whether the notion is a good or bad one, the right takes 
precedence’.171 In another example:  
…asserting the existence of a right to watch game shows…seems to leave no room for 
further debate about the permissibility of my action: if I have a right to do it, the action is 
permissible regardless of the balance between competing goods and bads. [sic]172 
 
Human Dignity in International Human Rights Law 
Beyleveld and Brownsword class human dignity as empowerment or as constraint, with the 
former having a ‘background’ role, and the latter a ‘foreground’ one. Of dignity as 
empowerment, they say it has a ‘…background role typically assigned to human dignity in 
the founding international instruments of human rights.’173 
 
In the years following the atrocities of Nazi Germany, the dignity of human beings came into 
sharp focus. Ed Bates provides a usefully concise overview of the history of human rights, 
which details the development of rights in international law both pre- and post-Second World 
War.174 This ‘policy-oriented jurisprudence’; policy which responds to atrocities in the 
formulation of international human rights law, seems to have been the motivational means 
by which our modern international law on human rights, and the UDHR and European 
Convention in particular, came into play.175 But the inspiration behind this revolutionary 
legislation was not based upon the need to provide individuals with rights and entitlements 
per se, but to protect something deemed very important. The severe attack upon man’s 
dignity that the Nazis’ ‘final solution’ entailed, seems, historically to have resulted in a 
protective legislative response and greater recognition of man’s inherent worth: 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
170 Nigel E Simmonds, Central Issues in Jurisprudence (2nd edn Sweet and Maxwell 2002) 256ff 
171 Ibid 256 
172 Ibid 256-7. So Simmonds suggests that morality ceases to be the principal consideration for the possession of 
the right. If it is legitimate, the value of the right matters not; it is permissible.  
173 Deryck Beyleveld, Roger Brownsword, Human Dignity in Bioethics and Biolaw (OUP 2001) 11 
174 In Daniel Moeckli, Sangeeta Shah, Sandesh Sivakumaran (eds) David Harris (cons ed), International Human 
Rights Law (OUP 2010) 17. See also Christoph Goos, ‘Würde des Menschen: Restoring Human Dignity in Post-
Nazi Germany’ in Christopher McCrudden (ed), Understanding Human Dignity (OUP 2013) 79ff 
175 See Siegfried Wiessner, Andrew R. Willard, ‘Policy-Oriented Jurisprudence and Human Rights Abuses in 
Internal Conflict: Toward a World Public Order of Human Dignity’ (1999) American Journal of International Law 
316 
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[in post-second WW international law] intrinsic human dignity is a seminal idea that acts 
as the background justification for the recognition of human rights and as a source of the 
fundamental freedoms to which all humans (qua human) are entitled. In this context, 
human dignity as empowerment (specifically, the empowerment that comes with the right 
to the conditions in which human dignity can flourish) is the ruling conception.176 
 
Thus, human dignity, here referred to as dignity as empowerment, is tied in with rights. In the 
same vein, the philosopher, Jacques Maritain, in a statement echoing the Kantian 
categorical imperative, linked the concept of dignity with rights, in 1951:  
 
…the human person possesses rights because of the very fact that it is a person, a 
whole, a master of itself and of its acts, and which consequently is not merely a means to 
an end, but an end, an end which must be treated as such. The dignity of the human 
person? The expression means nothing if it does not signify that by virtue of the natural 
law, the human person has the right to be respected, is the subject of rights, possesses 
rights. These are things which are owed to man because of the very fact that he is 
man.177 
 
Maritain had an influential role in the drafting of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights 
in 1948178. Whilst it is not particularly certain how dignity became a central theme of that 
Declaration, Maritain’s views were certainly toward a protection of the dignity of the person. 
We know from the broad concepts of dignity, that personhood is an indicator of inherent 
worth, sometimes named ‘dignity’. Autonomy is prevalent in Maritain’s statement; ‘master of 
itself’. Autonomy in the international law pertaining to human rights, is, as was suggested in 
Chapter 3, human dignity de facto.  
 
Dignity is seen as a universalistic basis of value for human beings, being non-religious and 
non-political, and so able to be culturally relative. If dignity is a shared value across cultures, 
then societies build upon that core ‘dignity’ value in the creation of their own legal rights, 
obligations and protections.179 Therefore, in human dignity, we find a bedrock upon which 
culturally specific laws can be built. Dignity can be a shared value that need not prevent 
culturally specific realisations of individual rights.  
                                                          
176 Deryck Beyleveld, Roger Brownsword, Human Dignity in Bioethics and Biolaw (OUP 2001) 11 
177 J Maritain, The Rights Of Man And Natural Law (1951) 65  
178 Christopher McCrudden, ‘Human dignity and judicial interpretation of human rights’ (2008) 19(4) European 
Journal of International Law 655, 662  
179 Rex Glensy, ‘The Right To Dignity’ (2011) 43(65) Columbia Human Rights Law Review 142 
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The preamble to the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR) of 1948 provides:  
‘Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of 
all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the 
world…’  
 
And at Article 1:  
‘All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed 
with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of 
brotherhood’.  
 
As per the first of the central themes discussed, the preamble speaks clearly of dignity being 
inherent, and thus not accorded to human beings by the state. Human beings are members 
of a ‘human family’, which again provides consideration that humans are separable from the 
rest of nature. Article 1 refers to human beings having been ‘endowed’ with reason and 
conscience from birth, alluding to the endowment of dignity by God, as per the 
Jewish/Christian traditions. Also stated clearly is the proviso of equality. This is fundamental, 
so that all members of the human race possess the same quantity and quality of dignity.  
 
The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESR) and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) both contain the underlying 
principles of human dignity in their respective preambles, for example, in the ICCPR: 
 
‘…recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all 
members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the 
world, Recognizing that these rights derive from the inherent dignity of the human 
person…’180 
 
 
A number of international conventions and charters contain references to the upholding of 
the principle of human dignity, particularly in reference to the prohibition of torture and 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.181 The following are other such examples of 
the use of the term dignity in international law, which indicate the universality of the concept 
in law making: 
                                                          
180 Preamble to The International Covenant On Civil And Political Rights (1966) 
181 See Moeckli D, Shah S, Sivakumaran S, (eds) David Harris (cons ed), International Human Rights Law (OUP 
2010) 209  
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“freedom, equality, justice and dignity are essential objectives for the achievement of the 
legitimate aspirations of the African peoples…”182 
 
“Based on the faith of the Arab nation in the dignity of the human person whom God 
has exalted ever since the beginning of creation and in the fact that the Arab homeland is 
the cradle of religions and civilisations whose lofty human values affirm the human right 
to a decent life based on freedom, justice and equality…”183 
 
‘The American peoples have acknowledged the dignity of the individual…’184 
 
‘The dignity of man is inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be the duty of all public 
authority’185  
 
These examples demonstrate the universal nature and use of the concept of dignity, over 
the course particularly of the 20th century, from North America, to Europe, Africa and the 
Middle East. This is so despite many different religious and social belief systems, political 
stances and ideologies, economies and experiences of war and adversity. The concept of 
dignity is found in the wording of conventions on human rights, as above, but also in national 
conventions and other socio-economic legal instruments, not only in Western jurisdictions, 
but in Africa,186 the Middle East, Asia and further afield. Anne Hughes points out that dignity 
‘began appearing as a concept in constitutions in the first half of the [twentieth] century.’187 
She cites Mexico,188 Weimar Germany,189 Finland,190 Portugal,191 Ireland,192 Cuba,193 
                                                          
182 Preamble To The African Charter On Human And Peoples’ Rights (1981) 
183 Preamble To The Arab Charter On Human Rights (2004) 
184 Preamble To The American Declaration Of The Rights And Duties Of Man (1948) 
185 Article 1, Section1 German Basic Law 
186 Hughes provides an extensive discussion of the use of dignity in South African jurisprudence which exceeds 
the scope of this thesis; Anne Hughes, Human dignity and fundamental rights in South Africa and Ireland 
(Pretoria University Press 2014) 49-50. In a similar context, the reader is directed to discussion on the African 
philosophical concept akin to dignity, of Ubuntu. See, for example Y Makgoro, ‘Ubuntu and the law in South 
Africa’ (1998) 1(1) Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal/Potchefstroomse Elektroniese Regsblad 
http://www.ajol.info/index.php/pelj/article/viewFile/43567/27090 accessed 1st August 2015. See also T Metz, 
‘Dignity in the Ubuntu tradition’ in Marcus Düwell, Jens Braarvig, Roger Brownsword, Dietmar Mieth (eds), The 
Cambridge Handbook of Human Dignity: Interdisciplinary Perspectives (Cambridge University Press 2014) 310ff 
187 Hughes ibid 
188 Political Constitution of the United Mexican States 1917 (amended 1946), Art 3(II)(c),  
189 Constitution of the German Reich 1919, Art 151 
190 Constitution of Finland 1919, Art 15 
191 Political Constitution of the Portuguese Republic 1933, Art 45 
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Spain194 and Costa Rica195 all as jurisdictions which considered dignity a vital ingredient to 
national identity.196 
 
Dignity is said to ‘inform’ rights197, and therefore the human rights which are codified by the 
state in legislation are based upon the concept of dignity. As P Carozza states, human 
dignity in international law is ‘a basic ground of commonality’.198 Human dignity ‘is the source 
of human rights and hence is anterior or above the state…[W]hat follows, consequently, is 
that in the right to dignity is embodied the notion that it is beyond the reach of the state.’199 
Schachter portrays something similar: ‘As a philosophical statement, the proposition that 
rights derive from the inherent dignity of the person is significant. It clearly implies that rights 
are not derived from the state or any other external authority’.200 
 
Glensy states, again from a US Constitutional law perspective; ‘…What has…emerged from 
the domestic legal framework is a dense but very confused picture of the role and meaning 
of human dignity within the ambit of legal rights’.201 Statman elaborates; ‘…on the one hand, 
dignity is assigned supreme importance, but on the other, it has no clear reference.’202 In 
Ritschl’s estimation, human dignity should not be ‘squeezed into quasi legal terminology as 
though [it] were not the platform or frame of reference for human dignity but were a summary 
of human rights in itself.203  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
192 Constitution of Ireland 1937, Preamble, 5th para 
193 Constitution of the Republic of Cuba 1940, Art 20 
194 Charter of the Spanish People 1945, Arts 1 & 25 
195 Political Constitution of the Republic of Costa Rica 1949, Art 56 
196 She explains that among others, the religious influence of the Catholic Church had a part to play in this, Ibid 
50 
197 Christopher McCrudden, ‘Human dignity and judicial interpretation of human rights’ (2008) 19(4) European 
Journal of International Law 655, 681 
198 Paolo Carozza, ‘Human dignity and judicial interpretation of human rights: a reply’ (2008) 19(5) European 
Journal of International law 931 
199 Rex Glensy, ‘The Right To Dignity’ (2011) 43(65) Columbia Human Rights Law Review 142 
200 Oscar Schachter, ‘Human Dignity as a Normative Concept’ (1983) 77(4) The American Journal of International 
Law 848, 853 
201 Rex Glensy, ‘The Right To Dignity’ (2011) 43(65) Columbia Human Rights Law Review 142 
202 Statman in Kretzmer and Klein op cit 227 
203 Ritschl in Kretzmer and Klein op cit 93 
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As Beyleveld and Brownsword illustrate, it is upon reflection of these international legal 
instruments that several ideas of what human dignity is, form. Every individual possesses 
dignity, equally and without question, and this inherent dignity forms the foundation for the 
possession of human ‘rights’.204 As is pointed out in their work, human dignity forms the 
basis for the human rights legislation and for human rights protection in general, but, ‘having 
done its work in grounding human rights, then slips into the background.’205   
 
 
Can Dignity be a Legal Concept? 
 
Given the essential reference human dignity receives in these important international 
conventions, and that it is apparently crucial to a finding that we as humans are deserving of 
rights, we might ask; “Does dignity have some legal standing in its own right, aside from the 
rights it informs?” It is arguable that no pragmatic and theoretically sound legal concept of 
dignity has yet been propounded and agreed upon, and has questionably not been 
sufficiently analysed within legal scholarship.206 It has been said that human dignity is not a 
legal concept at all, but may exist figuratively; as discussed in Chapter 3, Ritschl, for one, 
presents a compelling analysis of human dignity, providing arguments against its legal 
status.207 Equally, it has been said that perhaps dignity is merely a virtue, rather than a legal 
concept or a right in itself.208  
 
Judge Christian Byk explains in the opening sentence to his article assessing the legal utility 
of dignity, that the concept did not appear until after the Second World War as a legal 
reference. As such, he calls into question its utility as a legal concept, stating, ‘The broad 
definition and opposed interpretations create legal uncertainty that may well prejudice the 
utility of the concept of human dignity as well as our trust in the legal system…However, my 
                                                          
204 Deryck Beyleveld, Roger Brownsword, Human Dignity in Bioethics and Biolaw (OUP 2001) 13 
205 Ibid 
206 This is a point made by Denise Réaume, in D Réaume ‘Indignities: Making A Place For Dignity In Modern 
Legal Thought’ (2002) 28 Queens Law Journal 61, 62  
207 In Kretzmer and Klein op cit 
208 Meyer discusses the recent study of the ‘virtues’, and asserts dignity as one thereof. He posits 4 types of 
dignity – ‘social dignity’; ‘special status as human being’; ‘a sense of dignity’ and ‘the virtue of dignity’; Michael 
Meyer, ‘Dignity as a (modern) virtue’ in Kretzmer and Klein op cit 87ff 
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view is that all these difficulties, although very real, are not obstacles that prevent us from 
benefiting from the concept of human dignity.’209 
 
 
Summary and Next Chapter 
 
This chapter has considered the concept of human rights and some theories which present 
rights and duties, liberties and powers. Human rights are natural or ‘moral’ rights, 
independent of legal precedent, but they also exist as prescriptive legal rights. It has been 
discussed that underpinning the concept of human rights is the idea of human dignity. 
Dignity appears to inform and ground moral/natural rights, and thereby directs legal rights 
through international conventions protecting individual rights and entitlements in civil liberties 
and also in socio-economic rights. More explicitly, human dignity, as it has been deduced in 
Chapter 3 to consist of two central themes; inherence in all humanity and as autonomy, is at 
the heart of international human rights theory and law. 
 
In the next chapter, we focus in to a greater degree on one particular aspect of human rights 
and human dignity. We will explore dignity within rights in the ‘European’ context, with a 
focus on Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights, and specifically inhuman 
and degrading treatment. As will be seen, Article 3 and its jurisprudence210 will further 
indicate the veracity of dignity as a normative legal concept. It will also become apparent that 
another theme of dignity begins to present itself; that is the integrity of the person, which 
might be termed personal inviolability. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
209 Judge Christian Byk, ‘Is human dignity a useless concept? Legal perspective’ in Marcus Düwell, Jens 
Braarvig, Roger Brownsword, Dietmar Mieth (eds), The Cambridge Handbook of Human Dignity: Interdisciplinary 
Perspectives (Cambridge University Press 2014) 363  
210 The jurisprudence of Article 3 vis-à-vis its violation is the subject of Chapter 9. 
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5. HUMAN DIGNITY IN ARTICLE 3 OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN 
RIGHTS 
 
 
As a continuation of the previous chapter’s examination of human rights theory and dignity 
as it appears foundational to international human rights law, here there will be an exploration 
of judicial treatment of the concept of human dignity within the European Convention on 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950, (ECHR) specifically in Article 3 ECHR 
cases. As has been highlighted by Jean-Paul Costa, whilst dignity is given a foundational 
position in many international instruments on human rights, and in the UDHR, as discussed 
in the preceding chapter, in the ECHR at least, there is no mention of the concept of 
dignity.211 Thus, this study seeks to locate the idea of dignity within the Articles themselves, 
and for the purposes of this study Article 3 is adopted.  
 
The chapter will demonstrate through its favourable judicial recognition and protection, that 
human dignity can be a judicially recognised, normative concept, and justifiably modelled in 
IPA dignity in the chapters that follow this. It will also demonstrate that there needs to be a 
more precise breakdown of dignity violation for the purposes of this study, than that which is 
given in the Article 3 jurisprudence, which calls for the model of IPA dignity to meet this 
need. Throughout the chapter, as the interpretations of this provision are examined utilizing 
the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR” or “Strasbourg court”), the 
interpretative links between the violation of human dignity and the prohibition of IDT will be 
explored. There will be two sections examining human dignity and Article 3 ECHR.  
 
This first section identifies the concept of human dignity in judicial interpretation of degrading 
treatment in, inter alia the landmark case of Pretty v United Kingdom.212 Jurisprudence 
pertaining to Article 3 of the ECHR demonstrates judicial recognition of, and legal authority 
accorded to, human dignity in human rights case adjudication. This further justifies the 
ensuing construction of the IPA human dignity model. The second section, in Chapter 9 will 
analyse violation of Article 3 and compare to dignity violation by identifying the respective 
forms of dignity violation in the respective cases, and tying these to the relevant elements of 
IPA dignity that are violated by the Article 3 violation. Firstly, in this section, before the case 
                                                          
211 See Jean-Paul Costa, ‘Human Dignity in the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights’ in  
Christopher McCrudden (ed), Understanding Human Dignity (OUP 2013) 394 
212 Pretty v United Kingdom op cit 
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law is examined, the Article is introduced vis-à-vis its constituent elements with consideration 
of some pertinent issues that apply. 
 
 
Article 3 of the ECHR 
 
Article 3 is adopted because it is a right which is non-derogable. This means it is an absolute 
right, which cannot be set aside even in times of war or national emergency. It is also 
adopted because it is a protective right, safeguarding persons from inhuman and degrading 
treatment. The term 'inhuman' points towards the relevance of the Article where we are 
examining human dignity. The Article reads as follows: 
 
‘No one shall be subject to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment.’ 
 
As can be seen, the Article consists of three elements. The first element is torture. This has 
been described as ‘deliberate inhuman treatment causing very serious and cruel 
suffering’.213 The threshold for proving torture in a claim requires demonstration of an 
especially severe degree of pain and suffering, coupled with a specifically deliberate set of 
actions. The second and third elements are inhuman and degrading treatment (IDT).  
The two are often referred to in judgments as one element, as will be seen. The level of pain 
and suffering required to prove IDT differs from torture, as will be explained in what follows. 
Here, degrading treatment will specifically be separated from inhuman treatment, in order to 
demonstrate the courts’ understanding of treatment which diminishes human dignity.  
The leading case defining torture and IDT was Ireland v United Kingdom. This case 
concerned treatment by officials of the state of the United Kingdom towards suspected IRA 
terrorists, which consisted of the use of ‘the five techniques’; wall-standing, hooding and 
deprivation of sleep, subjection to noise and deprivation of food. In spite of the 
circumstances surrounding the detention and treatment of the suspects; that being what the 
British government contended, a state of emergency affecting the life of the nation, no 
derogation could be made from Article 3, an absolute right. Importantly in this case, the 
Court of Human Rights determined the nature of treatment or punishment which would 
amount to torture, or IDT.  
                                                          
213 Ireland v United Kingdom (1979-80) 2 EHRR 25 
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Specifically, regarding inhuman treatment, it held that the techniques caused intense 
physical and mental suffering and also led to acute psychiatric disturbances during 
interrogation, and thus amounted to inhuman treatment.214 Secondly, the techniques were 
held to be degrading, in as much as they ‘aroused in their victims feelings of fear, anguish 
and inferiority capable of humiliating and debasing them and possibly breaking their physical 
or moral resistance’.215 The Court also determined that torture would constitute ‘deliberate 
inhuman treatment causing very serious and cruel suffering’.216  
This describes treatment which will be cruel and barbaric, lacking in human qualities 
perhaps, but with the additional contribution of prolonged and deliberate suffering that is 
exceptional. The Court decided that on the facts no torture had been committed against the 
detainees, but IDT had been applied to them, and therefore the United Kingdom was in 
breach of Article 3: 
Although the five techniques, as applied in combination, undoubtedly amounted to 
inhuman and degrading treatment, although their object was the extraction of 
confessions, the naming of others and/or information and although they were used 
systematically, they did not occasion suffering of the particular intensity and cruelty 
implied by the word torture as so understood.217 
 
Here, our focus is upon the concept of degrading treatment, because it is in judicial comment 
regarding this specific element of Article 3 that the court speaks of the diminution of human 
dignity, and the debasement of the individual. This is important for this study, since we are 
concerned with judicial treatment of the concept of human dignity specifically, as a means of 
providing further legal/normative  justification for its modelling in IPA, later. Before exploring 
the case-law to specifically locate dignity terminology, first some background as to the 
operation and enforceability of Article 3. 
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The Possibility of Self-Infliction 
 
What is the situation where the perpetrator of an Article 3 violation is the victim also? The 
court has not explicitly dealt with the applicant being the source of their own degrading 
treatment. It might be reasonable to ‘treat oneself’ in a certain manner that is necessarily 
harmful to oneself, say through substance abuse.218 The concept of protecting one’s own 
dignity arose in the controversial dwarf-throwing case.219 In that case, the court prohibited 
the practice of dwarf-throwing, which necessarily meant that for Mr Wackenheim, the 
opportunity to earn a living from the practice was terminated. Mr Wackenheim may have 
claimed that his dignity was intact, and that the activities represented no such undignified 
‘treatment’, but the court held that his own dignity was violated by the activities. 
 
In another continental case,220 the German Federal Administrative Tribunal stated that strip-
tease shows, where the stripper could not see or engage with the audience to which she 
performed, represented an infringement upon her dignity. This decision came even in spite 
of the apparent voluntariness of the actions of the stripper in question. In respect of 
treatment, the self-objectification demonstrated here was sufficient to violate the dignity of 
the stripper and was unconstitutional. 
In the unreported case of Tremblay221 the European Court heard a case of alleged forced 
prostitution in unusual circumstances – that by forcing a former sex worker to repay social 
security money, the French authorities allegedly forced the applicant back into prostitution.  
The Court did not have to discuss the issue of whether prostitution itself constituted inhuman 
or degrading treatment under Article 3, but commented that no case law existed which set 
out such a proposition. Its own view indicated that it believed that no prostitution could ever 
truly be voluntary, and was in one way or another ‘forced’, be it by socio-economic 
compulsion or other means. This is a ground-breaking and controversial analysis and 
statement by the ECtHR, given the nuances identified in the sociology of prostitution.  
Having now reached the stage of understanding how Article 3 operates and is enforced, we 
now seek the terminology of human dignity within the relevant jurisprudence of Article 3. This 
leads us to an exploration of degrading treatment. 
                                                          
218 I.e. in E Webster, ‘Exploring the Prohibition of Degrading treatment Within Article 3 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights’ (PhD Thesis, University of Edinburgh 2009) 
 
219 Wackenheim v France, Conseil D’etat [Ce Ass.] Oct 27 1995, Rec Lebon 372 (Fr) 
220 German Peep Show Case (1), 64 BVerfGE 274 (1981) (F.R.G.) 
221 (37194/02) (Unreported, September 11th 2007) (ECtHR) 
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Degrading Treatment 
If Article 3 is considered as three constituent elements, as discussed, torture is at the top 
end of the scale of severity, harm and thresholds required to be met to prove the respective 
treatment (or punishment). This is followed by inhuman treatment, and finally by degrading 
treatment. It is to be noted that there is exists conflation of the different levels of inhuman 
treatment and degrading treatment. Here, these will collectively be referred to as ‘IDT’, 
unless there is specific distinction to be made between the two.  
Unlike inhuman treatment, which has received no specifically separate judicial definition, 
save as to link it to torture,222 the definition of what treatment could be ‘degrading’ has been 
explored in recent ECtHR case-law, notably in the cases of Price223 and Pretty.  
 
In Price, a prison/detention case, the Court reiterated the concept of degrading treatment 
being that whose object was to humiliate or debase the individual concerned’.224 The 
applicant in Price was a severely disabled female committed to prison, and subjected to 
allegedly ‘extremely humiliating treatment’ by prison officers, who also happened to be male 
(although the court found no fault with that procedure). Interestingly, the Court moved away 
slightly from the then standard definition of degrading treatment, holding that even though no 
deliberate humiliating treatment could be proven, the nature of the applicant’s disability and 
the conditions in which she was held, though not ‘deliberate’ in the normal sense of the term, 
were such that a breach of Article 3 could be shown.  
IDT and the application of Article 3 to circumstances involving disabled persons would be 
examined in great depth shortly after Price in the landmark UK case of Pretty.225 In this case, 
the applicant was a sufferer of motor neurone disease which caused progressive muscle 
weakness and had a terminal, degenerative effect upon the sufferer, severely disabling her 
and causing significant suffering to her and her family. The applicant made a decision to 
commit suicide, but required her family’s help in so doing. She sought an undertaking from 
the Director of Public Prosecutions (‘DPP’) that her husband would not be prosecuted if he 
were to assist her to commit suicide. Whilst the commission or attempt of suicide is not 
illegal in the UK, assisting suicide is illegal.  
                                                          
222 As in Ireland v United Kingdom op cit 
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As such, the DPP refused to make such a representation or undertaking and the applicant 
asserted that by failing to do so, the DPP was not allowing her to kill herself, and that the law 
on assisted suicide itself breached, inter alia, Article 3, because it ensured that her suffering 
continued. The threshold of torture being far beyond the claim, the Court considered the 
threshold applicable to degrading treatment in Article 3. It determined that, whereas ‘the 
suffering which flows from naturally occurring illness, physical or mental, may be covered by 
Article 3, where it is, or risks being exacerbated by treatment, whether flowing from 
conditions of detention, expulsion or other measures, for which the authorities can be held 
responsible’, may breach Article 3, there was no breach on the facts.226 
It was ‘beyond dispute that the respondent Government [had] not itself, inflicted any ill-
treatment on the applicant’.227 Thus the absence of de facto treatment or punishment was 
fatal to the applicant’s claim. Pretty was part of a succession of similar ‘right-to-die’ cases 
that the ECtHR heard, specifically dealing with assisted suicide for sufferers of debilitating 
illness. For further case law to this end, see the cases of Purdy228 and, more recently 
Nicklinson229. In the latter case, the court spoke of dignity taken together with autonomy in 
the case of arguments for and against assisted suicide. In the judges’ opinions, the right to 
die encompassed a moral dilemma where autonomy and the inherent dignity of human 
beings was called into question. Both cases were applications brought not under Article 3, 
but principally Articles 8 and 2, respectively.  
 
Human Dignity in Article 3 – A Clear Judicial Definition of Dignity and its Violation? 
In Keenan230 the prison authorities were faced with making a decision as to whether to force-
feed the prisoner. The question of dignity arose with the court. Would it be a greater indignity 
to force-feed the prisoner, than to allow him to starve? Although there is frequent mention of 
dignity and autonomy as joint concepts, and the Court expressed that human dignity would 
indeed be diminished by certain poor treatment of prisoners, there appears in Keenan to be 
no clear explanation of what human dignity is, save for what would violate it.  
What will breach the threshold of degrading treatment will be different in each case. The 
Article retains a fluidity so that it can be applicable to a variety of circumstances and the 
                                                          
226 [52]-[53], [55]; Emphasis mine 
227 Ibid [53] 
228 R (Purdy) v DPP (n 136) 
229 R (on the application of Nicklinson) v Ministry of Justice op cit 
230 Keenan v United Kingdom (application no. 27229/95) (2001) 33 EHRR 38 
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inherent subjectivity of the experiences of claimants.231 Indeed, it is a difficult provision 
through which to set clear objective limits, and perhaps this would be unwise – what might 
be degrading to me may not be to you.232 But within the threshold of degrading treatment, 
we find the concept of human dignity, and specific reference to the diminution thereof as 
being a means by which degrading treatment may be proven.  
Pretty remains one of the most significant recent cases dealing with degrading treatment, 
serious illness and the state’s Convention obligations. Of degrading treatment, the Court 
said that: 
‘…where treatment humiliates or debases an individual showing a lack of respect for, or 
diminishing his or her human dignity or arouses feelings of fear, anguish or inferiority 
capable of breaking an individual’s moral and physical resistance, it may be 
characterised as degrading and…fall within the prohibition of Article 3’.233 
 
The Court breaks down degrading treatment into essentially three parts: that which 
humiliates, debases or shows lack of respect for the victim; that which diminishes human 
dignity; and that which arouses fear, anguish or inferiority capable of breaking moral or 
physical resistance. As will be noticeable from the ensuing violating dignity chapter, there is 
significant crossover between these concepts of mistreatment and harm caused to the 
victim. For example, that which humiliates and debases will naturally also arouse feelings of 
inferiority, for that is precisely what humiliation, in essence entails.234 
If we seek from this judgment a pure definition of what human dignity is we may have some 
difficulty. Is it suggested from the wording that the other two parts of degrading treatment are 
akin to diminution of dignity? Why then is diminution of human dignity separated by an ‘or’? 
This presents some confusion if we are seeking a clear judicial concept of human dignity and 
its violation from Article 3 jurisprudence. This theme is apparent throughout the relevant 
Article 3 case-law.235 
                                                          
231 A point made in Nigel Rodley, The Treatment of Prisoners under International Law (Oxford, Clarendon 1987) 
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This should not cause us too great a concern for the purposes of this thesis. What an 
analysis of Article 3 and its case law, as in Chapter 9 does, is illuminate a third theme of 
human dignity, which is the personal inviolability of each individual. This will be fully explored 
in Chapter 7, where IPA is constructed to include this element of dignity.  
 
Summary and Next Chapter 
Whilst the Article 3 jurisprudence fails to provide a detailed definition of what dignity is per 
se, it does in essence authorise dignity as a pivotal consideration when people are subjected 
to treatment which can be classed as degrading – the lowest threshold of the three elements 
within the Article. By examining Article 3, we can identify a judicially recognised normative 
understanding of the need to respect and protect human dignity.  
The protection of individual human dignity is thus given an international legal status. This 
theme has been confirmed by scholars in the United States, who, in recognition of arbitrary 
references to the principle of dignity have sought to construct legal models thereof for use in 
constitutional law, based on judgments of the US Supreme Court. The next chapter presents 
an analysis of legal considerations and models of dignity from these scholars, with reference 
to associated ideas where relevant. These normative conceptualisations of human dignity 
narrow the concept down into various elements, so that dignity can be useful in a pragmatic 
sense in legal adjudication. 
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6. LEGAL MODELS OF HUMAN DIGNITY 
 
This chapter continues from the previous chapters on human dignity to identify descriptive 
legal models of dignity in the literature, and compare and contrast various elements. It will 
consider respective elements of dignity in those models, in light of the theory and law 
already analysed and justify the adoption of the three elements which will make up IPA 
dignity in the following chapter. So far, the study has considered two central themes of 
dignity, focusing upon some philosophical and theological ideas, followed by an examination 
of human dignity in international law and human rights theory. As stated in Chapter 3, one of 
the problems with attempting to construct a legal model of dignity is that it does not simply 
have one meaning, and instead the term may be applied in a variety of ways, and divided 
into various sub-concepts. Before this chapter considers the approaches of legal theorists to 
model dignity, the next section outlines important non-legal models of dignity which merit 
mention here.  
 
 
Legal Models of Dignity 
 
Some jurisdictions have used human dignity in an adjudicative sense over the years, 
including South Africa.236 Anton Fagan explains that, whilst not ascribing to a particular 
concept of human dignity, the South African Constitutional Court ‘has endorsed [certain] 
Kantian…propositions about human dignity’.237 
The ensuing conceptions are interpretations of dignity238 mainly developed in US 
constitutional legal theory.239 These models were adopted in this study, because they are 
                                                          
236 Sandra Liebenberg has critiqued of the use of the concept of human dignity in respect of adjudication in South 
African jurisprudence; Liebenberg op cit  
237 Anton Fagan, ‘Human dignity in South African law’ in Marcus Düwell, Jens Braarvig, Roger Brownsword, 
Dietmar Mieth (eds), The Cambridge Handbook of Human Dignity: Interdisciplinary Perspectives (Cambridge 
University Press 2014) 404: ‘(1) Human dignity is the value inherent in every human being (the value every 
human being has simply by virtue of being human). (2) This value is infinite and consequently incomparable with 
other values. (3) This value, since it is both inherent and infinite, is equal for all human beings, regardless of their 
character or conduct. (4) Human beings, as objects of value, deserve respect. (5) Human beings, as objects of 
equal value, deserve equal respect. (6) Human dignity, so understood, is the foundation of most (possibly all) of 
the rights in the Bill of Rights.’ 
238 By this it is meant that a standard of dignity is constructed out of various elements. 
239 Carter Snead cites other iterations of dignity in US law, inter alia in criminal law and procedure, and in civil 
rights and anti-discrimination law; Carter Snead, ‘Human dignity in US law’, in Marcus Düwell, Jens Braarvig, 
Roger Brownsword, Dietmar Mieth (eds), The Cambridge Handbook of Human Dignity: Interdisciplinary 
Perspectives (Cambridge University Press 2014) 386ff 
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constructed in response to a concern that dignity was being invoked in Supreme Court cases 
without sufficient consideration of the many iterations of the concept, and of the alleged 
inconsistency of its judicial invocation.240  As such, a number of scholars have in recent 
years sought to construct descriptive models of dignity that would enable there to be a less 
ad-hoc application of the concept in US constitutional law.241 The models of dignity proposed 
by US scholars are outlined here, and the elements of dignity they use are identified. It will 
become clear that these models consist of the central themes of dignity discussed so far, 
and to some extent they expand on those themes.   
In the examination which follows, I draw upon the work of a number of scholars, including 
Leslie Henry and Neomi Rao to understand how dignity has been conceptualised as a model 
for adjudicative use in US constitutional law.242 Before the US versions are considered, the 
work of Christopher McCrudden is addressed, as we begin with the analysis of a ‘Minimum 
Core’ model of dignity. 
 
 
A Minimum Core of Dignity  
 
Christopher McCrudden and Paulo Carozza, in different papers, identify a ‘minimum core of 
human dignity’243, which is, as McCrudden explains agreed by the basic human rights texts. 
This minimum core contains three elements; firstly ‘that every human being possesses an 
intrinsic worth, merely by being human’.244 This is called the ‘ontological’ claim. Secondly, 
that ‘this intrinsic worth should be recognized and respected by others, and some forms of 
treatment by others are inconsistent with, or required by, respect for this intrinsic worth’.245 
This second element is known as the ‘relational’ claim. Finally, as a supplement to the 
                                                          
240 Neomi Rao writes specifically that the use of dignity in its European (as she claims), communitarian 
perspective, would weaken American constitutional principles for individual rights; Neomi Rao, ‘On the Use and 
Abuse of Dignity in Constitutional Law’ (2007) 14 Columbia Journal of European Law 201 
241 I.e. Neomi Rao, ‘Three Concepts of Dignity in Constitutional Law’ (2011) 86(1) Notre Dame Law Review 183 
and Leslie Meltzer Henry, ‘The Jurisprudence of Dignity’, (2011) 160(169) University of Pennsylvania Law 
Review 169  
242 It will be seen that autonomy could be a principal identifying factor of human dignity in these estimations. Rao 
specifically contrasts dignity with autonomy however, because a person who is unable to exercise autonomy 
through incapacity in body and/or mind does not therefore lack dignity. This is a point that will be explored in 
further detail during the formulation of IPA dignity, in the following chapter.  
243 Respectively in Christopher McCrudden, ‘Human dignity and judicial interpretation of human rights’ (2008) 
19(4) European Journal of International Law 655; Paolo Carozza, ‘Human dignity and judicial interpretation of 
human rights: a reply’ (2008) 19(5) European Journal of International law 931 
244 Christopher McCrudden, ‘Human dignity and judicial interpretation of human rights’ (2008) 19(4) European 
Journal of International Law 655, 679 
245 Ibid 
Page 85 of 232 
 
second requirement; ‘a third element regarding the relationship between the state and the 
individual’.246 This final element is known as the ‘limited-state’ claim. As an influential legal 
approach to modelling human dignity, it will be helpful to digest each of these elements in 
turn, with appropriate cross-reference to other scholars’ views and conceptualisation of 
dignity. McCrudden identifies differences in the approach to each of the three elements by 
courts in a variety of jurisdictions including the U.S.A, Germany and Canada.  
 
The approach taken by McCrudden has been termed ‘essentialist’ in its nature, since it aims 
to ‘distil human dignity’ to a core meaning. In her contrasting assessment of dignity, Leslie 
Henry explains why an essentialist approach is not helpful in identifying violations of dignity 
in every case. It is her position that by diminshing dignity to a concrete core, it is difficult to 
be guided as to how dignity is affected in individual cases. A minimum core, therefore, 
requires a further breakdown to be applied to specific cases.247 
 
An ontological claim, and inherent dignity 
 
To begin with, there is the familiar inherent, intrinsic view of dignity, or ‘ontological claim’.248  
The claim relates to the theistic or agnostic, Stoic, and particularly the Kantian theory of 
dignity, with the focus being that our inherent dignity is equal in all peoples. Consider this 
quote of Kant;  
 
“[E]verything has either a price or a dignity. What has a price can be replaced by 
something else as its equivalent; what on the other hand is raised above all price and 
therefore admits of no equivalent has a dignity”249 
 
The focus is upon the individual having such worth that they have no identifiable pecuniary 
value – they are priceless, which has been termed a ‘morality of ends’.250 Persons are not to 
                                                          
246 Ibid 
247 Leslie Meltzer Henry, ‘The Jurisprudence of Dignity’, (2011) 160(169) University of Pennsylvania Law Review 
169, 182. She explains that essentialist and (the opposing) reductionist views (discussed further on in this 
chapter) are not sufficient to deal with the complicated nature of the concept; ‘Standard approaches to 
conceptualizing dignity may be the very reason that dignity skeptics [sic] and antidignitarians [sic] have long 
opposed the word’; 186 
248 This ontological claim is termed by Neomi Rao (see further on) as ‘inherent dignity’, and by Leslie Henry as 
‘Equality as Dignity’ to represent the same intrinsic value of dignity. 
249 Immanuel Kant (Gregor M (tr)) Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1998), 42 [4:434] referred to in 
Jürgen Habermas, ‘The Concept Of Human Dignity And The Realistic Utopia Of Human Rights’ (2010) 41(4) 
Metaphilosophy 464464 (n 4) 
250 Avishai Margalit, The Decent Society (Harvard 1996) 34 
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be regarded as things, but in their immutable inability to be traded as objects, they retain 
their intrinsic dignity. The inherent worth of the individual is universal, and exists regardless 
of a person’s race, sexual orientation, religion etc. One key demonstration of that point is 
that it is commonplace across the globe for funeral rites to be observed, even at times of 
war.  
 
A relational claim, and collective dignity 
 
As suggested in the name, this is to do with the respect for the dignity of the person, 
accorded to them by others in society. This is a notion held by Ritschl, as mentioned, as 
‘human dignity by impartation’.251 Once again, the Kantian categorical imperative also 
appears relevant here – there exists a duty to treat others in such a manner that their dignity 
is respected. The relational claim is not about the way in which people are governed, but the 
way in which they should view each other. As such there is a moral implication involved in 
such a claim – what we ought to do or not to do to each other in furtherance of respecting 
one another’s dignity. Is this not, though, an exclusively communitarian form of dignity? 
 
As will be seen further on in this chapter, this claim is comparable to what is termed 
‘collective virtue as dignity’ in Henry’s model, which she provides is primarily founded upon 
communitarianism; ‘Collective virtue as dignity addresses how members of civilised societies 
ought to behave and ought to be treated in order to respect the collective dignity of 
humanity’.252 It is Henry’s position that ‘[W]hen society treats people in ways that are in-
humane, or when people engage in activities that are de-humanizing, collective virtue as 
dignity diminishes.253 But in spite of the requirements of the community to take responsibility 
for this collective dignity, it remains individual – it is ultimately a one-to-one interaction which 
determines if this idea of dignity is preserved. 
 
To consider the idea further, we might again consider an intriguing case that demonstrates 
collective virtue as dignity, known colloquially as the French dwarf-throwing case.254 The 
activity of dwarf-throwing, where dwarf men and women would be thrown by members of the 
                                                          
251 Ritschl in Kretzmer and Klein op cit 88 
252 Leslie Meltzer Henry, ‘The Jurisprudence of Dignity’, (2011) 160(169) University of Pennsylvania Law Review 
169, 220-221 
253 It is easy to draw associations in the language used with Article 3 of the ECHR, and upon inhuman and 
degrading treatment, which violates the victim’s dignity. Can individuals accord other persons dignity, if they do 
not understand the concept themselves, or have no consideration for others? Chapter 9 explores the violation of 
dignity in Article 3 jurisprudence. 
254 Wackenheim v France as quoted in Rao op cit at [n 164] 
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public for entertainment, was banned by the police. The grounds for the action by the police 
was to preserve public order, and for the protection of dignity. One of the dwarves in an act 
that was shut down, Mr. Wackenheim, contested that by banning his right to take part in 
such contests, he was being denied the right to earn a living in that way. He argued that his 
autonomy was being curbed by the decision. The case progressed to the High 
Administrative Court -the French Conseil d’Etat, which concluded that it deemed the 
behaviour degrading to all members of society because it violated an overriding sense of 
human dignity.  
 
So whose dignity was injured in the process of the dwarf throwing? On the facts, no 
complaints were reported from those taking part, nor their spectators. So why did the state 
step in? The decision rightfully raises some concern for those who seek to model human 
dignity.  It is apparent from this decision that the protection of dignity can invoke state 
paternalism. Such paternalism in protecting dignity is discussed at length by Rao under the 
heading ‘Substantive Conceptions of Dignity’ and in particular, where substantive dignity is 
at odds with inherent dignity, as was clearly the case with Mr. Wackenheim. Can dignity be 
determined by and regulated by the state? This is suggested by McCrudden in the third 
element of the minimum core.  
 
 
The limited-state claim and state-defined dignity 
 
This final element of the minimum core of dignity relates to the state and its policies vis-à-vis 
upholding the principles of human dignity. Rao calls this modified version of communitarian 
dignity ‘dignity as coercion’. It is the principle that the state will prohibit behaviours:  
 
‘that offend social norms of dignity on the grounds that the community may at times look 
after the individual’s dignity better than the individual himself. Although private individuals 
often have judgments about what constitutes a good or dignified life, when such 
conceptions of dignity become legal requirements they can result in coercion. In this 
view, dignity is not inherent and universal; rather, a person can lack dignity when he fails 
to exhibit certain behaviours or qualities.’255  
 
I will term this interpretation of dignity as ‘man-made dignity’. It is not inherent, and as such, 
it clashes with our first core theme of dignity. It can also be lost when a person fails to exhibit 
                                                          
255 Rao op cit 222 
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the behaviour which is socially dignified. As Rao states, this is a ‘…socially constructed and 
politically enforced’ version of dignity.256 It is not difficult to see the dangers of this concept of 
dignity. As Steven Pinker acknowledges, the imposition of a leader’s ideal of dignity may 
lead in the extreme to a totalitarian regime, disregarding individual dignity altogether. Given 
what we understand from the broader conceptions of human dignity, it is somewhat alarming 
that the state could define dignity as it chooses, or enforce it in whichever ways it see fit. 
Certainly, a man-made dignity always has the potential to be politically motivated, and 
corrupted.257  
 
 
Leslie Henry’s observation of Five Concepts of Dignity 
  
We now turn to examine another typology of dignity – according to Leslie Henry. In her 2011 
article,258 Henry sets out five interrelated concepts of dignity that are identified from an 
empirical study of Supreme Court opinions that use the concept of dignity. Like other 
scholars, she identifies the problem, in the United States’ constitutional courts at least, with 
over-generalising and not clearly defining dignity in its judgments. Of the term ‘dignity’; ‘…its 
importance, meaning and function are commonly presupposed but rarely articulated’.259  
 
Indeed, as we have established, a term such as dignity has an extraordinary depth of 
meaning, which can vary from situation to situation. It can be a very ‘light’ term to express 
somebody’s dignity lost perhaps if a practical joke is played upon them, or it might be the 
dignity of a torture victim. Henry, consistent with the findings of this study in Chapter 4, 
quoting Gewirth260 says that dignity is ‘an essential “basis of human rights”’.261 Henry also 
points out that Ronald Dworkin was also a strong supporter of the concept of dignity as a 
                                                          
256 Ibid 
257 Hence the value of the ideal of dignity as inherent – is not imposed by man. It simply exists, either through a 
theistic lens as endowed by God, or otherwise, inter alia, as visible through separation from the rest of the animal 
kingdom. See Chapter 3. 
258 Leslie Meltzer Henry, ‘The Jurisprudence of Dignity’, (2011) 160(169) University of Pennsylvania Law Review 
169 
259 Ibid 172 
260 Leslie Meltzer Henry, ‘The Jurisprudence of Dignity’, (2011) 160(169) University of Pennsylvania Law Review 
169 [n 14] 
261 Ibid 172 
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basis for rights, and stated ‘…“the principles of human dignity…are embodied in the 
Constitution and are now common ground in America”’.262  
 
As is the method of this study in constructing IPA dignity in Chapter 7, Henry’s concepts are 
based on the so-called ‘Wittgensteinian approach’ to conceptualizing terminology; 
contending that dignity has a number of meanings that ‘in Wittgenstein’s words, share 
“family resemblances” to each other.263 What follows from her study are five concepts which 
are linked but are not mutually exclusive. She helpfully draws attention to eight different uses 
of the term dignity,264 and identifies ‘reductionist’ and essentialist approaches to studying 
dignity, (determining McCrudden’s work as the latter).265 In conclusion in her methodology, 
she explains that ‘dignity, therefore, cannot be defined in a permanent way, but must instead 
remain open to revision’.266  
 
 
Institutional Status as Dignity, and the concept of Dignity as Honour 
 
This conception is based on ancient underpinnings, as relates back to the Roman ‘honour’ 
system of dignitas as discussed above. Such a conception in modern terms has to do with 
political status and position in society. This model has less to do with the individual concept 
of inherent dignity, and more to do with what is earned.267 
 
 
Equality as Dignity; Dignity as Inherent 
 
Once again, this is the intrinsic quality of dignity which is universal – applicable to all 
persons. Here, the emphasis goes beyond the inherent nature of dignity to champion the 
equality that this status demands. All humans possess equal worth and therefore warrant 
treatment as an equal, (as opposed to equal treatment).268 
                                                          
262 Ibid, quoting Dworkin at [n 16]. This is backed up in Henry’s article by her methodological approach of 
examining the judgments of the Supreme Court, revealing the regularity of the uses of the term. 
263 Ibid 172, quoting Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (1968) 
264 Ibid 183 
265 Ibid 185-186 
266 Ibid 189  
267 As such, it will not be incorporated into the model of dignity, IPA. This is discussed further in Chapter 7. 
268 As Sandra Liebenberg suggests, in the words of Dworkin in Ronald Dworkin Taking Rights Seriously 
(Duckworth 1977) 227; ‘the acknowledgement of equal moral worth requires treatment as an equal as opposed to 
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 It is this conception which matches best to the ontological claim of the ‘minimum core’ 
model examined earlier. Henry identifies the potential for running into difficulty if inherent 
dignity is only recognised in human beings due to their: ‘displaying certain characteristics, 
such as ‘humans’ unique ability to reason, experience pain, form culture, teach 
collaboratively, have meaningful life projects, and engage in self-reflection…The challenge 
posed by pinning dignity to any of these qualities, however, is that some humans may not be 
able to express the dignity-denoting trait.’269 People who are mentally and physically 
disabled for example, and unable to demonstrate ability to reason, or ‘capacity to express 
most of these characteristics’270 clearly still possess inherent human dignity and worth, as 
much as those who can clearly demonstrate these functions.271  
 
 
Liberty as Dignity 
 
Unlike equality as dignity, this element can be obtained and lost throughout one’s lifetime – it 
is in this description of dignity that one who is unable to express certain traits would not 
qualify as having liberty as dignity.272 This is because liberty as dignity is to do with 
autonomy of the person. Not all persons have liberty all of the time; ‘… [B]ecause it is 
capacity driven, dignity of this kind is contingent – one can gain or lose it over a lifetime. 
For example, young children and mentally incapacitated individuals do not qualify for liberty 
as dignity, but it is not foreclosed to them if and when they gain mental competence’.273  
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
equal treatment…[T]reatment as an equal requires full acknowledgement of the racial, gender, social, economic, 
cultural and other differences between groups in society. Thus the quest for equal worth or dignity is not a quest 
for uniformity, but a quest to eliminate the disadvantages and inferior status that attach to membership of 
particular groups’; Liebenberg op cit 14 
269 Leslie Meltzer Henry, ‘The Jurisprudence of Dignity’, (2011) 160(169) University of Pennsylvania Law Review 
169, 201 
270 Ibid 
271 C.f. Willard Gaylin, ‘In Defense of the Dignity of Being Human’ (1984) 14(4) The Hastings Center Report 18, 
20 discussed previously 
272 Leslie Meltzer Henry, ‘The Jurisprudence of Dignity’, (2011) 160(169) University of Pennsylvania Law Review 
169, 208 
273 Ibid 
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Personal Integrity as Dignity and the inviolable nature of the person 
 
Henry explains that this form of dignity is offended when a person faces ‘dis-integration’ as a 
person – for example when the person is defined by one trait only that reduces that person 
to that single trait and ‘disqualif[ies] the people who possess or express it from a trajectory of 
human excellence or virtue’.274 Defamation is relevant here and so when a person is 
defamed, and thus reduced to the trait of, e.g. ‘adulterer’, or ‘tax-evader’, the focus upon that 
person is placed entirely on the (true or otherwise) statement of their person, and dis-
integration follows the reduction of the person to that single trait.275 The other way in which 
dis-integration may occur is when the individual is ‘only able to present himself as a part of 
his full self, rather than a unified, composed, or collected whole’.276  
 
This idea of dignity is one of boundaries. Personal boundaries are explicitly and implicitly 
expressed by individuals, to maintain physical and mental integrity. The transgression of 
such boundaries amounts to a violation of this element of human dignity. This idea of dignity 
appears highly relevant to the preservation of the inherent dignity of individuals, and as such, 
a violation of this form of dignity, say through sexual assault, would also violate inherent 
dignity. We also see from the analysis of Article 3 in the preceding chapter and in Chapter 9, 
the importance of this iteration of dignity. It will form part of IPA dignity, in the next chapter, 
where it will be examined more completely. 
 
 
Collective Virtue as Dignity 
 
As examined in the above section on the relational claim of the minimum core, this final 
conception of dignity from Henry involves the human being in the community within which he 
or she lives. Henry considers this a communitarian form of dignity, extending beyond the 
individual and seeing him or her as a piece of a larger puzzle. Henry describes this 
conception as ‘refer[ring] to the excellence of the human species. This excellence 
recognizes humans as the best example (arête) of the animal kingdom. Accordingly, 
collective virtue as dignity is expressed when people behave and are treated in ways worthy 
                                                          
274 Ibid 217 
275 Dis-integration is discussed at length in Chapter 8 as it relates to humiliation and the element of IPA dignity 
Personal Inviolability as Dignity. 
276 Leslie Meltzer Henry, ‘The Jurisprudence of Dignity’, (2011) 160(169) University of Pennsylvania Law Review 
169, 219 
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of humans, not beasts.’277 She continues, ‘When society treats people in ways that are in-
humane, or when people engage in activities that are de-humanizing, collective virtue as 
dignity diminishes.278  
 
She links torture with a diminishing of this conception of dignity,279 which again ties in with 
this thesis, and the ties between prostitution, human dignity and Article 3, inhuman and 
degrading treatment. But this form of dignity goes further to encompass the community’s 
viewpoints on the actions of individuals. If the individual conducts themselves in a way which 
conflicts with the community’s view of what is proper, or ‘when individuals engage in 
undignified conduct, their acts may threaten humanity’s collective virtue as dignity’.280 An 
example of such is the dwarf-throwing case as mentioned above. So collective virtue as 
dignity for Henry has a communitarian status.  
 
 
 
Neomi Rao; Legal usage of ‘Dignity’ 
 
Neomi Rao, in her 2011 work281 addressing the legal usage of dignity, identifies three 
conceptions thereof. Firstly, and demonstrating something of a common ground among 
scholars, she considers the inherent claim of dignity in human beings, claiming this to be the 
concept of dignity in its ‘most universal and open sense’.282 Secondly ‘substantive forms of 
dignity’ – which ‘require living in a certain way’283, speaking also of human flourishing. 
Thirdly, a community-oriented ‘dignity as recognition’; which relates, inter alia to modern 
human rights recognition. Rao acknowledges the confusion surrounding the term dignity in 
its legal usage, by comparing it to the terms ‘liberty’ and ‘equality’. This is reductionism, as 
highlighted by Henry.284 Dignity is reduced to another term, such as liberty or autonomy, and 
                                                          
277 Quoting Leon Kass, ‘Human Dignity’ in Leon Kass (ed) Being Human: Core Readings in the Humanities: 
Readings from the President's Council on Bioethics. (Recording for the Blind & Dyslexic, 2005) 568  
278 Leslie Meltzer Henry, ‘The Jurisprudence of Dignity’, (2011) 160(169) University of Pennsylvania Law Review 
169, 221 
279 Ibid 
280 Ibid 222 
281 Rao op cit 
282 Ibid 187 
283 Ibid 
284 Leslie Meltzer Henry, ‘The Jurisprudence of Dignity’, (2011) 160(169) University of Pennsylvania Law Review 
169, 182 
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thus loses its own character and status. Is Rao correct that this is the only way we can 
understand dignity in a legal sense? Lawyers and judges certainly have familiarity with 
different meanings of liberty and equality, values that are a part of our constitutional tradition, 
even if they themselves remain contested ideals. Rao indicates however that dignity 
presents a relatively new legal term, since it has ‘no firm footing and no established range of 
legal meanings’.285  
 
In much the same way as this thesis attempts to do in respect, in this instance with 
prostitution as a socio-legal ‘problem’, Rao hopes to utilise the three concepts to determine a 
range of legal meanings that potentially resolve the problem of the term’s legal status and 
utility. Her conceptions are now considered and cross-referenced to the others here 
discussed. 
 
 
Inherent Dignity, presenting as a negative freedom 
 
Rao’s interpretation of inherent dignity is much the same as McCrudden’s conception, 
tracing a historical path from creation, through Kantian philosophy to international human 
rights law.  
This conception is at odds with state interference: 
 
‘Dignity in this context supports individual autonomy and freedom from state 
interference. The basic idea is that a person’s dignity is best respected or enabled 
when he can pursue his own ends in his own way’.286  
 
This is so-called negative liberty – freedom from interference to pursue one’s own ends, aka 
the protection of autonomy. Rao explains that inherent dignity consists of two requirements, 
drawn from the Kantian understanding of dignity: 
 
‘…[firstly] a presumption of human equality that each person has the same quantum of 
dignity by virtue of his humanity…second, inherent dignity is not measured by an 
external goal of what counts as being dignified or worthy of respect…’.287  
 
                                                          
285 Rao op cit 190 
286 Ibid 203 
287 Rao agrees that what I term ‘man-made’ dignity does not accord with inherent dignity; Ibid 201 
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The right to sexual privacy and free speech are considered and Rao comments on the 
‘intrinsic quality of human beings as capable of formulating their own ends and therefore 
requiring space of freedom for self-definition’.288 Rao provides evidence from a number of 
constitutional cases of the courts’ grappling with the concept of dignity in judging a raft of 
difficult cases.  
 
Substantive Conceptions of Dignity 
 
‘By contrast to inherent or intrinsic dignity, positive conceptions of dignity promote 
substantive judgments about the good life. Dignity here stands for what is valuable for 
individuals and society at large.’289 Rao here speaks of the concept of dignity which is more 
like the limited-state claim of the minimum core – paternalistic to the extent that state-
mandated conditions of human flourishing can be met and dignity satisfied. As she mentions 
this is in sharp contrast to the inherent dignity of the individual as described in her first 
conception. This is a ‘man-made’ dignity in many respects – that determined to be best for 
the individual, even if the individual concerned does not agree. As mentioned above, 
whereas with inherent dignity, it is not determined by externally set goals, aspirations etc., 
with substantive conceptions of dignity, this is precisely the case.  
 
This model of dignity mirrors the limited-state claim of the minimum core, and the collective 
virtue as dignity model in Henry’s typology. Problematic is that the state decides upon what 
is ‘dignified’ behaviour, and paternalism is a real threat to inherent dignity and autonomy. 
Rao cites the dwarf-throwing case also as a demonstration of the tension of these two 
conceptions of dignity. It is pertinent to use a quote of Isaiah Berlin from Rao’s work: 
 
It is one thing to say that I may be coerced for my own good which I am too blind to 
see: this may, on occasion, be for my benefit; indeed it may enlarge the scope of my 
liberty. It is another to say that if it is my good, then I am not being coerced, for I have 
willed it, whether I know this or not, and am free (or ‘truly’ free) even while my poor 
earthly body and foolish mind bitterly reject it, and struggle against those who seek 
however benevolently to impose it, with the greatest desperation.290 
 
 
                                                          
288 Ibid 212 
289 Ibid 221 
290 Isaiah Berlin, ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’, in Isaiah Berlin, Four essays on liberty Vol. 969 (New York: OUP 
1970) 134, cited by Rao op cit 226 at [n 164] 
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Dignity as Recognition 
 
Rao’s final conception is akin to rights protection, the recognition, and thus preservation of 
individual particularity that: 
 
…stands for modern demands that go beyond first-generation civil liberties and even 
second-generation social-welfare rights to require a certain attitude by the state and by 
other people. This is comparable to the relational claim of the minimum core of human 
dignity. The state’s place in this conception of dignity is to ensure that ‘state policies 
demonstrate the proper regard for individual differences.291  
 
 
 
Drawing Conclusions from the Models 
There are some observations and comparisons that can be made between concepts. 
‘Equality as dignity’ and the ‘ontological claim’, are comparable as a reflection of the core 
theme of inherent dignity. The ‘relational claim’ and ‘limited-state claims’ of the minimum 
core appear to coincide with collective virtue as dignity, in that the community’s overarching 
needs and considerations are key, above the individual’s. Therefore the individual’s 
autonomy might be partially or completely overruled in what is best for them to uphold their 
dignity, as determined by the community and state.292 We have discussed the dangers of 
this form of dignity.293 Also a collective dignity, which is based on the premise of what others 
accord could not sit beside inherent dignity in a descriptive model – it would entirely 
contradict inherent dignity.  
Nonetheless, Henry’s five concepts of dignity provide a multi-faceted approach to the 
understanding of the concept. Also this approach is neither ‘reductionist’, nor ‘essentialist’.294 
She goes beyond the historical considerations of human dignity as mentioned above, which 
tended to centralise around inherent dignity alone, to explore autonomy, incapacity, and 
community views on dignity. Henry’s approach is thus preferred.  
                                                          
291 Rao ibid 243  
292 E.g. the case involving Mr. Wackenheim, as discussed; Wackenheim v France op cit 
293 See also Steven Pinker, ‘The Stupidity of Dignity’ (2008) May 12 2008 The Richard Dawkins Foundation for 
Reason and Science http://richarddawkins.net/article,2567,The –Stupidity-of-Dignity, Steven-Pinker, 1  
294 She describes the minimum core of dignity as being essentialist, not context-specific and hence unable to 
cope with a myriad of circumstances in which dignity is called upon; Leslie Meltzer Henry, ‘The Jurisprudence of 
Dignity’, (2011) 160(169) University of Pennsylvania Law Review 169, 178ff 
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Non-Legal Models of Human Dignity 
 
Before constructing IPA in the next chapter, it is important to state that the models here 
reviewed do not represent the entirety of dignity modelling in the literature, although they are 
representative of the legal efforts to do so in recent years. Reviewing these legal models 
has, as mentioned, confirmed the core themes of dignity in the literature. Are there any 
other, non-legal models of dignity which assist in our construction of IPA? 
A review of the literature in human dignity reveals the work of prominent theorists in the field 
of nursing and healthcare, with a particular leaning towards dignity as it relates to the care of 
the elderly. It is recognised that attempts to model dignity in this field have been practised by 
many theorists, and numerous models not referred to here are applied to dignity in 
healthcare and for those in elderly care.295 
 
A key researcher in this niche area of dignity theorisation is Lennart Nordenfelt, who asserts 
that dignity comprises four different ‘kinds’, which share semblance with some of the 
elements discussed above.296 A ‘dignity of merit’ is tied with the institutional status as dignity, 
or the traditional dignitas rank-imposed form of dignity.297 ‘Dignity as ‘moral stature’, as the 
second type, is akin to self-respect, and represents a highly subjective type of dignity. The 
‘dignity of identity’ appeals to personal integrity and elements of dignity that protect us from 
humiliation.298 Finally, what is termed Menschenwürde is essentially drawn from the concept 
of inherent dignity – identifiable across all persons of the human race.299 Immediately in 
Nordenfelt’s presentation of dignity, we see comparisons to the legal models discussed. The 
                                                          
295 Including one particular leading project which was conducted to understand dignity in older generations; 
Dignity and Older Europeans (Fifth Framework (Quality of Life) Programme) European Commission Research. 
More recently, dignity was conceptualised to produce a three-pronged model of dignity. It reveals dignity as 
representative of the body, mind and spirit of the individual, in a holistic approach. Margareta Edlund, Lillemor 
Lindwall, Iréne von Post, Unni Lindström, ‘Concept determination of human dignity’ (2013) 20(8) Nursing Ethics 
851. Such a formulation takes account of considerations of the Nooma of the person, previously discussed in 
Chapter 3, which separates the human being from the animal kingdom. See also Peter Singer on the dignity of 
animals; i.e. Singer (n 114) 
296 Lennart Nordenfelt, ‘The Varieties of Dignity’ (2004) 12(2) Health Care Analysis 69 
297 Nordenfelt explores different senses of this type of dignity, which also consists of ‘informal dignities of merit’, 
some of which can be fleeting; Ibid 72 
298 Hence there is again consideration of a personal inviolability that our inherent dignity accords to us. See also 
Glensy op cit, in which he discusses a ‘proxy approach’ to recognising dignity as a legal right, with the example of 
bodily integrity.  
299 Nordenfelt makes mention of the idea that dignity as it exists as Menschenwürde cannot be lost; Lennart 
Nordenfelt, ‘The Varieties of Dignity’ (2004) 12(2) Health Care Analysis 69, 79. This is a similar understanding to 
inherent dignity adopted in IPA. 
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only apparent difference is the application of the model of dignity proposed, in this case to 
patients in healthcare, rather than in the courtroom. 
In another healthcare model of dignity, Julie Clarke has also defined dignity for its promotion 
in practice. She echoes the ethos of this thesis, which argues for a pragmatic version of 
dignity, stating that; ‘…a standardised understanding is essential for the concept to be 
communicated, researched and used in practice, as well as to generate theory.’300 Clarke’s 
model stems from an understanding of dignity as both objective and subjective. Objective 
dignity is that which represents a fundamental right, whilst subjective dignity is divided into 
‘self-regarding’ and ‘other regarding’ dignity.301 This detailed model of dignity makes 
provision for the cost of dignity ‘loss’ on the self-esteem of a patient. This has a knock-on 
effect upon both mental and physical health.302  
 
 
Summary and Next Chapter 
 
From the review of the core themes, to the international law, and finally the conceptions of 
human dignity above, four elements are highlighted which represent human dignity. First of 
all, human dignity is inherent. The intrinsic/inherent nature of dignity appears to underpin all 
the literature, and foundations of the international law. Secondly, human dignity is personal, 
physical, psychological and emotional integrity or inviolability. Dignity is the integrity of the 
human person, body mind and soul. This form of dignity is particularly apparent from the 
human rights protections contained in the international human rights law, and notably in 
Article 3. Thirdly, human dignity is autonomy. The literature is clear that autonomy, as it 
stands for the freedom of choice over one’s life, demonstrates the possession of dignity. 
Finally, human dignity as traditionally derived from the social contract theories of Hobbes, 
Locke and Rousseau, enunciated by Ritschl as dignity by impartation and discussed in these 
models as accordance to other individuals of respect for their inherent dignity, is collective 
and relational. This is still individualistic human dignity, but is bestowed upon persons by 
others. 
                                                          
300 Julie Clarke, ‘Defining the concept of dignity and developing a model to promote its use in practice’ (2010) 
106(20) Nursing Times 16; www.nursing times.net, citing Leila Shotton, David Seedhouse, ‘Practical dignity in 
caring’ (1998) 5(3) 246 and Jane Haddock, ‘Towards a further clarification of the concept ‘dignity’ (1996) 24(5) 
Journal of Advanced Nursing 924 
301 Clarke Ibid 17ff 
302 Ibid 19 
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This chapter has presented recent legal conceptualisations of dignity, as elucidated partly by 
constitutional law scholars, and also non-legal models of dignity in another discipline; 
healthcare, in order to demonstrate comparisons between the legal and non-legal models of 
dignity.  
The next chapter constructs the IPA model of dignity from the three core themes identified, 
and the utility of IPA dignity will also be expounded to justify the modelling of dignity for the 
purposes of the ensuing socio-legal analysis in Part Five. 
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7. CONSTRUCTING ‘IPA’ DIGNITY 
 
The study has considered that the literature presents three central themes in the language of 
human dignity. When one speaks of human dignity, it is most likely that they are speaking of 
a combination of these elements, or perhaps one or two, depending on the context of the 
discussion or analysis. It is on the premise that these themes exist and they reoccur, that the 
construction of a model of dignity, the IPA model is justified. This chapter will set out the 
rules by which it operates, and it will be both related with and distinguished from the 
particular model upon which it is based, that of Leslie Henry as explicated in the preceding 
chapter.  
The utility of IPA will then be demonstrated and illustrated using some examples. As per the 
conclusion to Chapter 3, and in keeping with the core themes within the literature, inherent 
dignity is defined as a foundational element of the model, without which the other elements 
could not exist. The model will first be constructed as a descriptive model of dignity, 
representing the language of dignity from the literature and the models of dignity already 
examined previously. Following this descriptive approach and the construction of IPA dignity, 
the model will be ascribed a normative framework which will further legitimate and enable 
the model to be utilised to consider the issue of prostitution.  
As this chapter theorizes a model of human dignity, it is pertinent to mention the words of 
Daniel Solove303 in respect of theories such as the ensuing one, to indicate that this is but 
one of many possible approaches to modelling dignity: 
…[the theory propounded] is but a snapshot of one point in an ongoing evolutionary 
process. Theories are not lifeless pristine abstractions but organic and dynamic beings. 
They are meant to live, breathe, and grow…[as well as] be tested, doubted, criticized, 
amended, supported, and reinterpreted. Theories, in short, are not meant to be the final 
word, but a new chapter in an ongoing conversation. 
 
Justifications for the Modelling of Dignity 
The literature has revealed that dignity is hard to define. It is apparent that it means many 
things in multiple contexts. And yet its existence and its value have been presented in this 
study as beyond reasonable denial. It can be inductively determined that academics 
                                                          
303 This point is made by Leslie Henry in relation to her own work, using this quote from Solove, who has 
attempted to conceptualise privacy in Daniel Solove, ‘Understanding Privacy’ (2008) ix 
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generally agree with the suggestion that dignity is inherent in all persons, equally, even 
though that form of dignity need not be mutually exclusive with other ‘forms’ of it. Also 
agreed is that dignity represents autonomous free choice and agency. The suggestion in the 
literature is that dignity exists as an intangible concept, which finds itself based in a number 
of disciplines, each with different approaches.  
Dignity’s existence is also illuminated by actions which represent an affront to dignity. This is 
a particular point made by Avishai Margalit and Daniel Statman with reference to 
humiliation.304 Where a person is humiliated, we can discern that they have been humiliated 
because they have dignity. If the victim of humiliation had no dignity, it would be impossible 
for them to be humiliated. Humiliation, as will be examined in Chapter 8, represents a 
particular mode of dignity violation which offends personal inviolability as dignity. As such, it 
illuminates the presence of inherent dignity.  
As we have seen in Chapter 4, dignity underpins many international legal instruments. In the 
United States, the Supreme Court has made more regular references to the subject of 
dignity in its adjudication, prompting scholars to seek ways of making it more concrete and 
objective.305 Modelling human dignity has also been considered in other contexts. An 
example is in the health and human rights arena, where Jonathan Mann, in 1994 called for a 
taxonomy and epidemiology of dignity violations, which he believed ‘…may uncover an 
enormous field of previously suspected, yet thus far unnamed and therefore undocumented 
damage to physical, mental and social well-being.’306 Mann’s work focused almost 
exclusively on the perceived linkage between health and human rights, illustrating concerns 
that health and wellbeing, impacted upon by violations of dignity, would not at that time be 
fully understood.  
The supposed ‘need’ or maybe desire for a model of human dignity has been propounded by 
US constitutional law scholar Rex Glensy, who said that ‘without a certain specification of 
how fostering of human dignity is to play out within a legal framework, we are left with an 
empty vessel of questionable utility’.307 This study considers Glensy to be correct. If dignity is 
to have a substantive use in applications not only in a socio-legal context but also in legal 
adjudication, then there should be some structural representation of it. In the UK, the courts 
                                                          
304 See Margalit (1996) op cit and Statman in Kretzmer and Klein op cit 
305 As outlined in Chapter 6 
306 Jonathan Mann, Lawrence Gostin, Sofia Gruskin, Troyen Brennan, Zita Lazzarini, Harvey Fineberg, ‘Health 
and Human Rights’ (1994) 1(1) Health and Human Rights 6-23, 18 
307 Rex Glensy, ‘The Right To Dignity’ (2011) 43(65) Columbia Human Rights Law Review 142 
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have not yet fully declared what human dignity is, again demonstrating that a model is 
preferable.308 
It serves as the foundational principle in international law towards the rights of individuals 
and communities. It provides (in principle) protection through international law against 
atrocities committed by peoples. However, aside from Dreier’s statement above, why should 
dignity only be capable of invocation in the most extreme scenarios? If dignity is inherent in 
all humans, then it is relevant in all human situations. We can justify the modelling of the 
concept of dignity, as long as due respect is paid to the need to keep the model malleable to 
different contexts in which it is to be used. This theme is explored below. Firstly, there will be 
a presentation of the ‘anatomy of IPA dignity’ in what follows. 
 
The Anatomy of IPA dignity 
Inherent Dignity  
The model is headed by the core theme of inherent dignity. Firstly, dignity is inherent to all 
human beings of all races and all nations; intrinsic in human beings qua human.309 Since this 
is the case, it follows that this element of dignity is self-evident; it needs no demonstration, 
and also it cannot be removed from any individual by any violating act. As Jacques Maritain 
stated, human rights are ‘owed to man because of the very fact that he is man’.310 So rights 
are based upon the recognition that all persons have an inalienable dignity. Whilst in some 
accounts dignity is considered useless because of the lack of clarity over possessing and 
losing dignity, this element provides a bedrock of dignity – most widely-understood, and least 
rebuttable element of the model of dignity.311 Inherent dignity provides authority and 
grounding for the other two elements which follow.  
 
                                                          
308 For instance, the closest discussion of dignity in a non-human rights case context was in the House of Lords 
case Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza in which it was held: ‘Democracy is founded on the principle that each individual 
has equal value. Treating some as automatically having less value than others not only causes pain and distress 
to that person but also violates his or her dignity as a human being’; [2004] 2 AC 557, [605] Baroness Hale   
309 Principally drawn from the Imago Dei and Kantian concepts of human dignity. As Jacques Maritain stated, 
human rights are ‘owed to man because of the very fact that he is man’; Maritain (n 186) 65. Maritain was a 
prominent Catholic advocate in dignity and human rights development as a contributor to the birth of the 
Universal Declaration on Human Rights.    
310 Maritain (n 186) 65 
311 ‘Least rebuttable’ because it is so widely considered in the literature. It appears to be the first consideration of 
human dignity in academic discourse, in law and in general discourse, perhaps equal only to autonomy. 
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Personal Inviolability as Dignity 
This element of dignity appreciates the wholeness of the person, and the integrity of the 
individual. Acts which violate this element of a model of dignity involve disintegration. As 
Henry states, dis-integration involves the diminishing of the integrity of the person.312 The 
integrity of the person as personally inviolable is based on the premise of their inherent 
worth. Other modes of dignity violation such as humiliation,313 point towards the existence of 
this element of dignity.314 Unlike inherent dignity, this element can be violated, and to the 
point of total loss in the most extreme cases of inhuman or degrading treatment.315 
There are many synonyms for personal inviolability (PI), including ‘bodily integrity’, ‘boundary 
integrity’, ‘bodily no-violation’, ‘personal boundary protection’ and so on. In general it is easy 
to conceive of treatment which would breach PI such as rape or severe violent conduct. The 
main thrust of PI is that a person possesses a body, which need not be consistent of two 
arms, two legs etc. but possesses a body which is identified as human.316 That body is 
inviolable by virtue of the inherent dignity of the person. It is not always about physical 
integrity but also about psychological, spiritual wholeness.317 Since dignity inheres in human 
beings qua human, PI as dignity respects the wholeness of the individual.  
 
 
 
                                                          
312 See Leslie Meltzer Henry, ‘The Jurisprudence of Dignity’, (2011) 160(169) University of Pennsylvania Law 
Review 169. Dis-integration is also discussed at length by other scholars, including Avishai Margalit op cit 
313 The exclusive study of humiliation is relatively modern, and prominent research includes the work of Linda 
Hartling, in Linda Hartling, Tracy Luchetta, ‘Humiliation: Assessing the impact of derision, degradation, and 
debasement’ (1999) 19(4) Journal of Primary Prevention  259. See also Donald Klein, ‘The Humiliation Dynamic: 
An Overview’ (1991) 12(2) Journal of Primary Prevention 93. For humiliation and human rights, see Lindner op 
cit. 
314 I.e. Statman in Kretzmer and Klein op cit 211ff speaks about humiliation being a tool that actually indicates the 
presence of human dignity – i.e. it is illuminated by its violation. 
315 As explored, Article 3 ECHR is especially useful to highlight a legal grounding of the violation of human 
dignity, in degrading treatment. Inhuman and degrading treatment as they relate to and, at times, hinge upon 
human dignity, have been considered vis-à-vis Article 3 ECHR and the violation thereof, in the chapter ‘Violating 
Dignity’. 
316 It is hard to conceive of a valid argument that, as in a case of extreme disability, one might not be considered 
completely ‘human’, even where the body is not recognisable as such. Any such legal arguments may rightfully 
be excluded as de minimis non curat lex. 
317 The soul (Greek nooma) is recognised as the persona of the individual. This may be transgressed by dignity 
violation of personal inviolability. Hence the colloquialism that ‘rape is the murder of the soul’, because it 
transgresses more than just the bodily integrity of the victim. This is discussed at length with regard to dis-
integration of the person. 
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Autonomy as Dignity  
Dignity is expressed and actually presents itself through agency and autonomous thought 
and or action. Henry terms this aspect of the concept of dignity as ‘liberty as dignity’. She 
maintains that this element can be obtained and lost throughout one’s lifetime – it is in this 
description of dignity that one who is unable to express certain traits would not qualify as 
possessing liberty as dignity.318 ‘… [B]ecause it is capacity driven, dignity of this kind is 
contingent – one can gain or lose it over a lifetime. For example, young children and 
mentally incapacitated individuals do not qualify for liberty as dignity, but it is not foreclosed 
to them if and when they gain mental competence’.319  
It might be taken that autonomy should be considered as the ratio essendi for the 
possession of dignity – that autonomy is the cause or the one ground for the possession of 
human dignity, and this would certainly accord with a Kantian understanding of autonomy.320 
This thesis maintains that autonomy is a fundamental representation of human dignity, whilst 
not being the sole cause for the possession of it. Personal inviolability and autonomy both 
provide individual representations of human dignity in the literature, with their own normative 
claims embedded within.    
 
IPA informed by Henry’s Model 
Firstly, this proposed model of dignity is informed by the literature, and the broad concepts of 
dignity already presented. More specifically however, IPA is drawn from the model of dignity 
developed by Leslie Henry,321 which was expounded in Chapter 6. Why was Henry’s model 
considered so informative, and not, for example, the minimum core? 322 The answer to this 
methodological question is three-fold.  
First, the model is fluid in its approach to dignity. Henry’s approach dictates that a descriptive 
model of dignity cannot be a solid, immovable concept, but must remain open to revision. 
Secondly, the concepts are interrelated and overlapping, but also distinguishable from one 
                                                          
318 Leslie Meltzer Henry, ‘The Jurisprudence of Dignity’, (2011) 160(169) University of Pennsylvania Law Review 
169, 208 
319 Ibid 
320 I also take it that this is the view of Beyleveld and Brownsword in their approach to dignity. 
321 In Leslie Meltzer Henry, ‘The Jurisprudence of Dignity’, (2011) 160(169) University of Pennsylvania Law 
Review 169  
322 As the apparent corollary to Henry’s model. This is both a point she enunciates and also one which is 
observable from reviewing each model. 
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another. Equally, keeping to the Wittgensteinian approach, it can be adapted contextually. 
Henry describes her approach: 
This approach views dignity not as a concept, but as many conceptions. Dignity is not a 
fixed category, but rather a series of meanings that share a Wittgensteinian family 
resemblance. The types of dignity I discerned from the [US Supreme Court’s] opinions 
are as distinct as individual family members are unique, but like siblings, they have 
overlapping characteristics. In contrast to the standard approach to conceptualizing 
dignity, these types cannot be combined to forma Venn diagram with an unchanging 
central core. The types are context sensitive, and an overlap that appears in one 
situation may not appear in another. 323 
 
As will be clearer when the IPA model is given a normative framework, at the end of this 
chapter, how it is used to consider one social issue can be different to how it is applied to 
another one. This is important in that it can be malleable to unusual contexts. In this study, it 
will be applied to the prostitution encounter, but it might be later applied to a euthanasia 
issue, with very different considerations, as per the normative framework of Finnis, 
explicated shortly. This is an idea similarly articulated by Jürgen Habermas: 
…the experience of the violation of human dignity has performed and can still perform, 
an inventive function in many cases…in light of such specific challenges, different 
aspects of the meaning of human dignity emerge from the plethora of experiences of 
what it means to be humiliated and be deeply hurt. The features of human dignity 
specified and actualized in this way can then lead both to a more complete exhaustion 
of existing civil rights and to the discovery and construction of new ones.324 
 
Finally, the approach recognises the foundational legal status of human dignity underpinning 
human rights legislation. So IPA aligns well with the ideals of Henry’s model, but as the next 
section explains, it is also distinct and unique.  
 
 
 
                                                          
323 Leslie Meltzer Henry, ‘The Jurisprudence of Dignity’, (2011) 160(169) University of Pennsylvania Law Review 
169 188 
324 Jürgen Habermas, ‘The Concept Of Human Dignity And The Realistic Utopia Of Human Rights’ (2010) 41(4) 
Metaphilosophy 464, 467-468 emphasis mine.  
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IPA distinguished from Henry’s Model 
Whilst Henry’s model of dignity contains ‘Institutional Status as Dignity’, the IPA model does 
not adopt this element. To use this understanding of dignity in the same model as inherent 
dignity could not work, since dignity as inherent is distinct from a notion of a man-made form 
of dignity. A dignity which is bestowed upon persons for the status they accrue in their 
lifetime, or from rank or position in society seems to be at odds with inherent dignity, but this 
does not rule out the value we put on this status and apply, therefore, to ourselves and that 
can be harmed (i.e. reputation). Thus there may be a connection between status and our 
internalisation of dignity as ‘self’ or identity. Still, it is could be reasoned that this is a form of 
dignity which is earned, or even inherited. It is exclusive, and this runs against the idea of 
human dignity being all-inclusive.325 
Equally, the concept of dignity being collective is recognised as persuasive, yet not 
incorporated into the model here, for the same reasons as the exclusion of institutional 
status as dignity. These themes cannot align appropriately alongside inherent dignity, and 
are therefore not used here. This collective dignity may operate in two ways - as ‘commonly 
held’ (inherent) means if in inherent in me then also must be inherent in you, or collective 
(communitarian) if ‘assigned’ through a general will, then not necessarily inherent.  
The preceding chapters have presented the ongoing ‘conversation’ of human dignity in a few 
selected fields of academic research. Of course, IPA is not intended to, and obviously 
cannot be the final word on human dignity. It is part of the evolutionary process of 
deciphering a complex concept, and attempting to make use of it on the basis that it appears 
from the literature to have extraordinary value and international recognition. If such attempts 
are not made, that evolutionary process becomes stagnant or even comes to a halt. This 
would cause us perhaps to miss out on a unique approach to socio-legal issues such as 
prostitution.  
 
Summary and Next Chapter 
So far this thesis has constructed a model of human dignity which has been deduced from 
the literature on human dignity. IPA thus represents various discourses of dignity and the 
themes apparent therein, which centre on the concept of inherent dignity – as inalienable 
                                                          
325 It is understood why Henry includes this concept of dignity in her typology, and it is represented in the 
empirical data she presents. In this model, however, the idea is to found dignity on an understanding of inclusion 
and applicability to all peoples. The homeless child has the same quality of IPA dignity as the wealthy aristocrat. 
For further critique on dignity as ‘rank’, see Michael Rosen, ‘Dignity: the Case Against’ in Christopher McCrudden 
(ed), Understanding Human Dignity (OUP 2013)  
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individual worth, present equally in all humanity. As this chapter has expressed, IPA is useful 
to determine what themes dignity presents as. This is certainly in keeping with Henry’s 
Wittgensteinien ‘family resemblances’ approach to language to determine what the themes 
of dignity.  
Thus far this thesis has presented the study of human dignity in philosophical iterations and 
in legal models. The next chapter examines the idea of dignity violation, by examining and 
presenting different modes of dignity violation  
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8. VIOLATING DIGNITY 
 
Now that the IPA model has been constructed, it is necessary to consider once more the 
Honeyball report. In the report it is suggested that prostitution amounts to a violation of 
human dignity. So far the thesis has concentrated on how dignity can be understood through 
the parameters of the IPA model. This provides some objective measure of human dignity 
which can be used to understand what is meant by the language of dignity adopted in the 
report. This fails to assist in identifying what it means for dignity to be ‘violated’ however. 
Using a standard definition of the term violation will not provide much scope for an analysis 
of the kind needed to address the hypothesis to this study. More is needed, and this will 
involve utilising research which has specifically focused on the violation of dignity. A review 
of the literature identifies a taxonomy that has will be applied to IPA dignity to help 
understand its violation. This chapter explores the proposition that human dignity can be 
violated by certain courses of action and presents these as various ‘modes of dignity 
violation’. These modes of dignity violation will be identified and considered alongside the 
three elements of dignity presented in the model.  
 
What is meant by “Violation”? 
The term violation can have a number of normative interpretations, and so some refinement 
is needed to keep the scope of the examination limited to the methodology of this study, 
which is socio-legal. Therefore there are two particularly ‘legal’ iterations of the term 
‘violation’, which will be explicated here. These are ‘breach’ and ‘harm’. By considering these 
synonyms of violation, we can better understand what is meant in a legal mind-set, of the 
term ‘violation’. Firstly, violation may be akin to the term ‘breach’. This can be seen in the 
English law of tort, for example where the language of duty and its respective breach by a 
defendant is used in a claim of negligence. In the tort of negligence, there exists a duty 
which is owed by the defendant to the claimant. That duty may be breached by the 
defendant, which may or may not result in some damages being suffered by the claimant. 
What is true to say is that the duty, a special, perhaps fiduciary, relationship between the two 
parties, is violated because of that breach. Furthermore, that violation of the duty can 
amount to harm caused to the claimant. 
We also see the term breach used in other areas of English law, but equally in international 
law, too; for example in human rights claims it is common to use the language of a ‘breach’ 
of rights. In a human rights case, a breach of rights is the result of an act or omission which 
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prevents the individual from enjoying a right they possess, or it might do something to 
someone which directly or indirectly infringes upon a right. If we consider again the 
Hohfeldian schema which was mentioned in chapter 4, individuals may possess various 
rights, consisting of claim-rights, powers, or liberties. They may also have duties. An 
example in the schema would be where Jill has a claim-right that Jack should perform X, if 
and only if Jack has a duty to Jill to perform X. Jill’s claim-right is correlative to Jack’s duty. 
In order to determine the rights of individuals as they interrelate in the Hohfeldian schema, 
certain questions must be asked.326 For the purposes of this example, if Jack does have a 
duty to Jill to perform X, and yet does not perform X, he has breached her claim-right. More 
extreme examples can be found in the Article 3 jurisprudence, in the next chapter. In those 
cases, there is a negative duty; that is not to do some act towards an individual. By then 
doing that act there is a breach of that right. Violation may be seen then as a form of 
breaching of rights, if it is to be interpreted as per human rights theory. In this sense, 
violation of rights can occur where actions are done which infringe a right, or are not done in 
in infringement of a duty.  
Another interpretation of violation is ‘harm’. This will be recognised as based in criminal legal 
theory, and the work of Joel Feinberg is notable in this field. In reference to Feinberg’s 
terminology for what he calls, ‘the manner in which acts and other events affect interests 
when they harm them‘, or, as I will term it, ‘modes of harm causation’, he selects violation, as 
a mode of harm causation.327 The framework for this harm causation is the interest(s) of the 
‘wronged’ party. Violation of an interest will harm that interest. Feinberg, at the beginning of 
this work, considers that harm, as per the ‘harm principle’328 can be measured, inter alia as 
what ‘wrongs’ another person, or what thwarts, sets back or defeats an interest. With 
violation, it is the person’s rights which are under invasion:  
The term “violate” fits acts of harming in the “relatively narrow sense” that we will 
assign to “harm” as that work is understood in the harm principle. Harm in that sense 
                                                          
326 For example - Who are the parties who hold duties that give effect to Jill’s right(s)? What is the content of that 
duty(s)? What is the identity of Jack as correlative claim-right holder? Under what condition(s) might Jill lose her 
claim-right, and what are (if any), the conditions under which Jill might waive her claim-right? What are the claim-
rights, powers and liberties of Jill, in the event of non-performance of the duty(s)? What are the liberties of Jill, 
including a specification of the limits of those liberties (a specification of Jill’s duties (if only), including of non-
interference with the liberties of other claim-right holders of the same claim right, or of another recognized 
right(s)? What is the specification of the claim-rights of Jack? 
327 Additional synonyms he uses for harm are thwarting, invading, impairing, setting back, defeating, impeding 
and dooming interests. Joel Feinberg, Harm to Others: the Moral Limits of the Criminal Law (OUP 1984) 52. It is 
supposed that mere expressions of disrespect for values such as personal integrity or autonomy, as elements of 
human dignity, would not in themselves constitute a violation; see T Khaitan, ‘Dignity as an Expressive Norm: 
Neither Vacuous Nor a Panacea’ (2012) 32(1) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 1 
328 See also John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (Longmans 1869). Mill speaks of criminalising only conduct which 
causes harm to another, not merely oneself. This harm principle thus serves to inform criminal legislation. 
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has two components, one a violation of the victim’s rights (a wrong to him) and the 
other a certain deleterious effect on his interests, which we are here trying to make 
clearer. The word “violate” suggests the element of wrongfulness, but does not add 
anything to our understanding of the nature of the effect on interests. It is by no means 
an inappropriate term to use when characterizing wrongful harms, but it has no analytic 
power to explain what it is to have a damaging impact (wrongful or innocent) on 
interests. Natural events like fires and earthquakes cause harm in the purely interest-
afflicting sense, but only persons acting improperly “violate” interests. Strictly speaking, 
it is the victim’s rights that are violated when his interests are wrongfully damaged, 
and…rights can be violated even without harm to interests.329 
 
For the purposes of this study, and the ensuing application, we consider violation legally as 
an amalgamation of the two expressions – both a breach of legal rights, and a measure of 
harm to interests. But there is a restriction on how we can directly apply these ideas to IPA 
dignity if we do not go further, since IPA dignity is not a collection of rights per se. It is 
perhaps most appropriate to consider violation of dignity not as a ‘breach’ thereof, but as 
some course of action which encompasses possible ‘harm’ to dignity, i.e. some course of 
action which is detrimental to human dignity. Chapter 10 will explore the concept of human 
flourishing as a reflection of human dignity, and in essence, violation should be seen as a 
course of action which is detrimental to that flourishing. For now, this chapter will consider 
what exactly dignity violation might look like, and for this, we need to go beyond the fairly 
bland legal understanding of violation, and consider some alternative approaches. As 
discussed in chapter 6, research from the health and caring sciences sector provides much 
depth and nuances of language used to consider the dignity of patients with degenerative 
illness. From this field we find research which examines ways in which a patient’s dignity 
might be violated. It is to this research that we now turn in order to enrich our understanding 
of the concept of dignity and its violation.  
 
A Taxonomy of Dignity Violation 
Nora Jacobson’s 2009 health and human rights research provides a unique ‘taxonomy of 
dignity violation’.330 In order to identify violation of dignity, Jacobson sets out behaviours or 
                                                          
329 Feinberg op cit 52ff  
330 Nora Jacobson, ‘A taxonomy of dignity: a grounded theory study’ (2009) 9(3) BMC International Health and 
Human Rights 1. Jacobson is not alone in producing such a taxonomy. Other scholars have also indicated what 
behaviours may be an affront to dignity. For instance, see Oscar Schachter, ‘Human Dignity as a Normative 
Concept’ (1983) 77(4) The American Journal of International Law 848-854 at 852, where he lists various ways in 
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acts towards others which demonstrate dignity violation. I will call these ‘modes of dignity 
violation’. Her research identifies that there are a range of possible processes which occur in 
the experience(s) of the victim which could violate dignity, which I expand upon in what 
follows. There will also be consideration of ancillary ideas which align with Jacobson’s 
research from some prominent authors. The principal objective of the remainder of the 
chapter is to flesh out the concept of violation in order that certain modes of dignity violation 
can be made visible, which will be utilised in the analysis later on.  
 
Modes of Dignity Violation 
Exploitation  
Exploitation is defined in recent legislation as ‘encouragement’ or ‘requirement’,331 and 
‘subjection to force, threats, abduction, coercion, fraud or deception’.332 The relevant 
legislation provides protections for victims of human trafficking, and so that context is noted. 
It is helpful, however to consider what the legislature consider exploitation to be. Exploitation 
is ‘using an actor or viewing him or her only as a means to an end’,333 says Jacobson, akin to 
a Kantian categorical imperative ideal of dignity diminution. Much has been written, debated 
and reformed on exploitation particularly in the context of capitalist vs communist labour in 
Marxist theory,334 including some modern theories on ‘needs exploitation’, which provide 
more modern ideas of exploitation in the employer to employee relationship.335 In such 
theories, exploitation is in the context of the state’s power over the working class. Marx 
introduces the term “exploitation”’ ‘in the context of discussing the origin of capitalist 
profits…unpaid, surplus labor [sic]’336  
As Holmstrom indicates, for Marx it was: 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
which dignity can be affronted. They include ‘statements that demean and humiliate individuals or groups 
because of their origins, status or beliefs’ and ‘denial of the capacity of a person to assert claims to basic rights’. 
Unlike Jacobson’s taxonomy, which has universal, (and thus capable of socio-legal) application, Schachter’s 
appears to apply to specific human rights scenarios, such as imprisonment. 
331 Human Trafficking and Exploitation (Criminal Justice and Support for Victims) Act (Northern Ireland) 2015, 
s.3(4) 
332 Ibid, s.3(5) 
333 Jacobson op cit 5 
334 i.e. John Roemer, A General Theory of Exploitation and Class (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1982) 
335 Jeremy C Snyder, ‘Needs Exploitation’ (2008) 11(4) Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 389 
336 Nancy Holmstrom, ‘Exploitation’ (1977) 7(2) Canadian Journal of Philosophy 353, 358 
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…not the fact that capitalists have some, or even a very large income that is 
exploitative. It is the fact that the income is derived through forced, unpaid, surplus 
labor [sic], the product of which the producers do not control, which makes it 
exploitative.337 
For Marx, ‘the essential difference between different exploitative systems lay only in the 
mode in which the surplus was extracted from the producers’. Holmstrom says that there are 
four features of exploitation: ‘…it is the production of a surplus, appropriated from the 
producers, uncompensated for, and forced’.338 In Sensat’s estimation, there exist two 
frameworks of exploitation, the first of which consists of, in part individual theories of 
exploitative conduct, across which some ideas stand out. Firstly, ‘an exploitative state is one 
in which some individuals benefit at the expense of others’.339 Second, ‘whether a state is 
exploitative depends on whether a certain kind of alternative to that state is feasible’340 The 
second framework is more akin to the context of the present study, and presents some 
important issues regarding the concept of exploitation when we think in sociological terms, 
towards human beings:  
In ordinary contexts the term “exploitation” is often used to refer to a use of something 
which is either not a sort of use for which the thing was designed or otherwise fails to 
be a realization of an assumed nature or purpose of the thing. For example, one does 
not exploit a concert by attending it in the usual fashion even though one is using it as a 
means to an end, but one does exploit it by passing out fliers to the audience on their 
way out advertising one’s clothing store down the street341 
 
The challenge to a negative realization of exploitation comes in Sensat’s estimation, that 
‘one can exploit something in the present sense without acting in any way contrary to the 
realization of its nature, as in the case of nonharmful [sic] parasites for example.’342 The 
second framework is more reliable than the first, because ‘it does not suppose social 
neutrality…does not require exploitation to be a distributive phenomenon…[and] it avoids the 
pitfalls of relativity to the resource base.’343 This means that in this second framework of 
exploitation, Sensat considers that ‘exploitation can take place even when there is no 
                                                          
337 Ibid 359 
338 Ibid 360 
339 Julius Sensat, ‘Exploitation’ (1984) 18(1) APA Western Division Meetings 21, 23 
340 Ibid 
341 Ibid 33 
342 Ibid  
343 Ibid 
Page 112 of 232 
 
feasible alternative in which the exploited is better off, and innocence of material conditions 
is not presupposed’344 It allows human beings to be exploited not only by others but also by 
institutions and social systems.345 So exploitation may occur even where there is no 
alternative to that exploitation. Perhaps then, it does not rely upon a specific intention to 
exploit, as may have been thought. Such unintentional exploitation may occur where, for 
example, the exploiter has the belief that the recipient or exploitee is not worthy of respect, 
or may not have an understanding of what according others with respect actually requires. In 
other words, unintentional exploitation may occur through ignorance on behalf of the 
exploiter, and/or the exploitee.346 This is very applicable to prostitution as an institution. One 
might consider that that sex workers might be exploited, not by the client, but by the social 
situation they find themselves in (and the legal policy which may be an additional burden 
upon them). Exploitation can take place without any particular directed intention by one party 
to another. Aligned with exploitation is trickery, which Jacobson says is ‘…taunting, lying, or 
manipulating for material gain or psychological advantage’.347 The emphasis is on the act of 
a party in providing false information to the victim, which causes them to do something 
[presumably] to the exploiter’s advantage. Exploitation, as discussed is applicable to 
inherent dignity because it is an affront to respect for humanity. In a manner similar to 
objectification, and dehumanization, it makes ‘use’ of persons which violates the special 
property of humanness that inherent dignity represents. 
 
Objectification  
This form of dignity violation is more specific than ‘objectification theory’, which is explained 
in one article as ‘[positing] that girls and women are typically acculturated to internalize an 
observer’s perspective as a primary view of their physical selves.’348 Objectification theory in 
feminist thought is described by Humm as ‘the primary form of the subjection of women’ 
making reference to Catherine MacKinnon. ‘It is the male epistemological stance’.349 
Objectification theory research can be found principally in feminist thought on pornography. 
                                                          
344 Ibid 35 
345 Ibid 
346 Ruth J Sample, Exploitation: What it is and why It’s Wrong (Rowman & Littlefield 2003) 58 
347 Jacobson op cit 5 
348 Barbara Fredrickson, Tomi-Ann Roberts, ‘Objectification theory’ (1997) 21(2) Psychology of Women Quarterly 
173, 173 
349 Maggie Humm, The Dictionary of Feminist Theory (2nd edn, Prentice Hall/harvester Wheatsheaf 1995) 191 
Page 113 of 232 
 
Here we speak about the treatment of one person to another, where the diminution of their 
very status as human results in diminution of their human dignity.  
Therefore if a person is subjected to objectification, they are treated as if they are more like 
an object than like a human being, which can then lead to diminution of dignity. This is held 
by Jacobson as ‘treating an actor like a thing, not a person’. Of particular relevance to this 
study, (since the taxonomy in question is written from a feminist [probably Gender and Male 
Violence] epistemological approach), is that of Martha Nussbaum, in her seminal work on 
objectification.350 Nussbaum outlines seven ‘modes’ of objectification, and explores these 
principally with reference to the work of prominent feminist writers, Andrea Dworkin and 
Catherine MacKinnon. This study focuses on the legal theory of human dignity applied to the 
social issue of prostitution, Nussbaum’s taxonomy deals with the issues and ideas behind 
objectification in a sexual context, and so such a model is deemed suitable for this 
application.  
The seven modes are as follows: Instrumentality: The objectifier treats the object as a tool of 
his or her purposes; Denial of autonomy: The objectifier treats the object as lacking in 
autonomy and self-determination; Inertness: The objectifier treats the object as lacking in 
agency, and perhaps also in activity; Fungibility: The objectifier treats the object as 
interchangeable a) with other objects of the same type, and/or b) with objects of other types; 
Violability: The objectifier treats the object as lacking in boundary-integrity, as something that 
it is permissible to break up, smash, break into; Ownership: The objectifier treats the object 
as something that is owned by another, can be bought and sold, etc.; and Denial of 
subjectivity: The objectifier treats the object as something whose experience and feelings (if 
any) need not be taken into account.351 
As Nussbaum points out, objectification will only occur where the thing being so treated is 
not already an object.352 To each of the above, objectification occurs when the term ‘object’ 
in each example, is replaced by ‘person’. The modes are mutually exclusive, but as she 
hypothesises, objectification will be clearer where more than one is clearly demonstrated.353 
Some, in isolation would be difficult to prove ‘complete’ objectification; i.e. inertness, whilst 
ownership clearly completely objectifies the person ‘owned’. There is also apparent overlap 
between modes, so, for example, ownership encompasses almost all the other six. This will 
                                                          
350 Martha Nussbaum, ‘Objectification’ (1995) 24(4) Philosophy & Public Affairs 249 
351 Ibid 257 
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Page 114 of 232 
 
become more apparent as we review the individual modes in what follows. With 
instrumentality, one is used as a tool of another’s purposes in perhaps a variety of ways.354 It 
might be argued that a professional football player is used as a tool of the football club’s 
purposes. Objectification in this example is harder to prove perhaps, since the footballer is 
paid (often vast sums of) money to perform that role. So it is with many within an employee-
employer relationship – the employee is utilised by the employer for their skills and abilities, 
manual labour, intellectual ability and so on. The employee is not objectified in the complete 
sense, because there is an element of autonomy which allows the employee the choice to 
leave that role. There is no ‘ownership’ in the sense here depicted.  
Economic strains employees can face impact upon free choice, so it might be counter-
argued that employees can be ‘forced’ into continuing their labour aside from their own 
desire. Now we turn to the denial of autonomy. As discussed in the previous chapter, 
autonomy is inextricably tied in with dignity, and together with democracy, forms part of the 
foundational ‘spirit’ of the European Convention on Human Rights. Denying one’s autonomy 
provokes a sense of injustice. It is offensive to our preconceptions of living a life free from 
totalitarian control. In comparison to the first mode of objectification, when a person denies 
another person their autonomy, perhaps the latter is more greatly objectified than those used 
as instruments or tools of another’s purpose alone. Also, denial of autonomy is inextricably 
linked with complete ownership. As mentioned by Nussbaum in relation to her word 
processor, an instrument which has no autonomy is not inert, but active, and yet still treated 
as an object. Slaves are not inert but are on the contrary, active and used as tools for the 
purposes of their owners.  
With fungibility, the object is interchangeable with other objects deemed to be of the same 
type and worth. To treat persons as fungible denies that they are unique; that they are 
individuals, and instead that they are like a currency, to be exchanged without concern for 
their thoughts and feelings. As such, denial of subjectivity is clearly linked with fungibility. 
Violability denotes the violation of boundaries. Personal Inviolability in IPA is the protection 
of those boundaries, which may be physical or psychological. In this context bodily integrity 
is perhaps the most obvious, but it may be that other areas of normative inviolability can be 
infringed upon such as family/personal life. The issue of consent is probably important, 
although a violation occurs with or without consent. Consent merely provides some 
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justification for the violation. Dis-integration is an offence to personal inviolability, and treats 
a party as violable.355 
Ownership incorporates, inter alia, denial of autonomy. This is the strongest form of 
objectification. Ownership is ‘…by definition incompatible with autonomy’.356 With trafficking 
for sexual exploitation, or modern slavery, ownership of victims by pimps or criminal gangs 
and syndicates denies autonomy, and instrumentality, violability, fungibility and probably 
others. Ownership may be described in itself as objectification to the utmost degree. Finally, 
where the objectified person’s experience and feelings are not considered to be taken into 
account or important, they may be objectified as they suffer a denial of subjectivity. Teela 
Sanders provides a useful critique of research which maintains that objectification occurs in 
all prostitution, all of the time: 
 
Many of the critiques of the sex industry start from the premise that in commercial sex 
women’s bodies, emotions and sexuality are commodified and objectified as sexual 
entities for the purpose of male pleasure (Scully 1990). The conclusions to this 
argument are that the female body becomes devoid of individualism through the 
process of objectification and therefore it appears as normal and legitimate to acquire 
the female body for a fee. The process of objectification is a necessary part of the 
separation between emotions, intimacy and sex. If the sexual partner (e.g. sex worker) 
is an object then it is possible to avoid feelings or be concerned with any wider issues 
of emotions, exploitation or ethics. There are two accounts on which this simplification 
of what happens in the sex industry can be challenged. First, the argument of 
objectification ignores that there are emotional aspects of the client-sex worker 
relationship, and second, some men give a low priority to sex and higher status to 
emotional connectivity, therefore resisting objectification357 
 
Therefore, in considering Nussbaum’s taxonomy of objectification, and in applying this to the 
sexual contract between sex worker and client, we must avoid making broad assertions that 
all prostitution encounters involve objectification in the sense described by Nussbaum. To do 
so would insult the subjectivity of the sex worker or the client in the exchange, and in so 
doing, actually objectify the person (denial of subjectivity). There also exists a significant 
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problem with Nussbaum’s model that must be rectified before moving forward. The model 
presupposes that only treatment is required to prove objectification, and so the actual 
experience of the party who is objectified is not considered relevant to that end. This 
presents a problem because to ignore the experience of the objectified person in itself 
objectifies that person. We ought to consider a modified approach to the model, whereby the 
treatment provides prima facie evidence of objectification to the degree that certain modes 
are identified, but then consider the experience of the sex worker, also. 
 
Dehumanization 
In addition to Jacobson’s taxonomy, and akin to objectification, is dehumanization. This is 
the process by which a person is made to be less than human, sharing some characteristics 
with objectification, yet more towards the treating of individuals as not possessing the 
important emotional and physiological concerns that human beings have. In an article 
published in the Guardian in 2014358, George Monbiot highlights what dehumanization is 
with reference to dehumanizing language used by governments and society, and the 
seemingly pervious nature of such language into society. He states that ‘a dehumanising 
system requires a dehumanising language’, referring to the way in which human beings are 
converted into ‘stock’, ‘resources’ and even ‘biomass’.359 Amidst apparent calls for the 
taxation of prostitution and other ‘black market’ products,360 how the state views those 
involved in prostitution at all levels is an important question to consider. It is precisely this 
elucidation towards denial of respect for humanity that makes dehumanization a dangerous 
concept, and one which will violate human dignity.  
The prominent social psychologist Nick Haslam has explored the realms of dehumanization 
in a number of works.361 This study follows from the assumption of Haslam that previous to 
his taxonomy, there existed no ‘model’ of dehumanization. Haslam offers his own model 
based upon two types of human-like attributes – Human Uniqueness (UH) and Human 
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Nature (HN). Human Uniqueness attributes ‘are seen as distinguishing humans from 
animals…and involves refinement, civility, morality and higher cognition’.362 ‘Only humanity 
can perform the three indispensable functions: keep the record of nature, understand nature, 
and appreciate it.’363 It follows that the denial of Human Uniqueness attributes reduces 
human beings to a childlike, irrational state. Haslam states that therefore civility turns into 
lack of culture; refinement into coarseness; moral sensibility with amorality; rationality and 
logic with irrationality and instinct; and maturity with childlikeness.364 Of course the 
suggested elements of UH attributes are not possessed by nor demonstrated by all peoples 
all of the time. This clearly represents human beings at their ‘best’.365. 
If a party perceives in the victim of dehumanization one or all of these five mal-behaviours, 
that victim experiences animalistic dehumanization. They are not thus objectified, but 
reduced closer to an animal-like status in the perception of the offending party. ‘Being 
divested of UH characteristics is a source of shame for the target – often with a prominent 
bodily component, as in the nakedness of the Abu Ghraib prisoners – who becomes an 
object of disgust and contempt for the perpetrator…Disgust enables us to avoid evidence of 
our animality, so representing others as animal-like may elicit the emotion. Contempt, a 
kindred emotion plays a similar role, locating the other as below the self…’366  
Haslam states that the denial of UH characteristics involves a devaluing of the victim below 
the same level of the offending party. The denial of Human Nature (HN) attributes is perhaps 
more severe, since HN attributes are those ‘…seen as shared and fundamental features of 
humanity, such as emotionality, warmth and cognitive flexibility’367. The denial of Human 
Nature attributes involves the likening of the person to an object or machine.368 
Dehumanization can be seen as the inverse of the process of anthropomorphism;369 the 
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attribution of human likenesses and worth to inanimate objects. It is ultimately a failure to 
attribute human-like capacities to human beings.370 HN attributes are akin then to inherent 
dignity, and a denial of recognition of these attributes will amount to a violation of dignity 
according to the IPA model.  
 
Disintegration 
An overarching theme of this mode of dignity violation is that of dis-integration of the person. 
This can take place in labelling and grouping, as discussed below, but also as a by-product 
of objectification and bodily dissociation. This mode is identifiable where the person as a fully 
integrated ‘whole’ is broken down into constituent parts.371 Since modes contained under this 
group violate the emotional, psychological and bodily integrity of the person, treatment which 
disintegrates the person, whether that be through objectification or another means, will 
violate this IPA dignity. 
 
Intrusion 
Jacobson states that intrusion involves the ‘…transgressing [of] an actor’s bodily or personal 
boundaries’.372 In law, when we think of intrusion, it may be in the sense of physical or 
sexual violence. In rape for instance, it is the penetration of a person which intrudes upon 
their physical integrity, as well as the victim’s psychological integrity. In fact, the especially 
cruel nature of rape, as defined in Aydin v Turkey,373 could meet the high threshold of torture 
under certain conditions. In the same way, assault, which is ‘Using physical force to damage 
or demean an actor’s body and the spirit’374 [or personality], and bullying, which is 
‘Threatening or intimidating an actor’375, will both transgress a victim’s personal integrity, not 
only physically, but also psychologically and emotionally. But intrusion need not be as 
extreme as rape or physical violence. It might be that intrusion occurs where the usual 
standard set by a party is relaxed following pressure by the intruder, involving the personal 
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boundaries of the victim, not limited to emotions, but also in respect of religious or cultural 
standards being transgressed. 
Labelling is ‘tagging an actor with a descriptive term that carries a connotation of moral 
deficiency or social inferiority’.376 It is easy to see the problem with labelling. It commits a 
person to a particular set of motives, behaviours and an image that are all thrust upon them 
by a third party. The third party, by labelling that person, takes charge of who the victim 
actually ‘is’, and redefines them. In the same way, grouping is tied with labelling, and 
involves ‘seeing an actor not as a unique individual, but only as a member of a collective’377.  
To group would be to collect several people with similar characteristics, be they work or 
otherwise, and gather them under one title – i.e. ‘prostitutes’. As stated in the methodology 
chapter, this thesis avoids the use of the term ‘prostitutes’ where possible, in an attempt to 
avoid such grouping and stigmatisation. Of course, the label ascribed must be detrimental or 
insulting to violate dignity in this way – as Jacobson says, a label which is morally or socially 
deficient or inferior. Both labelling and grouping violate personal inviolability as dignity 
because they ‘dis-integrate’ that person.378 The focus becomes on an aspect or aspects of 
the person, who is not treated as a constituted ‘whole’, which violates their personal integrity. 
When considering what dis-integrates a person, then perhaps the labelling of a person as 
‘prostitute’ or ‘sex-worker’ reduces them to that single trait. Perhaps in the same way, a sex 
worker is unable to express themselves in a way which presents them as a ‘unified, 
composed or collected whole’. Whilst this is not a bodily intrusion, it is an intrusion 
nonetheless upon the mind and soul of the victim.  
 
Abjection 
Abjection is, says Jacobson, ‘Forcing an actor to humble him or herself by compromising 
closely held beliefs or by forced association with material or practices considered 
unclean’379. The dictionary defines the term ‘abject’ as ‘completely without pride or dignity’. 
An example of abjection is given by Margalit, where he describes the treatment of Abu 
Ghraib prisoners by their captors. By being forced to commit indecent acts, the prisoners 
transgressed their valued religious belief systems. Readers interested specifically in 
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abjection theory are directed to the key work of Julia Kristeva on abjection,380 as well as 
critiques of the feminist/maternal stances underpinning Kristeva’s theory.381 
 
 
Humiliation 
This type of mode of dignity violation degrades the victim and lessens his or her worth. This 
is an ‘attack’ upon the integrity of the person, and might be coupled with ‘dis-integration’.382 
The term humiliation derives from ‘humus’, or earth.383 As Lindner identifies, ‘it entails a 
downward orientation, literally a “de-gradation”’.384 Links are clearly drawn between the two 
concepts here - to humiliate is to degrade an individual; to ‘de-grade’ is to reduce their 
status, to lessen their worth; to lessen a person’s worth is to diminish their inherent human 
dignity. Studies in personal disintegration are to be found inter alia in mental health journals, 
where depersonalisation and disintegration are coupled.385 This research informs of the 
deleterious nature of disintegration in psychological harm. In the same vein, it is said that 
humiliation produces in a person a very real experience of pain and suffering.386 What, then 
does it mean to humiliate or debase an individual? Following an apparent absence of 
‘conceptual or empirical scrutiny’,387 studies have been conducted which aim to answer this 
question in a scientifically meaningful way. Donald Klein provides an early analysis of 
humiliation, which will be discussed shortly. And so it appears that a harmful cycle begins 
from humiliation. 
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disturbance scale (DSSI/sAD)’ (1976) 15(4) British Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology 387 
386 See Linda Hartling, Tracy Luchetta, ‘Humiliation: Assessing the impact of derision, degradation, and 
debasement’ (1999) 19(4) Journal of Primary Prevention  259 and Donald Klein, ‘The Humiliation Dynamic: An 
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In a slightly outdated, (mentions of ‘coloured people’ for example, are no longer socially 
acceptable terms, yet are used throughout) but still pertinent piece, Donald Klein explains 
the existence in his view of the ‘Humiliation Dynamic’ as a ‘powerful factor in human affairs’ 
which purveys human society.388 Klein posits that it is key in the oppression of minority 
groups, and includes the very fear of being humiliated. It is asserted, as in a number of 
works on humiliation that being humiliated leads to violent, and other destructive behaviour.  
Klein defines humiliation as ‘involv[ing] the experience of some form of ridicule, scorn, 
contempt, or other degrading treatment at the hands of others’ and is ‘…intensely painful’.389 
There is no doubt that the court in Pretty was speaking of humiliation as such an experience. 
Klein alludes to Lazare’s earlier identification of five key characteristics in a humiliating 
experience: visual exposure, i.e. feeling blemished, exposed, or stigmatized (ties together 
with D Shapiro’s idea of ‘nakedness’ in the experience); feeling reduced in size, i.e. feeling 
belittled; being found deficient, i.e. feeling degraded, dishonoured, or devalued; being 
attacked, i.e. experiencing ridicule, scorn or insult; an avoidant response, i.e. wanting to hide 
one’s face or sink into the ground.390 Perhaps similarly to the objectification taxonomy of 
Nussbaum, in a humiliating experience, not all five have to be present, but the presence of 
all five factors indicates a particularly humiliating experience. In the context of prostitution, 
the invasion of the self is an important factor. ‘To be humiliated is to have your personal 
boundaries violated and your personal space invaded.’391  
There are potentially three parties to a humiliating experience: the humiliator; who is 
responsible for inflicting the treatment; the victim; who suffers the treatment which is 
humiliating; and the witness; who observes the treatment and agrees that it is humiliating.392 
However, the humiliating experience does not need the witness for it to be humiliating. For 
instance, a rape victim suffers humiliation despite the act being carried out in private, with no 
audience, although the presence of an audience may cause a higher level of humiliation 
than when one is not present (specific research has been carried out which addresses this 
issue).393 
                                                          
388 Donald Klein, ‘The Humiliation Dynamic: An Overview’ (1991) 12(2) Journal of Primary Prevention 93 
389 Ibid 2 
390 Ibid 4; alluding to Aaron Lazare, ‘Shame and humiliation in the medical encounter’ (1987) 147 Archives of 
Internal Medicine 1653 
391 Donald Klein op cit 6 
392 What is termed by Klein as the ‘Triangle of Humiliation’, Ibid 9 
393 Although not peer-reviewed, this research is persuasive: Eeelke V Driel, ‘”What humiliation feels like in 
different contexts”’ (Masters Thesis, University of Amsterdam, 2011) 
http://dare.uva.nl/cgi/arno/show.cgi?fid=352633 accessed 7th September 2015 
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As mentioned, Daniel Statman in his article on human dignity explains that it is by 
recognising humiliation that dignity is illuminated. Thus the assertion made is that the 
humiliation of an individual causes their dignity to be visible and brought to the fore. Statman 
explores dignity vis-à-vis humiliation and self-respect. In links with debasement and 
humiliation as mentioned in judicial reasoning of Article 3 cases, he argues that ‘humiliation 
is seen as first and foremost an injury to the dignity of its victims…’ This mode of thought 
helps to link between the philosophical concepts of dignity as propounded, and the 
purposive reasoning of the courts in dealing with cases of mistreatment, where Article 3 
rights are potentially affected. It is Statman’s position that humiliation could be used to 
interpret dignity, rather than the other way around; ‘the down to earth understanding of 
humiliation might provide us with a down to earth understanding of dignity, too’.394 Margalit 
holds also that it is through negative politics, that we find dignity - by finding that humiliation 
has taken place, we can identify human dignity. 
 
To degrade a human being to an utterly arbitrary will means that this human counts for 
nothing, and counting for nothing as human beings is the very essence of humiliation. 
Because we understand humiliation better than we understand the idea of positive 
human dignity, we should adopt negative politics: preventing humiliation rather than 
promoting the positive politics of promoting dignity.395  
 
Margalit proposes also, that humiliation can be determined not necessarily by the result of 
the humiliated person’s feelings, but by ‘any sort of behaviour or condition that constitutes a 
sound reason to consider his or her self-respect injured’396 
Humiliation requires the imposition of a collaboration between the perpetrator and the 
victim. The victim should recognize that his tor-mentor is expelling him from the human 
commonwealth. Thus "nor-mal" [sic] humiliation requires the continued existence of a 
victim as some-one who can recognize the fact that he is being humiliated. While there 
is a destructive element in humiliation, there is a tension between humiliation and 
destruction, for humiliation seeks to destroy some part of the humiliated person without 
destroying that person.397 
                                                          
394 Statman in Kretzmer and Klein op cit 227 
395 Avishai Margalit, ‘Human Dignity between the Kitsch and Deification’ (2004-5) Essay given at Litowitz Lecture, 
Yale University October 14th 2004. See also Peter J Duffy, ‘Article 3 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights’ (1983) 32(2) The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 316, specifically at 319 in a discussion 
regarding degrading treatment in Article 3 ECHR. 
396 Avishai Margalit, The Decent Society (Harvard 1996) 9 (emphasis mine) 
397 Avishai Margalit, ‘The Uniqueness of the Holocaust’ (1996) 25(1) Philosophy and Public Affairs 65, 74 
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As Schachter states, ‘nothing is so clearly violative of the dignity of persons as treatment that 
demeans or humiliates them’.398 
 
Summary and Next Chapter 
This chapter presented various modes of dignity violation. These were exploitation, 
objectification, dehumanization, humiliation, abjection, disintegration, and intrusion. This is 
not an exhaustive list and not intended to be. The chapter’s purpose has been to provide the 
language of violation of dignity according to the socio-legal methodology of this study. The 
deleterious nature of these various modes of dignity violation upon IPA dignity has been 
discussed. Each mode may violate human dignity in a mixture of ways, so that certain 
modes will violate one’s autonomy, or one’s personal inviolability. The next chapter 
continues but narrows the discussion of dignity violation further by returning to Article 3 
ECHR, which was introduced in chapter 5. Now there will be an examination of how 
violations identified in Article 3 jurisprudence could in-turn relate to violation of IPA dignity. 
The overall purpose of the next chapter is to provide further legal and judicial impetus for a 
normative application of the IPA dignity model, the measure of dignity violation through the 
modes here expounded, and the ensuing application of IPA to the narratives taken from the 
sociology of prostitution. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
398 Oscar Schachter, ‘Human Dignity as a Normative Concept’ (1983) 77(4) The American Journal of International 
Law 848, 850 
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9. IPA AND DIGNITY VIOLATION IN LAW 
 
This chapter continues the discussion on dignity violation, by exploring judicial recognition of 
the violation of dignity. The themes of dignity which are represented in the IPA model are 
apparent in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, in its implementation of 
the protections accorded under Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR), which was considered in Chapter 5. Article 3 cases present issues that clearly 
engage dignity. The IPA model’s veracity is emphasised through this chapter, since it can be 
seen that dignity violation is judicially recognised, and the chapter will outline some of the 
situations in which the court has identified and confirmed that the violation of dignity is akin 
to breaches of Article 3. Here there will be consideration of a variety of cases that indicate 
degrading treatment, and thus violation of human dignity.399 These will be related to IPA 
dignity through modes identifiable in the respective judgments, and dignity violation 
suggested, according to the relevant elements of IPA. Conclusions will be drawn as to the 
nature of IPA dignity violation vis-à-vis the modes identified in the previous chapter, caused 
through the respective Article 3 violations. 
  
 
Article 3 Violations and modes of dignity violation 
The cases which follow are grouped into three separate types of Article 3 case. These cases 
are pertinent to an analysis of how violation of Article 3 might equate to violation of dignity, 
and how this might occur utilising the modes, and the IPA model of this study. This analysis 
begins with selected so-called ‘detention’ cases, followed by corporal punishment and then 
sexual assaults. Not considered here are immigration and extradition cases, for the sake of 
brevity and because they exceed the scope of the thesis. 
 
Prison Detention and Treatment of Prisoners 
Valasinas v Lithuania400 concerned a detainee in a Lithuanian prison, who complained that 
his detention conditions and also a strip search he was subjected to, amounted to a breach 
of Article 3. The applicant alleged that the prison conditions were such that they amounted to 
                                                          
399 Cases reviewed are presented in a table in Appendix A which sets out the type of case and the decision of the 
Court. 
400 [2001] Prison LR 365 
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infliction of degrading treatment upon him; a contention which was not (on this occasion401) 
allowed by the Court. The second part of the application was successful, however. This 
related to an intimate search (including of the genitals of the complainant) in the presence of 
a female prison officer, where the officers carrying out the search did not use gloves 
throughout the examination. This did amount to degrading treatment under Article 3. The 
Court found that although intimate searches are necessary in certain circumstances, they 
must be carried out appropriately, and not in a manner that would likely offend the prisoner’s 
dignity. In this case, the search had breached that threshold and was degrading. The court in 
this case referred to dignity in respect of humiliation and debasement, and behaviour which 
might cause the victim anguish or making him feel inferior: 
Obliging the applicant to strip naked in the presence of a woman, and then touching his 
sexual organs and food with bare hands showed a clear lack of respect for the applicant, 
and diminished in effect his human dignity. It must have left him with feelings of anguish 
and inferiority capable of humiliating and debasing him.402 
 
Behaviour which debases is an ‘attack’ upon the integrity of the person, and causes 
humiliation. Reference is made to the previous section and humiliation. Humiliation is a 
mode which violates personal inviolability as dignity in IPA. Therefore, it is asserted that in 
Valasinas, the violation of Article 3 amounted to a violation of IPA dignity, namely the second 
element thereof. In another prison/detention case,  Keenan v United Kingdom,403 the Court 
considered whether detention conditions were degrading. The Court, having regard to, inter 
alia Ireland404 and Tyrer405, considered that punishment or treatment would be ‘degrading’ if 
‘its object is to humiliate and debase the person concerned and whether, as far as the 
consequences are concerned it adversely affected his or her personality in a manner 
incompatible with Article 3’.406 The Court also said that in assessing whether the treatment or 
punishment crosses that threshold, it should consider in the case of mentally ill persons, 
(Keenan was mentally ill) their ‘vulnerability and their inability, in some cases, to complain 
                                                          
401 N.B. Alver v Estonia(2006) 43 EHRR 40 (distinguished) 
402 [177] 
403 Keenan v United Kingdom (2001) 33 EHRR 38 
404 Ireland v United Kingdom (n 222) 
405 Tyrer v United Kingdom (1979-80) 2 EHRR 1 
406 Keenan (n 449) [110]  
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coherently or at all about how they are being affected by any particular treatment’.407 The 
Court found that Article 3 had been breached in that case.  
This case concerned prison conditions and the effect which these had upon the wellbeing of 
the victim. The court considers humiliation to be the key factor in its deliberation in favour of 
the victim. It is proposed that inherent dignity is also violated here through dehumanization. 
This is through a denial of the victim to Human Uniqueness (UH) attributes. When UH 
attributes are denied, humans are not treated as distinguishable from animals in the way in 
which they are treated. By keeping a prisoner in detention conditions likely to debase and 
humiliate them, UH attributes may be denied which leads to dehumanization. Keenan, 
having suffered violation of Article 3 suffered a violation of his inherent and personal 
inviolability as dignity, according to IPA. 
 
Corporal Punishment 
Tyrer v United Kingdom408 is unique in this discussion because this is a case of punishment, 
rather than treatment. The court indicated that as this was a punishment, which would by its 
nature be to some extent humiliating, there had to be an extenuating degree of humiliation to 
reach the threshold of ‘degrading’ punishment.409 In Tyrer; a case which was heard in the 
same year as Ireland, the Court held the United Kingdom in partial breach of Article 3, this 
time for an act of judicial corporal punishment in the Isle of Man. In this case, a juvenile was 
sentenced to three strokes of the birch – a sentence then prescribed in the Petty Sessions 
and Summary Jurisdiction Act 1927. The sentence was carried out in accordance with the 
law but an application was made by Mr Tyrer that the Court should consider his punishment 
to be in breach of Article 3.  
The applicant was challenging not excessive, extra-judicial violent behaviour, but the entirely 
lawful infliction of violence preserved in statute. The Court examined the Article in order of 
severity of treatment, first with torture, then inhuman treatment and finally degrading 
treatment. The Court found that no torture had been committed, nor had Mr Tyrer suffered 
inhuman treatment. On a vote of six to one however, the Court held for Mr Tyrer, that his 
punishment has been degrading within the meaning of the Article.  
                                                          
407 Ibid [111]  
408 Tyrer v United Kingdom op cit 
409 [30] 
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In reaching their decision, the Court noted that the punishment was carried out with Mr 
Tyrer’s posterior being naked, and administered by three complete strangers - factors which 
contributed to the Court’s finding, although which were not in themselves the ratio of the 
decision.410 As with Valasinas, in the judgment of this case specific reference was made to 
the humiliation suffered by the victim of the Article 3 violation of degrading treatment:  
…the humiliation or debasement involved must attain a particular level…The assessment 
is, in the nature of things, relative: it depends on all the circumstances of the case and, in 
particular, on the nature and context of the punishment itself and the manner and method 
of its execution.411  
 
There had to be a distinguishing level of humiliation in this case extending beyond the 
‘ordinary’ humiliation suffered as a result of corporal punishment, and in this case, that level 
had been met because of the circumstances surrounding the experience of this particular 
victim. Humiliation is certainly a factor here, but also intrusion, another personal inviolability 
grouped mode of dignity violation. Mr Tyrer therefore suffered a violation of his IPA dignity, 
through this second element, as in Valasinas. Corporal punishment was to be examined 
again in the case Costello Roberts v United Kingdom412, which involved a pupil being 
‘slippered’ by the school headmaster. The court in this case, contrasted the facts with those 
in Tyrer; 
Three smacks on the buttocks, through shorts, with a soft-soled shoe, apparently 
causing no visible injury, cannot be compared to the thrashing suffered by Anthony Tyrer 
when he was birched as a form of judicial corporal punishment413  
 
This was an intriguing analysis of the different elements of dignity violation experienced by 
Mr Tyrer and the pupil in the latter case. Was the latter experience any less degrading? The 
court apparently only adjudged the severity of the violence administered, not the potential 
emotional or psychological fallout of the two events. If the court had taken a literal approach 
and considered the dictionary definition of degrading as above, then they might have come 
to a different conclusion.  
                                                          
410 [33], [35] 
411 [30] 
412 (1995) 19 EHRR 112 
413 At para 42 
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Certainly, the type of punishment described above in Costello Roberts might cause the pupil 
to lose self-respect, which would be degrading treatment under the literal meaning of the 
word. Accordingly, no breach of Article 3 was found in this case. If it were on the grounds of 
humiliation as per Tyrer, then similar results could be found regarding the violation of IPA 
dignity. 
 
Sexual Assaults 
In SW v United Kingdom; CR v United Kingdom414; conjoined appeals to the ECtHR, the 
Court considered applications that Article 7(1) had been breached by the Respondent United 
Kingdom, in enacting retrospective legislation relating to the crime of rape. The cases related 
to marital rape, where the developing common law had begun to erode immunity from 
prosecution for husbands who had raped their wives. Aside from this main issue, the Court 
had cause to consider the character of rape itself. The Court stated that the essentially 
debasing character of rape was manifest, that the abandonment of the ‘unacceptable idea’ of 
spousal immunity was required to respect human dignity and human freedom.415 Whilst the 
Court did not explicitly deal with Article 3 or relate the case to it, the wording of the judgment 
indicated that rape was of an essentially debasing nature. The definition in Ireland of 
degrading treatment is that which causes humiliation and debasement.  
The Court was edging nearer towards a link between rape and IDT – a link which would be 
established only two years later in Aydin v Turkey.416 Aydin was a landmark case because it 
classified the crime of rape as torture under the Article, on the facts in that case. The 
complainant/applicant in Aydin had been detained by state officials, and repeatedly 
mistreated and raped. It was the combination of those circumstances and actions that 
equated to a breach of Article 3, and a particular focus on the crime of rape. The Court held:  
[t]he accumulation of acts of physical and mental violence inflicted on the applicant and 
the especially cruel act of rape to which she was subjected amounted to torture in breach 
of Article 3 of the Convention417  
 
                                                          
414 (1996) 21 EHRR 363 
415 At [44], [42] of the judgment 
416 (1998) 25 EHRR 251 
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The act of rape alone may not have constituted torture, but the combination of the 
circumstances, and the official status of the perpetrators went towards such a classification. 
Clare McGlynn is of the opinion that rape in this case would have been ill treatment alone, 
which was escalated to torture owing to these circumstances.418 She argues that the Court 
established in Aydin ‘that an act of rape could satisfy the threshold of harm for torture, but 
implied that not all rapes will necessarily do so’419 As demonstrated, rape will always be 
sufficient for degrading treatment, but will not necessarily be sufficient for torture. Rape 
amounts to a severe intrusion and transgression of bodily and psychological integrity. It will 
certainly be degrading and violate personal inviolability as dignity. It will also amount to the 
MOV of objectification, through the means of instrumentality and denial of subjectivity, for 
example. It will violate inherent dignity as a result.  
The Court in MC420 did not consider rape as torture or IDT per se, but it examined States’ 
positive obligations under the Article to prosecute crimes of rape. What the Court did 
mention was the importance of an individual’s sexual autonomy, and the ‘effective protection’ 
thereof by providing a rigid approach to prosecuting sexual offences.421 The judgement 
made an interesting observation also; ‘…the development of law and practice in [sexual 
offences law] reflects the evolution of societies towards effective equality and respect for 
each individual’s sexual autonomy’.422 The Court indicated an evolutionary trend placing 
higher emphasis on sexual autonomy and freedom from sexual violence. 
 
Summary and Next Chapter 
The purpose of this chapter was to illuminate examples of Article 3 violations, which serve to 
demonstrate that the court will draw links between humiliation, debasement and the 
transgressing of bodily and psychological integrity as capable of amounting to at least 
degrading treatment under the Article. As has been explicated, these violations amounting to 
degrading treatment also amount to violations of IPA dignity through various modes, 
affecting multiple elements of IPA. This leads to the conclusion that dignity violation is, 
certainly in a human rights context judicially recognised and provides legal authority and 
context to the premise of the construction of the model of dignity, based upon the core 
                                                          
418 C McGlynn, ‘Rape, torture and the European Convention on Human Rights’ (2009) 58(3) International & 
Comparative Law Quarterly 565-595, 576 
419 Ibid 579 
420 MC v Bulgaria (2005) 40 EHRR 20 
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themes, human rights theory and law and models previously adopted. This chapter 
concludes Part 2 of the thesis, and has related the jurisprudence of Article 3 ECHR to 
violation of IPA dignity. The study has now presented human dignity, developed IPA dignity 
and demonstrated how that dignity might be violated.  
According to the Honeyball report, prostitution amounts to a serious violation of human 
dignity. We have now provided a model for dignity which enables some of that statement to 
be objectively assessed. We could consider the statement as ‘prostitution violates dignity (as 
inherent dignity, autonomy as dignity and personal inviolability as dignity)’. Further, we can 
say that when the report speaks of that dignity being violated, it is because prostitution 
allegedly amounts to exploitation, objectification, humiliation etc. as modes of dignity 
violation which are necessarily deleterious towards IPA dignity. But the question of whether 
prostitution can amount to any of these modes of dignity violation cannot be answered 
before an analysis of the sociology of prostitution which will take place in chapter 11. Indeed, 
no attempt to consider prostitution as either dignity violating or promoting should take place 
without a thorough consideration of the issues involved.  
Before that is performed, however, the next chapter will move the thesis into part 3, and will 
provide a final part to the development of IPA dignity, which is a normative framework. If we 
are considering the statements of the Honeyball report with any true concern for the motives 
behind it, or the suggestions it makes for policy change in the area of prostitution, then a 
descriptive model of dignity is limited. What is the normative ‘call to action’ which demands 
that we should care whether prostitution violates dignity or not? Why does the hypothesis 
question matter at all? The answers to these questions will be now be considered, in the 
next chapter.  
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PART THREE 
10. A NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR IPA DIGNITY 
 
The IPA dignity model, now constructed operates as a kind of lexicography of dignity which 
provides an understanding of what is meant when the language of dignity is used. The study 
has also examined ways in which dignity might be violated, looking at modes of dignity 
violation and examining the jurisprudence of Article 3 ECHR. Of course, there are many 
alternative ways in which dignity might be understood, but IPA represents generally agreed 
themes of dignity, as discussed previously. If we are to address the hypothesis question, a 
model of dignity is required to set the parameters of the language of dignity. The Honeyball 
report uses the language of dignity to comment on the apparent deleterious nature of 
prostitution (and sex trafficking). If IPA dignity is the model by which dignity is expressed and 
understood, then the Honeyball report might be read to say that ‘Prostitution is a very 
obvious and utterly appalling violation of human dignity, that is it violates inherent dignity, 
autonomy as dignity and/or personal inviolability as dignity’. In this way, IPA dignity may tell 
us what we collectively mean when we use the language of dignity, what it most reasonably 
consists of, and how it is generally perceived and understood.  
However, for the purposes of this thesis, this cannot be the end of the enquiry into the 
conceptualisation of human dignity. There exists a problem moving forward if the study is to 
continue to address the hypothesis question using IPA, and the problem surrounds the 
purely descriptive nature of the IPA dignity model which is presently constructed. IPA 
consists of 3 elements which are themselves core ‘themes’ of dignity, but each of those 
themes carry their own values, interpretations and may potentially conflict. For example, 
there are many ways in which autonomy and personal inviolability may be understood, some 
of which may conflict with each other, as will be shown. Moreover, stating that prostitution 
violates human dignity, as presented in IPA,  provides no objective normative basis as to 
why we should care, and in so doing, fails to properly address the hypothesis question by 
adequately addressing the perceived lack of objectivity in the Honeyball report. It is one thing 
to explain that dignity may be represented by a model which contains the elements 
demonstrating it to be inherent, as autonomy and as personal inviolability, and yet another to 
suggest that we ought to preserve, protect, respect or otherwise not negatively impact upon 
that IPA dignity (or any element thereof). In natural law theory, this is what is termed the 
‘is/ought’ distinction, and it is through natural law theory that the conflict between the two is 
tackled. This chapter considers the ‘ought’ element of the problem, and presents a specific 
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normative framework by which there can be a ‘call to action’ not to violate dignity that the 
Honeyball report seems to want.  
 
Adopting a Normative Framework for IPA dignity 
If the ensuing analysis identifies that prostitution violates the respective elements of IPA 
dignity, what normative reference can and should be used to account for how dignity is 
actually violated and, from this, offer a principled objective reason and direction for the law’s 
(vis-à-vis the Honeyball report and subsequent policies to criminalise prostitution) 
engagement with prostitution? This leads to a discussion of potential frameworks, and the 
adoption of one which will be specifically used in this study to address the hypothesis 
question. It might be surmised the approach of Honeyball’s is to consider dignity violation 
vis-à-vis prostitution through a traditional criminal legal lens which is overtly moral, but 
without clearly defined moral-philosophical boundaries. This may be problematic as will now 
be explained.  
The criminal law has traditionally engaged with prostitution in a certain way, and in effect, 
tried to ‘understand’ and control it. In so doing, it has presented a kind of moral reflection on 
the prostitution encounter, which is evidenced in the language used in the common law and 
statute over the past century. The earliest twentieth century case to define prostitution and 
the sex worker was in 1918. In R v De Munck423 the term ‘common prostitute’ was coined 
and defined as: 
…not limited so as to mean only one who permits acts of lewdness with all and sundry, 
or with such as hire her, when such acts are in the nature of ordinary sexual connection. 
We are of opinion that prostitution is proved if it be shown that a woman offers her body 
commonly for lewdness for payment in return.424 
 
The term ‘lewd’ is described as ‘crude and offensive in a sexual way’,425 and so it follows that 
for the court in De Munck, prostitution is the payment for sex which is crude and offensive. 
The terms ‘crude’ and ‘offensive’ are subjective terms, couched in morality, without 
grounding in any specific objective moral criteria. The definition provided in the case 
demonstrates a ‘narrowness’ and limited applicability in the 21st Century as a truly ‘complete’ 
legal definition of prostitution, but also it indicates that such a criminal law approach fails to 
                                                          
423 [1918] 1 KB 635 
424 Ibid at 637-638, per Darling J (Emphasis mine) 
425 OED 819 
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offer an objective framework to assess prostitution. The case DPP v Bull,426 reported as 
recently as 1995 extended the definition from De Munck to encompass male as well as 
females in prostitution. This demonstrated an advance in how prostitution was perceived, but 
still contained some problematic language, i.e. the use of the term ‘lewdness’, to describe 
the activities involved in prostitution.427 This somewhat subjective moral assessment of 
prostitution is continued in the Home Office report Paying the Price428 in 2004. Classifying 
those working in prostitution has been problematic, too. It was held in Morris-Lowe, following 
De Munck, that a ‘common prostitute’ is a woman who ‘is prepared for reward to engage in 
acts of lewdness with all and sundry, or with anyone who may hire her for that purpose’.429 
Webb430 presented a slightly more innovative definition, as it was held that there need be no 
physical contact between a man and a woman for prostitution to occur. In that case, it was 
held that all that is required for the commission of prostitution is for a woman to be paid for 
an ‘indecent act’ (or sexual service). Words such as ‘indecency’, however, still possess 
subjective moral overtones which are unsuited to a thorough analysis of prostitution. 
Parliament has addressed these deficiencies in recent years, and, for example, the 
stigmatising term ‘common prostitute’ has since been replaced by ‘person’, in legislation 
such as s.1 of the Street Offences Act, following the Government’s coordinated prostitution 
strategy.431 The reasons for the change were clear: 
The clause amends the offence of loitering or soliciting for the purpose of prostitution, 
as set out in section 1 of the Street Offences Act 1959. It removes the term ‘common 
prostitute’… Perhaps the only area of unanimity — at least there was one — was 
support for removal of the term ‘common prostitute’ from the statute, as it is outdated 
and offensive. The clause therefore removes the term.432 
 
And so it can be seen that the criminal law has approached prostitution with strong moral 
overtones, which may or may not be entirely subjective. The legislators may be driven by 
                                                          
426 [1995] QB 88 
427 Given the sociology of prostitution which is examined in Chapter 11, ‘lewdness’, as with the term 
‘crude’, is perhaps an unclear representation of the experiential reality of prostitution for some sex 
workers and clients. This moral language is discussed in Chapter 10. 
 
428 Home Office, ‘Paying the Price: A Consultation Paper on Prostitution’ (2004) London: Home Ofﬁce 
Communication Directorate 
 
429 [1985] 1 ALL ER 402 
430 [1964] 1 QB 357 
431 Amended by s.16(2)(a) Policing and Crime Act 2009 
432 Hansard, HC Public Bill Committee, 9th Sitting, col.318 (February 10, 2009) 
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public opinion or perceptions of the ‘rights and wrongs’ of prostitution. It is true that these 
provide one perspective, but are naturally prone to the weaknesses of subjectivism, as the 
critics of the Honeyball report point out. Therefore, in this study, criminal law will not be 
utilised as the framework to address the violation or otherwise of dignity in the prostitution 
encounter.  
A normative framework will necessarily be based in natural law theory, which is the 
epistemological basis of this study, as explained in part 1. Such a framework for IPA must 
achieve two aims: firstly, it must identify with the elements of IPA; and secondly it should 
justify the promotion of those elements – the aforementioned ‘call to action’. Thus the 
framework which is adopted should consist of a scheme which appropriately fits with IPA 
dignity, vis-à-vis its constituent elements. The framework used should therefore recognise 
the value of human dignity, and call to all persons to respect, preserve or even promote it, 
and certainly never to violate it.  
Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum have made individual and collective efforts to promote 
what are termed ‘human capabilities’, and in so doing, their work provides some insight into 
what amounts to a life consistent with an expression of human dignity. A life which is 
consistent with human dignity (IPA dignity), is one where human agents are accorded the 
capabilities necessary to make choices about how they will work, where they will live, what 
religion they will or will not adhere to, access to education and other fundamental ‘goods’ 
which lead to a life of dignity, or a life which might also be termed a flourishing life.433 And it 
is this concept of a flourishing life which it is asserted aligns well with human dignity, and 
with the IPA dignity model, since, according to Nussbaum, for instance, where one is 
afforded capabilities, their autonomy as dignity is certainly promoted or respected. The 
language that starts to emerge from an assessment of the living out of a life of human dignity 
encompasses the terms ‘goods’ and ‘human flourishing’, but it should be noted that Sen and 
Nussbaum’s philosophy does not necessarily coincide with a natural law approach which is 
the epistemology of this thesis.  
We need a framework which identifies objective goods, and calls to action human agents 
towards the promotion of those goods which lead to a flourishing life, and necessarily then 
accord a person with dignity. As a basis for law’s engagement with dignity, arguably the 
most influential theory of the past century on the promotion of human flourishing in the 
natural law theory school is arguably that of John Finnis, in his 1980 (and 2011 postscript) 
                                                          
433 See Martha Nussbaum, Creating capabilities (Harvard University Press 2011).   
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seminal work, Natural Law and Natural Rights.434 Finnis sets about the task of reformulating 
a theory of natural law as a beacon of objective moral legal evaluation of agency, action and 
flourishing in life. Finnis says of the theory of natural law: 
A theory of natural law need not be undertaken primarily for the purpose of…providing a 
justified conceptual framework for descriptive social science. It may be undertaken, as 
this book is, primarily to assist the practical reflections of those concerned to act, whether 
as judges, or as statesmen, or as citizens.435 
Finnis is concerned then with providing a normative framework for the law to observe; a call 
to action towards promotion of human flourishing which acts as a mandate for law making. 
To Finnis, these are reconstituted principles of natural law. This is an Aristotelian approach, 
and is in essence, Finnis’s attempt to continue Aristotle’s work in seeking to identify what 
amounts to a life worth living, a life of human flourishing; which is taken to be a life of dignity, 
considering the understanding of Sen and Nussbaum as above. How does Finnis attempt to 
achieve this task? He begins by exploring basic values that are present in shaping our 
practical reasoning.436 He contrasts with Hart’s position of ‘natural facts and aims’ of human 
beings concerning the setting within which human beings seek various ‘ends’ or goals. 
Whilst Hart determined that only ‘survival’ existed as an indisputable end, Finnis indicates 
that there are a number of such values, or self-evidently objective ‘goods’.437 The object of 
moral judgment, says Finnis, is to make decisions which amount to the preservation of and 
respect for objective goods that ultimately lead to ‘human flourishing’.438 
 
Objective Goods 
The goods are important because achieving those goods is what amounts to human 
flourishing, and it is here asserted that the preservation, protection or promotion of human 
dignity is synonymous with human flourishing. This idea of human flourishing is akin to 
human dignity, since it is essentially about the promotion of and positive action towards a life 
                                                          
434 John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (OUP 1980) 
435 Ibid 18 
 
436 Finnis also speaks of the concept of ‘self-evidence’; being a principle which ‘…cannot be demonstrated, but 
equally needs no demonstration…’; Ibid 59ff. This is an important principle as it relates to human dignity, since 
the theme of dignity as inherent in humans qua human may rest on the principle of self-evidence. It may not be 
feasibly demonstrated, but it needs no demonstration.  
437 Finnis op cit 81ff 
438 Ibid 
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which is full, successful and fulfilling. These goods are considered in turn with reference to 
the text.439 
Firstly, all human societies ‘show concern for human life; self-preservation is accepted as a 
proper motive for action’. All ‘regard the procreation of a new human life as in itself a good 
thing’. He identifies that ‘no human society fails to restrict sexual activity; in all societies there 
is some prohibition of incest, some opposition to boundless promiscuity and to rape, some 
favour for stability and permanence in sexual relations’. This is so even in societies that have 
relaxed sexual social norms, such as in the UK, where homosexual practice, civil partnership 
and gay marriage are now lawful. All human societies ‘display a concern for truth’. This is 
exhibited in law through the provision of legislation prohibiting conduct which is ‘dishonest’, 
such as theft, and fraudulent acts. Further, such acts which involve a breach of trust by a 
person of authority for example, will receive higher penalties. In the courtroom, the protection 
and promotion of sound witness testimony is a stalwart provision of the criminal and civil 
justice systems of the UK and beyond. Finnis continues, that ‘all know friendship, title or 
property, reciprocity, play’. Finally, ‘all societies treat the bodies of dead members of the 
group in some traditional and ritual fashion (and funeral rites are observed even at war).440  
Building upon these observations, Finnis observes from this list of values that there are 
seven basic tenets or forms of ‘good’ for human beings to flourish. The first is Life. This 
consists of a drive for self-preservation, and it follows, not simply as Hart suggested 
‘survival’; instead flourishing in life. This includes being healthy, and having an absence of 
pain, injury or disease in the body or mind. To seek this good is to perform or abstain from 
actions/behaviours which cause or risk causing harm to this good. It might be therefore that 
to perform a sky-dive negates this good, even momentarily where the risk to life and health 
is under threat. The next tenet, is Knowledge. Finnis devotes some time to the consideration 
that human beings, in order to flourish, need to pursue knowledge, and most would have the 
desire to do so. This includes the curious mind – wanting to seek answers to questions of 
life. After knowledge; Play. Procreation, including sex, sits within the good of life, but sexual 
intercourse may be play, friendship or an effort to procreate. Sex is not then limited only to 
procreation, but extends to what is conducted between consenting adults as ‘fun’. This is 
considered by Finnis ‘a large and irreducible element in human culture’441. He posits, that 
‘…Each one of us can see the point of engaging in performances which have no point 
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beyond the performance itself, enjoyed for its own sake’.442 Linked to play is the good of 
Aesthetic Experience. This could be considered the human ability to experience and 
recognize beauty. Perhaps human beings are unique in the animal kingdom for their ability 
to appreciate nature and its wonder, although also unique in the purposeful disregard for its 
wellbeing.  
The next tenet is Sociability (Friendship), which is given as ‘…A minimum of peace and 
harmony amongst men, ranging to full friendship’.443 Friendship of course can take many 
forms, but involves some self-less thinking and action towards another. Finnis places 
Religion in the scheme of basic goods in respect of the relationship between humanity and a 
sovereign God, calling it the ‘…relation of human initiative and the orders of humanity to the 
whole cosmos and to the origin/creation…’ and ‘…human freedom from instinct and impulse 
to intelligent grasp of worthwhile forms of good, mastering one’s own environment, own 
character, yet subordinate to a God, sovereign over all’.444 Notably, it is not suggested that 
belief in God is the necessary good in itself, but ‘…the importance of considering the 
questions of origin, faith and obligation to God, even if the person decides against a belief in 
a God’.445 The final good is practical reasonableness, which is discussed next. 
 
Practical Reasonableness as a normative call to action 
Practical Reasonableness (PR) stands alone among the other goods because its ultimate 
purpose is to be utilised for the achieving of all the other goods. It ‘…is participated in 
precisely by shaping one’s participation in the other basic goods, by guiding one’s 
commitments, one’s selection of projects, and what one does in carrying them out’.446 
Therefore, the purpose of PR is produce human flourishing or wellbeing. Practical 
reasonableness is described as 9 elements - a rational plan of life; no arbitrary preferences 
amongst values; no arbitrary preferences amongst persons; detachment from objectives – 
(in order to be sufficiently open to all the basic goods in all the changing circumstances of a 
lifetime…one must have a certain detachment from all the specific and limited projects which 
one undertakes towards achieving the basic goods); commitment to objectives – balanced 
against the 4th requirement is a certain fidelity towards the same objectives; to bring about 
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good – efficiency of methods (which is contrary to utilitarian/consequentialist thought); 
respect for every basic value in every act (not damaging any realization of a good); following 
the common good of one’s communities and acting in accordance with one’s own 
conscience (the ‘gut feeling’). According to Finnis, the product of the nine requirements of 
PR is morality:  
…some philosophers have located the essence of ‘morality’ in the reduction of harm, 
others in the increase of well-being, some in social harmony, some in universalizability of 
practical judgment, some in the all-round flourishing of the individual, others in the 
preservation of freedom and personal authenticity…not every one of the nine 
requirements has a direct role in every moral judgment, but some moral judgments do 
sum up the bearing of each and all of the nine on the questions in hand, and every moral 
judgment sums up the bearing of one or more of the requirements.447 
 
Practical reasonableness is determined by Finnis to be a manner of action which leads 
towards the promotion of the objective goods, and necessarily leads one away from acts 
which would negatively impact upon the attaining of them. Finnis says that for a person to 
make a ‘moral’ decision/judgment, they will necessarily adopt one or more of the 
requirements, and on occasion, all of them. This practically reasoned judgement, leading to 
human flourishing vis-à-vis promotion of the objective goods is the normative call to action 
which we are in this chapter concerned with. This normative call to action is a requirement 
on all agents to conform with PR (by acting in a way which is practically reasonable because 
it conforms with an element/s of PR, and thus ultimately leads to promotion of the objective 
goods, and a fortiori human flourishing).  
The objective goods lead to human flourishing. A course of action which offends some or all 
of those objective goods has a detrimental impact on human flourishing. Such a course of 
action fails to conform to PR as the call to action to promote human flourishing, and, by the 
linkages suggested above, human dignity. A course of action which involves a mode of 
dignity violation as presented earlier violates the dignity of the individual, and inevitably has 
a detrimental impact upon the flourishing of the individual. Therefore a course of action 
which involves a mode of dignity violation necessarily fails to conform to PR. A failure to 
conform with PR acts in contradiction to the normative principles Finnis lays out in his theory, 
and also breaches his defined principles of natural law. This normative framework, applied to 
IPA dignity suggests that a course of action which violates IPA dignity because it involves a 
mode of dignity violation, once demonstrated can be considered to be offending the 
normative principles of natural law set out by Finnis and here applied to IPA dignity.  
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Summary and next chapter 
This chapter has set out a normative framework for IPA dignity. This has resulted in the 
descriptive model of dignity constructed in this thesis being accorded normativity necessary 
for the ensuing analysis which seeks to answer the hypothesis question. Only with a 
normative framework can we properly engage with the Honeyball report, and comment on 
the violation or otherwise of dignity in prostitution, following a thorough review of the issue in 
the academic discipline of sociology. This leads us to the next chapter which reviews the 
literature of prostitution in order to provide a justification for the ensuing analysis. Without 
providing a considered reflection on the issue of prostitution, the study is open to potential 
criticism. The chapter will also identify and align the study with an ‘explanatory model’ of 
prostitution, in order to refine the materials used in this highly complex area of study, and 
place the analysis of narratives in their correct academic context.   
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PART FOUR 
 
11. THE SOCIO-LEGAL ISSUE OF PROSTITUTION 
 
This study seeks to address the hypothesis question ‘does prostitution violate human 
dignity’. The study is prompted by a recent report by Labour MEP, Mary Honeyball, which 
states that prostitution amounts to a violation of human dignity. Criticism has been levelled at 
the report because it fails to utilise an objective set of criteria to reach that conclusion, 
despite the report being weighty in its influence on legislators in the European Union and 
perhaps beyond. It coincides with calls for criminalisation of elements of the prostitution 
encounter – the sale/purchase of sex in a number of states, as well as in the UK, adhering to 
the so-called ‘Nordic’ model used in Sweden, Norway and Iceland, which criminalises the 
client of prostitution.  
In order to engage with the debate and provide some objective criteria to approach the idea 
of dignity violation in prostitution, the thesis has reviewed the literature to identify core 
themes of human dignity. In order to provide some objective and measured sense of what is 
generally meant when the language of dignity is used, a model of dignity was constructed of 
three elements, to present dignity as inherent dignity, autonomy as dignity and personal 
inviolability as dignity. Dignity violation was considered in theory and in law before the 
model, IPA dignity was critiqued. It was recognised that in order to make a normative claim 
on the prostitution encounter as the Honeyball report does, using in this study the IPA dignity 
model, a normative framework needed to be applied to the model. The previous chapter 
addressed this need and utilised the natural law theory of John Finnis to present a call to 
action not to violate human dignity, vis-à-vis the IPA model.   
This chapter introduces Part Four of the thesis. This chapter will review the literature in this 
field, and present the sociology of prostitution, and the explanatory models used to 
understand it in the sociological discipline. It will indicate that the Gender and Male Violence 
explanatory model (GMV) will be utilised to inform the ensuing study, and will draw from the 
GMV model the principal issue of the sale of sexual services, termed  the ‘prostitution 
encounter’, as well as the issue of violence in prostitution. It will introduce the legal 
approaches to prostitution and consider that human rights and human dignity as modern 
approaches in law, may be more sufficient.  
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Introduction to the Academic Subject 
The sociology of prostitution is a subject of high complexity, and as an academic discipline, 
whilst principally lying within sociology and criminology, is also correlated to other academic 
fields, including law, religion, gender studies and radical feminism.448 One academic way of 
approaching prostitution is through the sociology of prostitution, although the theoretical 
premise of this method is itself subject to some critical appraisal.449 The ensuing study 
considers specific legal and ‘rights’ issues within the sociology of prostitution. Prostitution will 
be regarded here not from a moralistic ‘wrong’ or ‘right’ approach, although such dialogues 
are considered and explicated later on.  
The study will utilise a phenomenological analysis of the narratives of sex workers and the 
issues they face in the prostitution encounter. The hypothesised effect that the prostitution 
encounter has upon the sex worker and the client respectively is then considered by 
adopting an approach through the legal and philosophical theory of human dignity, to 
explore how prostitution might affect the dignity of sex workers through the IPA model of 
human dignity, as introduced in the methodology chapter, and constructed in later chapters. 
Equally, the issues faced by the client in the prostitution encounter are considered, with a 
specific focus on the issue of the purchase of intimacy. 
Before any such analysis can take place, however, the thesis begins with the sociological 
element of the study.  Although this is predominantly a legal study, the question of what 
prostitution is, beyond a simplistic lay understanding, has to be established. This chapter will 
provide an introduction to the core issues within the sociology of prostitution.  
This chapter provides a sufficient understanding of how prostitution, and the selected issues 
within it are relevant for the ensuing study. It will place the study’s principal adopted issue of 
the ‘prostitution encounter’ – the exchange of sexual services between sex worker and 
client, within the sociological context and explanatory models of prostitution. The key aim of 
this chapter is to provide fundamental insight into the subject area, advancing from the 
methodology chapter proficient in the main sociological, political and legal issues that arise 
in this controversial vocation.  
                                                          
448 I.e. Kate Millet, The Prostitution Papers (St. Albans: Paladin 1975); Kathleen Barry, Female Sexual Slavery 
(Englewood Cliffs, NJ 1979); Kathleen Barry, The Prostitution of Sexuality (New York: New York University Press 
1996); Carole Pateman, ‘Defending Prostitution: Charges Against Ericsson’, (1983) 93 Ethics 561; Carole 
Pateman, The Sexual Contract (Cambridge: Polity Press 1988), Catherine MacKinnon ‘Prostitution and Civil 
Rights’, (1993) 1 Michigan Journal of Gender and Law 13; Andrea Dworkin, Pornography: Men Possessing 
Women (New York: Plume 1989) 
449 I.e. Edward Armstrong, ‘The Sociology of Prostitution’, (1981) 1(1) Sociological Spectrum 91 
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Following this, there will be a review of the predominant literature in prostitution, and then 
the key ‘explanatory models’ through which prostitution is examined in the discipline of 
sociology. Of the explanatory models, the Gender and Male Violence model (‘GMV’) will be 
highlighted as most pertinent to the ensuing study. There will be a discussion on the different 
sex markets, plus the motivations for entry into, exit from, and retention within prostitution.  
 
Reviewing the Prominent Literature  
The author of this thesis is a lawyer by discipline. As such, the texts that follow were chosen 
to enable the author and the reader of this thesis to consider some of the complex issues in 
the sociology of prostitution, and be equipped to apply the issues presented to the IPA 
model of dignity, which will be constructed later.  
 
General Sociology of Prostitution  
As mentioned above, prostitution and the reasons for women’s entry into prostitution have 
been examined in various ways over the decades, and many academics such as Jane 
Scoular, in law and gender studies, Carol Pateman and Andrea Dworkin in feminist studies 
of prostitution, and Belinda Brooks-Gordon, Teela Sanders and Maggie O’Neill, in the 
sociology/policy fields of prostitution study, have made key contributions to knowledge of the 
many issues and approaches to the study of prostitution. A number of prominent scholars 
were identified in the field of prostitution study, including Maggie O’Neill, Teela Sanders, 
Rosie Campbell, Jo Phoenix and Sarah Kingston. These authors are also noted for their 
contribution to the debate on rights in prostitution, whether that be surrounding rights to 
protection in the course of performing sex work, or recognition through trade and economic 
welfare consideration.  
Research, theory and narratives in the sociology of prostitution appear, in part located in 
feminist theory,450 and this is particularly so when reading in the field of feminist theory per 
se, which considers pornography in particular as an issue of patriarchy and male 
dominance.451 It is also apparent that the explanatory models which will be discussed tend to 
emphasise on the similarities and differences between sex workers and non-sex worker 
women, and each model ultimately reduces to this key focus-point. This is a point made by 
                                                          
450 I.e. Frédérique Delacoste, Priscilla Alexander, (eds), Sex Work: Writings by Women in the Sex Industry (2nd 
edn Cleiss Press1998) 
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Rosie Campbell, who has called this the ‘othering’ of sex workers.452 The explanatory 
models which will be introduced, and are used in the sociology of prostitution, are those as 
observed by prostitution researchers, including, inter alia Teela Sanders, Joanna Phoenix 
and Maggie O’Neill.  
The sociology of prostitution can be considered through qualitative empirical study. An 
example of such a (commonly adopted) approach, is that of Jo Phoenix. Phoenix conducted 
an empirical study in the late 1990s, which involved interviewing sex workers of varying ages 
from an anonymised city of ‘Midcity’ - a large city in England of around one million 
inhabitants, with a variety of ethnic groups. She conducted interviews with 21 female sex 
workers aged between 18 and 44, and access to them was established via two ‘gatekeepers’ 
– one from a local sexual health outreach service and the other who worked in a probation-
linked day centre. In the interviews, questions asked ranged in diversity of themes, and 
topics included general involvement in prostitution, encounters with the police, and 
objectification of sexual relationships. The interviewees’ working routines were also 
observed. Some sex workers were street based and others worked in saunas and brothels.  
Such a study is typical of the empirical interview-based method, which appears to be 
dominant in the sociological study of prostitution. Whilst the study by Phoenix is not intended 
to be exhaustive or reflective of the entirety of street and indoor prostitution in the United 
Kingdom, it provides a snapshot which the reader would find useful for the purposes of this 
study; enabling the reader to understand the realities of the issues only theorised elsewhere. 
The respective text provided an overview of prostitution, sufficient for this study, but also 
including appropriate depth within the subject. No comment is made as to the ethnic diversity 
of the sex workers involved in the study conducted by Phoenix, and perhaps this illustrates a 
shortcoming in this work, if only minor.  
Phoenix’s UK study might be contrasted with another piece of empirical research, conducted 
more recently in Lithuania by Dalia Puidokiene, which explores the dysfunctional nature of 
the lives and backgrounds of a small group of sex workers.453 It enables the reader to 
grapple with the complexities of the sex workers themselves, and to appreciate that for some 
of the sample tested, prostitution was never a wholly freely-made choice. It highlights the 
assertion that there existed a factor or combination of factors which led the women 
interviewed into prostitution, including suffering sexual violence as children. There are 
                                                          
452 Rosie Campbell, ‘Treating crimes against sex workers as hate crime: a tool in the recognition of the rights of 
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obvious dangers of placing too great a reliance on such studies, and a temptation to make 
sweeping statements about all sex workers, based on these findings. This study is also an 
academic dissertation, and so appropriate weight should be given thereto, given the 
absence of peer review.  
What these two studies show for the purposes of this review, however, is a variety of 
approaches, and focus points. Phoenix’s study examines the ‘present’ situation for sex 
workers – how is prostitution affecting them now, what do they experience on a day-to-day 
basis, whilst the Lithuanian study has more of an emphasis on the ‘why’ and the historical 
factors leading to the present prostitution. One also has to observe problems associated with 
the conflation of prostitution and trafficking, which seems apparent in the latter study; a 
problem which will discussed further on.  
Some studies are focused on the general issues underpinning and overarching prostitution. 
Sanders, O’Neill and Pitcher present a resource with a focus on the sociology of sex work, 
that takes a particular look at feminist arguments for and against sex work, moving into 
economic issues and policy, and then into the lives of the sex workers themselves, with 
figures provided for those entering, leaving and remaining within the sex industry.454 The text 
then explores trafficking and policy in the UK, (although this is a fast moving area of 
international law and policy which has altered in recent years); and also explores the role of 
the client in the sex industry. Such a text therefore provides a good overview of the key 
issues relating to prostitution, sex workers’ and clients’ lives and lifestyles, and trafficking for 
sexual exploitation, providing crucial foundational and extended knowledge in prostitution. 
Authors such as Jane Scoular, Maggie O’Neill and Phil Hubbard have focused attention 
upon the relationship between law and prostitution, and the regulation of prostitution.455  
Some resources aim at providing a collection of chapters that identify specific issues, 
relevant at the time of writing. ‘Rethinking Prostitution: Purchasing Sex in the 1990s’456 is a 
UK work which provides a collection of articles and research from prominent prostitution 
experts. Susan Edwards provides an interesting chapter which frames prostitution as a 
human rights issue, by considering the interaction between prostitution and the law from 
soliciting offences and kerb crawling to rent law, inequality and self-determination. This work 
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is separated by some twenty years from a recent edited text, in which Kingston and Sanders 
adopt a broad overview of the sociology of prostitution, to incorporate new disciplines and 
focus on themes such as policy (past and present), methodologies used in sex work 
research, mobility and consumption and emerging trends in prostitution and culture.457 This 
modern resource provides much sociological theory on prostitution, defined there as sex 
work. Some of the obvious changes in that time surround new technologies used in 
prostitution. Webcam work (explained later) is very prominent now, but wasn’t even in 
existence in the early 1990s.  
To summarise, the preceding literature, and others not specifically referred to in this review 
examined and explicated a general sociological overview of prostitution and associated 
issues. In the next section of literature reviewed, authors demonstrate alignment to polarised 
positions on prostitution. 
 
Abolitionist Debate 
Some authors, such as Melissa Farley, hold the position that prostitution is violence against 
women, and is an ardent campaigner to that end. Farley’s expertise in clinical psychology 
has provided the backdrop for much of her research into the effects of prostitution upon the 
mental health of sex workers. In an international work from 1998, Farley et al studied post-
traumatic stress disorder in 475 sex workers in five different countries; Thailand, South 
Africa, USA, Turkey and Zambia.458 As such, the research was conducted across not only 
‘developing’ countries but also in the West. Violent backgrounds are identified in high 
proportions of those interviewed, along with instances of homelessness and drug and 
alcohol dependency.  
Farley’s research clashes at times with other scholars such as Ronald Weitzer, whose 
general stance is that the conflation of trafficking and prostitution has led to implausible and 
dangerous assumptions. In a 2005 article,459 she responds to challenges by Weitzer of the 
methodologies used in her research into the harms of prostitution.460 For Weitzer, she 
claims, indoor prostitution is favoured over street prostitution because of the benefits to the 
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local community in removing prostitution from the streets.461 Farley’s position remains that 
prostitution is harmful in invisible ways – extending not only to physical violence but to long 
term emotional harm including, in the extreme, post-traumatic stress disorder, evidenced in 
some of those interviewed. 
Farley has been criticised in recent years for her epistemological stance against prostitution 
and sex workers’ ‘rights’. John Lowman is a particularly outspoken critic of Farley’s position, 
following their work as expert witnesses on opposing sides of Bedford v Canada,462 in which 
Farley gave evidence on behalf of the state as Respondent, whilst Lowman gave evidence 
on behalf of the Applicant sex workers, seeking decriminalization of prostitution in Canada. 
Lowman’s apparent tenet is that sex workers should be protected from harm which is 
perpetuated through criminalization of prostitution, and stigmatization.463 The polarisation of 
views on prostitution is visible in the literature between such key researchers as these, and 
is evidenced throughout the discourse on prostitution.  
Janice Raymond’s research addresses sexual exploitation and tends to conflate prostitution 
with sex trafficking. In accordance with Farley, she asserts that prostitution is violence 
against women and, in accordance with a radical feminist stance on male patriarchy in 
sexual domination over women, ‘exists because significant numbers of men are given social, 
moral and legal permission to buy women on demand’.464 Her work has focused mainly on 
sex trafficking, and the UN’s trafficking protocol, which was introduced in 2000, as part of her 
role in the Coalition Against Trafficking in Women (CATW).465 
Catherine MacKinnon, who is an ardent advocate of women’s rights is noted as a particularly 
strong voice against prostitution. In her article ‘Prostitution and Civil Rights’, she explains 
that ‘Women are prostituted precisely in order to be degraded and subjected to cruel and 
brutal treatment without human limits…In rape, the security of women’s person is stolen; in 
prostitution, it is stolen and sold.’466 MacKinnon also writes on trafficking and prostitution, 
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and has authored an article exploring sexual violence in the wake of the Rwandan 
genocide467.  
Dorchen Leidholdt provides an article contending with the ‘pro-prostitution lobby’ that 
prostitution violates human rights, and is not, as the latter group might advocate, an 
opportunity for women to exercise numerous rights. Making reference to a key text,468 in this 
article she argues that prostitution is not about a relationship of equal footing, but of 
imbalance.469 It is, in her words ‘a paradigm of sexual and racial inequality’, and amounts to 
objectification and dehumanization.470  
Weitzer, as mentioned, is an advocate for indoor but not street prostitution. In a more recent 
article he has been critical not only of Melissa Farley, but of the general prohibitionist 
viewpoint. He says that ‘Prohibitionist writers adopt what I call the oppression paradigm, 
which depicts prostitution as the epitome of male domination and exploitation regardless of 
historical period, societal context, or type of prostitution’.471 He evidences his criticism in 
presenting the strong language used by prohibitionist writers such as Andrea Dworkin, 
Melissa Farley and Janice Raymond et al. Examples given include; ‘When men use women 
in prostitution, they are expressing a pure hatred for the female body’; and ‘prostitution is 
rape that’s paid for.’ 472 Weitzer is outspoken on what he calls ‘sensationalism’ and the 
defining of prostitution in a ‘one-dimensional manner’473, the latter term echoed in other 
esteemed researchers’ works which indicate the dangers of such broad-brush thinking.474  
Other literature which features in the polarised debate about the rights and wrongs of 
prostitution, are works which concentrate on the legality of prostitution, and policy changes 
to criminalise, legalize or decriminalise it.  
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Attention in some articles is paid towards the Swedish criminalisation of clients and pimps, 
and the resulting effect the law has had on trafficking and prostitution generally. Max 
Waltman and Gunila Ekberg are two such example scholars. Waltman identifies that whilst 
the law has had a positive impact upon the demand for prostitution, resulting in fewer 
persons being trafficked into Sweden, the law has failed sex workers in aiding their exit from 
prostitution.475 Ekberg holds a very supportive position towards the Swedish law criminalising 
prostitution, commenting that Sweden’s stance against prostitution should be emulated 
across the world to restrict the global sex trade. Her stance is undoubtedly aligned to that of 
Farley et al, as above.476  
The next section of literature outlines the sources of sex worker and client narratives in the 
thesis. As outlined in the methodology chapter, this literature represents a cross-section of 
current empirical data taken from sex workers and clients, mainly through interviewing. This 
material provides narrative data regarding the prostitution encounter, and the violence 
reported in prostitution. As stated clearly in the methodology chapter, important 
consideration is given to the era in which the book was authored, where it was written, and 
known bias – specifically any feminist pro sex work or sex work as violence against women 
viewpoints, and finally a brief synopsis.  
 
Sex Worker Narratives 
Other material which is available provides accounts from sex workers, and a specific text in 
this category will be a source for the narrative element of the thesis.477 The resources now 
reviewed provide more of an in depth phenomenological presentation of the lives of the sex 
worker, to reveal sharp nuances between different narratives given.  
‘Red Light, Blue Light’478 was authored in the 1990s in the UK. It details an empirical study 
carried out in the UK in 1993, interviewing 100 sex workers, their clients and also the police; 
making it a fairly unique study in that respect. It has been included in order to consider 
narratives from not only sex workers, but from clients and the police, which can help to build 
a broader and perhaps more balanced picture of the realities of street sex work. This text 
                                                          
475 Max Waltman, ‘Sweden’s prohibition of purchase of sex: The law’s reasons, impact and potential’ (2011) 34 
Women’s Studies International Forum 449 
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shares similarities with others, such as ‘Sex Work on the Streets’479 - also produced in the 
1990s, this time in Glasgow, Scotland. This was an empirical study of street sex workers by 
a team adopting a service-provider role and obtaining interviews on the streets of a red light 
district. Discussions of issues such as negotiation, and the skills of bargaining with clients 
are also included.  
Such an analysis is beneficial to gain insight into the prostitution encounter, and the 
interrelation between sex worker and client. In this text as well as others utilizing empirical 
study, the narratives encourage the reader to ignore previously held generalisations about 
sex workers as victims, and explore the perception posed that some sex workers are clearly 
very skilled professionals who enjoy their work in prostitution.480 That theme is picked up in a 
seminal narrative-focused text ‘Sex Work: Writings by Women in the Sex Industry’;481 from 
the USA. It comprises a collection of narratives taken from interviews conducted between 
the 1970s-90s, which chronicle the lives and experiences of [then] current and former sex 
workers, exotic dancers and pornographic actresses. A range of different types of sex work 
are included, from street prostitution, dancing, through to ‘home’ sex work. This text provided 
a great deal of understanding of the lives of those in the sex industry and the multi-faceted 
dynamics involved, which are apparent from the varied tones of the narratives of the sex 
workers who took part in this particular study. 
This text provides raw and unfettered narratives of real life as a sex worker. The visceral 
nature of the experiences, some positive and others not, is particularly relevant when 
considering a phenomenological approach to the study of the sociology of prostitution, and 
the experiences of those at the heart of prostitution. 
 
Client Research 
Alongside inter alia, Sarah Kingston, and Teela Sanders, Mario Monto is a prominent 
researcher in male clients of prostitution.482 Sanders has written comprehensively on the 
                                                          
479 Neil McKeganey, Marina Barnard, Sex work on the streets (Open University Press 1996) 
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issues faced by clients of prostitution. Paying for Pleasure483 is a unique text which 
concentrates on the client of prostitution instead of the sex worker. Sanders recruited 50 
clients through a variety of means, with a focus on the ‘sexual stories’ of the clients 
interviewed. Overarching questions asked of the subjects included the nature of sexual 
industry, stigma and secrecy, emotions, sexual scripts and social conduct and also on law 
and policy. Socio-demographic features are catalogued, and marital status, for example 
being one factor, was noted in each. Equally important was the type of market from which 
each client purchased sex. This demonstrated that the majority bought sex from both 
massage parlour and escort services, whilst very few bought sex from street workers.484 
Motivations and ‘push factors’ were recorded, to frame the reasons for which the men 
interviewed sought mercenary sexual services. Equally the various ‘pull factors’ – those 
keeping men hooked into prostitution are recorded. The study provides a very 
comprehensive structural analysis of the sample of clients interviewed. 
 
Literature: a summary 
The literature on the subject of prostitution is vast, extending across decades, and through a 
variety of disciplines, in addition to the sociological material reviewed here. The texts 
selected represent recent (1970s to date) quantitative research that highlights the key issues 
in the GMV explanatory model, as will be explored next. The history of prostitution, and also 
how it is considered in other cultures, is not reviewed in this study, bearing in mind the 
relative comparability of the prostitution encounter in general. Any research conducted on 
sex workers has to acknowledge that there is extraordinary variability between experiences 
sex workers face,485 not least because of the global scale of the subject matter. Other 
factors, such as globalisation, capitalism, issues of gender and caste all play a part in the 
international existence of prostitution, and to attempt to fully comprehend it in one piece of 
work would be almost impossible. We now return to Phoenix’s study486, and to the 
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explanatory models of prostitution which inform this work; models which will now be 
explicated to enable a sufficient understanding of the complexity of the study of prostitution. 
 
Explanatory Models  
The following analyses are informed largely from Phoenix’s insightful (1999) text, which 
contains an excellent chapter on the sociological discourse relating to prostitution and sex 
workers. As Jo Phoenix identifies in her work, there are a number of methods used to study 
prostitution, including ethnographic, pathological, and functionalist approaches.  
Each looks at prostitution in a different way; for instance to view prostitution via a 
functionalist approach would be to determine that prostitution is necessary in a democratic 
society – that it serves a useful function,487 yet to approach it through a gender and male 
violence approach would be to adopt a more feministic epistemology, and focus chiefly upon 
the sale of sexual services. 
Since this is not a critical review of the sociological study of prostitution per se, the following 
analysis is not intended to be exhaustive, but more of an introduction to the sociological 
methods in the study of prostitution. The principal aim of the review of these models is to 
identify what each model stands for and what its approach is. This will provide justification 
for the adoption of one particular model, the Gender and Male Violence model, as 
specifically informative in the ensuing study. 
The reader will here be able to identify that there is a theme running through all the 
explanatory models; that being the question of whether sex workers are the same or 
different to non-sex workers.488 It is a question which goes to the heart of the personality of 
the sex worker, and seeks to draw distinctions between those who sell sex and those who 
do not. In considering human dignity later, it will be asserted that the concept has universal 
applicability - the intrinsic nature of human dignity entitles all, sex worker, non-sex worker or 
client, to the same level of respect and appreciation. In this way, this study will contrast with 
these explanatory models. 
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Functionalist explanatory model (FN) 
Functionalism is itself a vast area of study within the sociological and philosophical 
disciplines.489 It has been linked to prostitution, and the two studied in line with each other.  
If prostitution is considered a ‘necessary evil’, it is considered under a functionalist approach, 
originally propounded by Kingsley Davis (prominent in functionalist theory), in 1937, in his 
seminal appraisal of the sociology of prostitution.490 His approach, which makes reference to 
anthropological studies,491 is that certain organisations and structures have a level of 
necessity about them. In such a method, it is considered that prostitution serves a useful 
function. For example, sex workers provide sexual relief for married (and unmarried) 
sexually frustrated men. 
In his examination, Davis discusses the reasons for prostitution’s existence, at times delving 
into anthropology, and reviewing the function of prostitution in his view as actually 
‘preserving marriage’.492 He considers prostitution ‘malleable, providing for variety, perverse 
gratification, and intercourse free from entangling cares and civilised pretence.’493 Davis 
certainly appears to look upon prostitution favourably, demonstrating the essence of the 
functionalistic ‘needs-must’ view point.494 In an article from 1968 which examined female 
‘deviance’, the functionalist approach was said to stress ‘the impact of social structural 
features on individuals and groups and also the structuring of situations which lead to 
opportunities for deviance’.495  
The problem with a functionalist model in the scope of this study is that it appears to 
disregard the inherent harms of deleterious issues of prostitution in favour of its overarching 
validity in society, regardless of moral views or public policy opinion. It does not consider the 
issues facing the sex worker, but instead hinges upon the client – i.e. it is the client’s needs 
which are met through the provision of prostitution, as per Davis, above. Studies which 
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wholly examine the client’s welfare, needs and also those exploring criminalisation or 
abolition of prostitution may well utilise a functionalistic approach. Adopting a functionalist 
approach does not fit well with the epistemological approach of this study, since its focus 
centres almost exclusively upon the needs of the client, and would not therefore provide 
adequate consideration of the welfare of the sex worker.  
 
Pathological and Ethnographical Explanatory Models (P&E) 
One particularly historical model of study is a pathological approach to prostitution. Studies 
by Lombroso and Ferrero in 1895, focused on the criminality of the female mind, associating 
female prostitution with the criminal mind of the male.496 The main thrust of the work posited 
that females who worked as sex workers were apparently degenerate in their psychological 
make-up, and lacked ‘normal’ mental development. Owing to some of the language used, 
the article is plainly out-of-date, and modern studies would certainly cast considerable doubt 
on such findings - for example:  
…the mental and physical peculiarities which are said to be characteristic of the criminal 
are in reality common to him with the lunatic, the epileptic, the alcoholic, the prostitute, 
the habitual pauper. The criminal is only one branch of a decadent stem; he is only one 
member of a family group; his abnormalities are not peculiar to himself; they have a 
common origin, and he shares them in common with the degenerate type of which he 
furnishes an example…497 
 
A later pathological study examined not only the inherent psychological development of the 
female sex worker, but usefully went further to examine the economic backgrounds of 
subjects.498 Such a study seems more realistic given that it is acknowledged that economic 
factors are perhaps very often a fundamental cause of entry into, and retention within 
prostitution.499 Glueck et al state; ‘It is clearly the profit-making motive that is involved in its 
[prostitution’s] promotion’.500 The literature suggests it does not necessarily appear to always 
be the case that profit-making initially drives most women into prostitution, but instead 
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poverty and drug abuse, homelessness etc.501 As can be seen in the material that follows, 
these are often also the factors responsible for the retention of women in sex work. 
Sex workers were categorised in a later study into ‘voluntary’ and ‘compulsive’ prostitutes.502 
The former category were those who chose to sell sex freely, as a means of making money 
– a decision entered into with rational forethought, whilst the latter were forced into 
prostitution by their own psychological disposition. There is a focus in that work on those 
entering prostitution falling into the second category, having suffered trauma in early 
childhood.  
Some modern research has indicated that many women enter prostitution following abusive 
experiences in both child/adulthood.503 As per the literature review above, Farley et al have 
pointed specifically towards childhood trauma as a factor for entry into prostitution.504 This is 
indeed a specific area of study which requires more attention, to ask the questions across 
many demographics, as to how and why women enter the sex trade, and as to whether 
specifically any such past abusive experiences genuinely drive the migration. 
Ethnographical study in general is a very essential form of sociological research, in which 
the researcher observes the study subject in their day to day lives, making note of what [the 
researcher] sees and hears. It is very successfully utilised to research prostitution.505 The 
reader is directed to a useful resource for more information on ethnographical study, which is 
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not discussed further here.506 For the purpose of this study, an ethnographic or pathological 
model is not adopted.507  
 
Social Dislocation and Criminal Subculture Explanatory Model (SDC) 
This model describes women’s involvement in prostitution having regard to their position in 
society and ‘questions are asked about the extent to which women are segregated, or cut 
off, from legitimate or acceptable social relationships and institutions’.508 Under this 
explanatory model, it is the woman’s position in society and how it has impacted upon her 
which is key to understanding how she has entered into prostitution, and perhaps what 
keeps her there. Phoenix refers to an important study by Wilkinson in the early 1950s which 
explored the lives of sex workers.509 
This model is situated less along the lines of pure feminist theory, in that the model does not 
propound the general female subordination epistemology existent in core feminist work. 
Instead, this model concentrates on what has happened to the woman in early life to cause 
her to enter into prostitution. As such, it is very much concerned with facts and experiences, 
and there is clear crossover with the pathological model in asking the question, ‘why has this 
person entered into prostitution’. Puidokiene’s study would appear to adopt such a focus.510 
That study paints a picture of fractured early home life, broken homes and sexual abuse 
being attributed to entry into prostitution, similarly to other studies in this model. 511 Various 
contributors to such social dislocation as the supposed cause(s) of entry into prostitution are 
considered:  
…Long-lasting, traumatic experiences in childhood, during the especially sensitive 
periods of personality development, chop at the roots of personality formation and greatly 
interfere in its development. In such a case, a person cannot be understood by 
character, dysfunction type or one or another structure from the perspective of proprium 
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[sic] (or individuality) but only by associating the person’s life story with specific ways of 
being in that person’s world.512 
 
Naturally, a criminological study would also overlap here, and the study of deviance, criminal 
thought, and, more specific to this work, the study of women and crime could be 
addressed.513 For example, in a key text in this area from 1979, Freda Adler and Rita James 
Simon explore the historical perspective of the ‘female offender’, making reference to the key 
articles from Lombroso and Ferrero, and Glueck et al. and providing insight into the 
criminality of women involved in prostitution.514  
 
Economic Position and Poverty Explanatory Model (EPP) 
The title of the model is self-explanatory, and really coincides with the social dislocation 
model to some extent. The principal focus of this model, is the economic status of those 
entering prostitution and keeping them there. Kingsley Davis, who was as mentioned a 
prominent advocate of the functionalist model also considers the economic factors. He holds 
that prostitution ‘embraces an economic relation, and is naturally connected with the entire 
system of economic forces’,515 however, ‘the existence of prostitution seems related both to 
the physiological nature of man and to the inherent character of society, both of which 
include more than the sheer economic element’.516  
What is also clear from studying human trafficking is the effect the myriad of causes, 
including globalisation, has had on prostitution. In an article taken from Adler and Simon’s 
text, Kate Millett opens by declaring, ‘I don’t think you can ever eliminate the economic factor 
motivating women to prostitution. Even a call girl would never make as much in a straight job 
as she could at prostitution.’517  
She tells of the choice some women have between starvation and earning good money as a 
sex worker, making comparisons to the so-called ‘legitimate’ business decision making. This 
model concerns various economic concerns which go beyond the scope of this study. 
However, future research with human dignity might consider the effect that economic factors 
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have upon the dignity of the sex worker, in respect perhaps of economic coercion into 
prostitution, for example. 
 
Gender and Male Violence Explanatory Model (‘GMV’) 
This approach to understanding prostitution has been called the ‘sexual-domination’ 
approach, which ‘contests the claims of choice, consent and voluntariness’.518 The GMV 
model finds itself embedded in radical feminist theory, particularly in the polarised debate 
between prostitution being violence against women on the one hand, and being liberating to 
those who sell sex as ‘sex work’ on the other. 
Phoenix says of the GMV model that it ‘explains prostitution as a manifestation and result of 
men’s control over women’s sexuality’.519 As Phoenix explains, it is this model which looks 
more into the detail of the sale of sex than the other models520.  This is pivotal in its use in 
this study, which centres on the prostitution encounter, as explained. The GMV consists in 
part of a complex study of the reasons for sex workers entering into the vocation, and the 
reasons they remain there; exploring the background of sex workers and the patterns 
familiar between them.  
Høigård and Finstad’s 1992 work is particularly influential in numerous articles where the 
issue of violence in prostitution521 is, by Phoenix’s estimation, ‘a good example of the gender 
and male violence…model’.522 Their work appears to align with the work of a number of 
feminist organisations including the Coalition Against Trafficking in Women (CATW), who 
observe a strong anti-prostitution or abolitionist position. This viewpoint considers sex 
workers invariably as victims, being dominated by men, and using their sexuality as a means 
to make money in that culture of subservience to the opposite sex. Comparisons can be 
drawn between these strong viewpoints on prostitution and the sex trade in general and the 
concepts of objectification523 and male dominance/female subservience in feminist theory.524 
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As such, the feminist stance tends to lead to two general modes of discussion – sex-worker 
discourse and exploitation discourse. The model indicates that ‘Women become prostitutes 
because of prior victimisation by men.’525 The GMV model also in part considers the 
‘essential’ and very real element of violence in prostitution. Examples of such violence can 
be found as shared by sex workers on the website Punternet.com. On the website, blogs 
allow sex workers to share experiences, warn other workers of potentially dangerous clients 
or problems in particular areas. As far as research in prostitution goes, the discourse 
specifically related to violence in prostitution is vast, extending beyond the space available 
here, but the reader is directed to various other sources for further information.526  
The GMV model examines the links between prostitution and poverty, and choice of sex 
workers to engage in prostitution for economic benefit. Høigård and Finstad go further to 
state that ‘Money is the reason for prostitution’,527 thus creating links between this 
explanatory model and the economic position and poverty model as discussed above. So far 
under this heading, the suggestion has been that those who advocate a GMV model are 
‘anti-prostitution’, however, there exist a number of academics, some of whom are former 
sex workers themselves, who take a different view on this model. This leads us to an area of 
the literature within the GMV model which is known as the ‘sex worker discourse’ model.  
In this GMV sub-model it is argued that sex work is a ‘right’ of women, and as much as there 
is feminist discourse against prostitution as exploitative of women, there is much, inter alia, 
feminist academic comment on the rights of women to work in the sex industry too. 
Discourse surrounding sex work and exploitation, as two polarised positions is dominated by 
feminist voices. For example, Overall describes the feminist discourse on sexuality as: 
a split between an emphasis on sexual freedom and pleasure that views women 
exclusively as agents, on the one hand, and an emphasis on sexual danger and 
degradation that sees women exclusively as victims on the other.’528  
 
She continues, ‘…the subject of prostitution provides a particularly sharp example of this 
split in feminist thought.’529 In her 1992 article, she suggests ways in which the views of each 
side could somehow be recognised – as starkly different as they were/are, and, as the title of 
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the article suggests, seeks to answer the question of whether there is actually anything 
wrong with prostitution. She also points out, interestingly, what are in her view more 
traditional motivations for condemning sex work, including ‘a hatred of women…or a hatred 
and fear of sexual activity itself.’530  
In feminist theory we find narratives of male dominance and female submission, which seem 
key to these arguments.531. Tied in with the sex work discourse, comes consideration of 
trade and economics. For some, sex workers should be entitled to form unions and possess 
employment rights as a valid group of workers, in a recognised trade, as illustrated in 1998 
when the International Labour Organisation (ILO) called for sex work to be recognised as a 
valid ‘trade’. Groups such as the English Collective of Prostitutes have campaigned for such 
rights for some time, and the ILO’s views on prostitution constitute a grand statement of the 
way views have changed in recent years to prostitution as a vocation and as an institution.  
The ILO’s position as a body of the United Nations gives it a powerful voice on a global 
scale, in light of which, the image of the sex worker is undoubtedly being altered over time to 
incorporate a view of prostitution as a trade like any other. One might draw links here with 
the functionalist theory as discussed above, and Davis certainly opined that prostitution 
served a reasonable purpose.  
 
Conclusion – Utilizing the GMV Model 
Before moving into Part Two of this thesis, it is essential to establish a lens through which 
the sociology of prostitution is understood and viewed in the ensuing analysis. There are 
many ways of understanding the sociology of prostitution as discussed above, but one 
model is adopted here; the GMV model. The GMV model provides particular consideration of 
the exchange between the sex worker and the client of prostitution. The literature within this 
model provides a picture of prostitution from a polarised position, and reducing the potential 
for bias in this study, since it considers pro and anti-prostitution literature. 
It also appears that the literature in the GMV model brings into sharp focus, the effect 
prostitution has upon the sex worker in her health and wellbeing, in the stigma associated 
with prostitution and the criminalisation thereof as well as physical and mental health issues. 
The GMV model appears to bring to the forefront of the sociology of prostitution the issue of 
human rights from the two standpoints. 
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531 Tong op cit 110ff 
Page 160 of 232 
 
For instance, for those who have an anti-prostitution stance, and view prostitution as 
violence against women, the right to protection from inter alia, inhuman and degrading 
treatment is promoted.532 For those who promote prostitution as sex work, inhuman and 
degrading treatment are not considerations at all; instead, labour rights are important, and 
the right to a private life, freedom of expression etc.533 Issues surrounding rights will be 
considered in a later chapter, with a focus on Article 3 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights as it might relate to prostitution and human dignity. Other studies might 
consider an approach which examines Article 8 rights and labour rights in prostitution as sex 
work. Article 8 of the ECHR provides the right to respect for private and family life. The right 
may be drawn upon by sex workers who claim that it is their right to conduct their sexuality 
as they so choose, for example. 
Using the GMV model to inform the research may be controversial because the model has 
traditionally been adopted to view sex workers as victims. Such a viewpoint is not assumed 
in this study, but instead an analysis of the central issues within the prostitution encounter as 
promulgated will, it is asserted, identify any potential violations of human dignity in 
prostitution. Also, in consideration of the ‘pro-sex work’ ethos, the study will consider how 
human dignity might be supported by prostitution, in the element of autonomy as dignity, 
later on. 
In summary then, the sociology of prostitution has been introduced, and the explanatory 
models in the sociological study of prostitution have been considered. From those principal 
models, the GMV model has been deemed most applicable to inform the ensuing study. The 
following section explores the different markets of prostitution. The aims of this section are to 
build upon the sociological background of prostitution, to inform the reader of the practical 
out-workings of prostitution. The reader will, by the end of the next section understand how 
prostitution is typically conducted.  
 
Prostitution Markets  
As might be imagined, there is no universal method for the conduct of prostitution. The 
reader is introduced to the idea that, to adopt terminology from the discipline of economics; 
there are different markets of prostitution. Sanders states that there are several different 
markets in prostitution, including licensed saunas, brothels, working premises (private 
                                                          
532 I.e. MacKinnon op cit 
533 See Kamala Kempadoo, ‘Globalizing Sex Workers’ Rights’ (2003) 22(3-4) Canadian Woman Studies 143 
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premises), escort work (Visiting; ‘outcalls’), home working (including webcam work), the 
street market (or ‘the beat’), and pornography.534 Locations, services, rates and clientele will 
all differ dependent upon which market/s the sex worker operates in. Some markets will 
operate in legality, whilst others will not.  
For example, saunas are legally compliant with a licence, as other entertainment licences 
such as liquor licences are, where that sauna is not operating as a brothel, which would be 
illegal535. A brothel is defined in the amended Sexual Offences Act 1956, as an 
establishment ‘…to which people resort for practices involving prostitution’.536 Reference is 
made in that section to the definition of Prostitution as given in s.51 (2) Sexual Offences Act 
2003; the statutory definition given above in this chapter. Brothels are illegal in the UK at 
present, but the law surrounding this is unclear.  
Women can legitimately work from home individually, providing sexual services from flats or 
houses. They may work from home and operate a ‘webcam’ service – where clients 
purchase time with the sex worker who strips or performs sex acts over the internet via the 
webcam. These services, in contrast to the usual ‘direct’ sex work involving ‘genital contact’ 
are sometimes termed ‘indirect’ sex work.537  
Street prostitution is considered very much in a league of its own. This is in the sense that 
street prostitution is considered in the literature to be far more violent and dangerous, 
empirically speaking, than indoor work. Street work is not in itself illegal, but soliciting for sex 
is illegal, as is ‘kerb-crawling’.538 Escort workers tend to visit clients at their homes or in 
hotels and other premises. It is apparent in the literature that some of the markets are safer 
and more lucrative than others, and street work, for instance is more dangerous539, and often 
less lucrative than sauna-based prostitution, or indoor prostitution in general.540 As Phoenix 
identifies, based on Wilkinson’s earlier work, some sex workers are coined with the term 
‘higher end’ workers541, with higher potential earnings as they target more wealthy clients. 
                                                          
534 Teela Sanders, Sex Work: A Risky Business (Willan 2005) pp14-19 
535 Sexual Offences Act 1956 s.33 
536 S.33A 
537 Sanders et al op cit 18-19  
538 Sexual Offences Act 2003 s.51A 
539 Sanders et al op cit 43 
540 See Weitzer op cit 
541 See, for example Phoenix op cit 51 
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She differentiates between the terming of different types of prostitutions, such as ‘’bread and 
butter trade’, ‘high-class work’ and ‘drug-related work’’542 
The treatment sex workers receive from clientele, and others in general can differ dependent 
on the type of market they operate in, too, as one account explains that there are, in her 
opinion, class divisions within prostitution:  
…It breaks down around race, but also class background. I am in an elite position 
because some friends who had worked for years on the street built up a different kind of 
clientele, business men…When people talk about hookers and whores, they don’t mind 
the women who are on call, you know, the women who have clientele, it’s the women on 
the streets they nab on…’543 
As there are different markets for prostitution, motivations for entering sex work can differ 
too, and are specific to each market. O’Neill indicates four potential motivations for entering 
into prostitution; economic need; prior association with the sub-culture; drug dependency; or 
those vulnerable and in local authority care.544 On reflection, O’Neill’s listed motivations 
appear to reflect the themes running through the explanatory models, above. The causes of 
entry into prostitution can also naturally be the reasons for retention in the sex trade; drug 
dependency can keep women from exiting prostitution.545  
Whatever the motivations, it has been estimated around 80,000 people in the United 
Kingdom engage in prostitution546 – although this figure is perhaps impossible to verify 
because the specific act of selling sex is one which can be overtly or covertly done. It is also 
very apparent that some people step into the sex trade and out of it very quickly, or may 
simply sell sex to a client or even to a friend on one or maybe a handful of occasions, never 
to return to it in the future. 
Reports are given (largely in tabloid newspapers) of women who have performed in strip 
clubs, or on webcams for extra money, particularly to pay off student loans.547 Of course, the 
work is very lucrative, with minimal outlay, and usually cash in hand which negates, 
                                                          
542 Ibid 51 
543 ‘Nell’ Ibid 53 
544 Maggie O’Neill, Prostitution and Feminism (Cambridge: Polity 2001) 83 
545 T May, G Hunter, ‘Sex work and problem drug use in the UK: the links, problems and possible solutions’, in 
Rosie Campbell and Maggie O’Neill (eds) Sex Work Now (Cullompton: Willan 2006) 
546 Figure taken from a 1999 Europap-UK survey, quoted in: Home Office, ‘Paying the Price: A Consultation 
Paper on Prostitution’ (2004) London: Home Ofﬁce Communication Directorate  
547 One such tabloid report; http://www.dailymail.co.uk/femail/article-2605809/Lap-dancing-webcam-work-teach-
transferable-legal-skills-Law-student-set-scoop-funds-degree-stripping-online-earns-50k-year-it.html accessed 
16th April 2014 
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necessarily the payment of taxes; (i.e. the 2006 Home Office Coordinated Prostitution 
Strategy (2006) report explains that prostitution is taxable). In licensed saunas, sexual 
services are covertly offered and such establishments operate under the guise of providing 
only massage and affiliated treatments.  
For sex workers in these environments, work is generally considered safer, but the volume 
of clients per day is much higher than in some other markets, such as in the escort or home-
working markets548. As a market, pornography has some differences and similarities to 
prostitution. 
Pornography might be described as ‘sexually explicit material consisting in graphic pictorial 
depictions and verbal descriptions of sexual organs and various modes of coitus’.549 As an 
institution, pornography itself is a substantial area of research and debate extending beyond 
the scope of this thesis, yet is certainly tied in with prostitution, and for the purposes of this 
thesis, is considered a form of prostitution, in view of the expanded definition of prostitution, 
given in the next chapter.  
Using that legal definition, it is asserted that pornography is another prostitution 
market/variant that could reasonably be defined as prostitution without stretching the 
definition too far. One clear difference is the absence of physical sexual contact between sex 
worker A and client B, but this is negated by the fact that A commits sexual acts, or has sex 
with sex worker D, for the gratification of client B/C, in return for some reward, thus 
completing the expanded definition in this chapter. Also, it will be observed that webcam 
work in prostitution has clear links to pornography. In spite of the lack of de facto sexual 
contact between sex worker and client, a prostitution encounter has taken place as per the 
statutory and expanded definitions.  
Readers seeking further philosophical debate, particularly from a feminist perspective on 
pornography are directed to a number of authors on the subject.550 Essentially, some 
feminist thinkers view pornography as oppressive to women because it is linked to sexual 
violence. To this end, for example, Catherine MacKinnon is a well-known voice on 
pornography and the objectification of women. This theme is echoed by Valerie Bryson, who 
states that pornography is ‘said to distort human sexuality, and to maintain gender inequality 
by treating women as objects and sexualising their subordination.’551 
                                                          
548 See the literature from O’Neill, Pitcher and Sanders, Scambler and Scambler and Phoenix.  
549 Tong op cit 112 
550 I.e. Susanne Kappeler, The pornography of representation (John Wiley & Sons, 2013) 
551 Valerie Bryson, Feminist Debates: Issues of theory and Political Practice (Macmillan Press Ltd 1999) 184ff 
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The markets referred to are explicit frameworks in which a traditional concept of prostitution 
takes place. But it is recognised in recent times that the lines between mercenary and non-
mercenary sexual relations are blurred. Of course, to suggest that the markets suggested 
above are exhaustive of all prostitution that takes place universally would be incorrect and 
naive.  
This is demonstrable by new trends in sex work which cast grey areas over the previously 
understood sex worker/client relationship. Academic research in the sugar daddy type 
relationship appears to reside in the research in African nations.552 The relationship referred 
to here is described in recent tabloid media as an apparently emerging trend known as the 
‘Sugar Daddy/Sugar Baby’ relationship553.  
In the sugar daddy relationship, men, who are usually wealthy businessmen will contract 
with younger women for a relationship which may or may not include sexual activity. One 
student, interviewed by a glossy women’s magazine explains her experience of being a 
‘sugar-baby’: 
I'm a 19-year-old law student with a passion for politics and BIG [sic] career ambitions. I 
also date and have sex with older men in exchange for a hefty monthly allowance, and 
I'm not ashamed of it… Whenever someone asks me how I define the Sugar 
Daddy/Sugar Baby relationship, I say it's mutually beneficial. One based on respect but 
also chemistry – with none of the hassle of a 'normal' strings-attached relationship. They 
get physical affection, intelligent conversation and someone pretty on their arm, I get a 
millionaire mentor and £2k a month. Everyone wins.554 
It is apparent that this ‘sugar-daddy/baby’ setup draws comparisons with escort services, as 
described above. This type of arrangement only fulfils the criteria set out in the definition of 
prostitution above, if sexual activity takes place in the contract. There exists some form of 
agreement or contract between the parties, but for a girlfriend/boyfriend relationship that 
                                                          
552 I.e. Nancy Luke, ‘Confronting the ‘sugar daddy ‘stereotype: age and economic asymmetries and risky sexual 
behavior in urban Kenya’ (2005) International family planning perspectives 6; Dominique Meekers, Anne-
Emmanuèle Calvès ‘'Main girlfriends, girlfriends, marriage, and money: the social context of HIV risk behaviour in 
sub-Saharan Africa’ (1997) Health Transition Review 361; Miriam J Temin, ‘Perceptions of sexual behavior and 
knowledge about sexually transmitted diseases among adolescents in Benin City, Nigeria’ (1999) International 
Family Planning Perspectives 186; Fiona Leach, Pamela Machakanja, ‘The sugar daddy trap. Peer pressure 
pushes girls into sex’ (2001) Insights: Development Research 1 
553 ‘The rise and rise of the student Sugar Babies’ Cosmopolitan Magazine Online 27th January 2015 
http://www.cosmopolitan.co.uk/worklife/campus/a33002/student-sugar-babies-uk/; ‘Meet the student having sex 
with 'Sugar Daddies' to further her career’, Cosmopolitan Magazine online 29th January 2015 
http://www.cosmopolitan.co.uk/worklife/campus/a33037/what-its-like-being-sugar-baby/ accessed 11th February 
2015 
554 ‘Anonymous’, ‘Meet the student having sex with 'Sugar Daddies' to further her career’, Cosmopolitan Magazine 
online 29th January 2015 http://www.cosmopolitan.co.uk/worklife/campus/a33037/what-its-like-being-sugar-baby/ 
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might be exclusive of sexual relations. Where no sexual activity takes place, a prostitution 
encounter does not occur. This type of relationship is unique in prostitution, and skews its 
traditional understanding. This is about the purchase of intimacy, and the purchase of 
companionship, as opposed to the widely held image of the prostitution encounter being 
purely payment for sex.  
 
Conclusions Relating to Prostitution Markets 
There are explicit markets for prostitution, and also innumerable relational nuances which 
involve the exchange of sexual services for some financial reward. Also, prostitution does 
not always have to involve a physical sexual encounter between the sex worker and the 
client, since the availability of modern technology such as webcam communication allows 
sex work to be conducted via internet video services rather than in person. This is still 
‘indirect’ prostitution, according to the expanded definition, since the sex worker is 
performing sexual acts and services, and accordingly fulfils the above definition of 
prostitution.  
The next section considers the party representing the other half of the prostitution encounter 
– the client of prostitution. There will be an exploration of the issues researchers identify in 
the client experience, and a specific issue located in the client’s experience, the ‘purchase of 
intimacy’, which forces a modification of traditional moral understandings of the purchase of 
sex. 
 
The Client 
Typically, research in prostitution has focused heavily upon the sex worker, as opposed to 
the client. According to Perkins, in 1991 at least, male client research accounted for 1% of all 
research on prostitution.555 Whilst the literature relating to the client is thin in comparison to 
that explicitly focused on the sex worker, academics in this field remark that sources of 
information on customers of prostitution are increasing.556 A review of the literature makes it 
apparent that there are a number of prominent factors under consideration and examination 
by researchers of the client of prostitution. In accordance with conclusions drawn above 
regarding different markets of prostitution, not all clients purchase sex in the same way, and 
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what clients seek in a prostitution encounter will differ. This is important to note so as not to 
consider that all clients are the same in drive, desire, background etc.  
An example of consideration to this end is that research which accounts for those male 
clients who only use street sex workers cannot be used to indicate generalisations about all 
male prostitution users. Equally, some aspects of the client’s motivations are not restricted to 
a client of prostitution – Monto asserts, for instance, that ‘most common motivations for 
pursuing prostitutes are also experienced by men who are not prostitute users’.557 It is also 
asserted that ‘there is no one main reason why men pursue prostitutes and no single 
variable that differentiates users from nonusers’.558 A review of client research reveals 
considerations of the ethnography of clients, attitudes and orientations of clients, human 
rights, masculinity issues, and the concept of ‘rape myth acceptance’ among clients. Teela 
Sanders’ comprehensive work provides a foundational understanding of the diverse 
character that is ‘the client’ of prostitution. In her work, Paying for Pleasure a comprehensive 
analysis of the male client is made and presented.  
Upon review of the literature pertaining to the client of the prostitution encounter, recent 
research has added to a far smaller selection than that which focuses on the sex worker. 
There has been, especially in the last 10-15 years, a steady increase in the literature 
covering this field of the study of prostitution. Methods to obtain accounts vary, but one 
mode is to use online communication systems to conduct surveys in privacy and 
confidentiality.559 Another problem with conducting such research is obtaining an 
appropriately large and broad sample, and similarly with research on sex workers, the 
numbers involved are huge and difficult to target meaningful cross-sections of research 
samples.  
An example of such difficulty would be that it would be very difficult to say what the ratio of 
married to non-married clients is, although it might be possible to point towards a marginally 
higher number of married to single clients from the 2008 study.560 Equally, it is difficult to 
isolate the reasons for which men buy sex, as they vary, to include those who are older, or 
seek exciting sexual liaisons, or those perceived as unattractive by self/others.561 Sanders 
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559 See for instance, Teela Sanders, ‘Male Sexual Scripts: Intimacy, Sexuality and Pleasure in the Purchase of 
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indicates that, in line with previous research, motivations include ‘the capacity to purchase 
specific sexual acts; access to a wide variety of women; the ability to contact women with 
certain characteristics; limited, temporary relationships; and the thrill of the activity’.562 The 
ways in which clients communicate with each other is also the subject of client research.563  
It is apparent then, and seemingly obvious that there will not be a single ‘type’ of client. A 
variety of attitudes and orientations are presented by those clients participating in the 2008 
research. Some clients express the need for intimacy, friendship or companionship, or to feel 
‘loved’.564 The concept of ‘mutuality’ can exist, where ‘clients believe that sex workers are 
experiencing emotional and sensual closeness as well as sexual pleasure’.565 Sanders has 
considered the research over the past few decades which has explored the way in which 
clients attempt to find intimacy in prostitution. The concept of the girlfriend experience (GFE) 
has been developed to explain the experience that mainly ‘regular’ clients seek which 
combines a physical sexual and also an emotional and intimate relationship.566 
The website ‘Punternet.com’ provides clients with the opportunity to review experiences they 
have had with, and the quality and standard of service of sex workers. Two quotes below are 
comments relating to a sex worker called ‘Chloe Kisses’: 
If you're looking for gfe, then Chloe is the lady for you. As soon as I arrived and sorted 
out the paperwork, she started kissing me and sexily undressing me. This soon brought 
me to attention. I had an assisted shower. This was a first for me, but certainly won't be 
the last time.567 
It started with a kiss. Doesn't everything? It ended with total satisfaction. Chloe has a 
relentlessly inventive approach to delivering an excellent service.  
If the industry had a quality standards, they would be called. the Chloe standards.  
For me, she defined what good is.568 
It is presumed from the name of this particular sex worker, that she advertises GFE services, 
and kissing is a specific service some men seek out.569 For others, the prostitution encounter 
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serves to provide convenient release of unilateral sexual ‘need’, which can be conventional 
or deviant. The attitude of clients to the specific commercial nature of the prostitution 
encounter is also something which differs amongst interviewees. What remains perhaps an 
unanswered question is whether the attitudes of those interviewed are limited to the 
prostitution encounter, or to sex in general.570  
There are several further key factors that client research encounters. Firstly, philosophical 
approaches might deal with embodiment and disembodiment in clients, of masculinity in 
society as defined in modern liberal democracies, male domination/control over women, and 
biological need. Furthermore, studies have been conducted which have explored the 
perceptions of clients who are violent towards, or have acceptance of violent behaviours 
towards women, and in particular sex workers.571  
A particularly extreme example of these behaviours is the concept of ‘rape myth acceptance’ 
(‘RMA’), as coined by M R Burt in 1980, which describes male acceptance, through cultural 
and social ideals, of violence against women, including rape.572 The mind-set of RMA leads 
to the belief that women (but in this context sex workers) cannot be raped, and women that 
are raped are in some way responsible for the treatment they receive,573 an attitude it is 
believed is traditionally aimed at and centred on ‘the prostitute’.574  
With such dialogues it is easy to see the client as the perpetrator of harm and the sex worker 
as the victim thereof. This thesis does not provide the capacity to consider the entirety of the 
client’s experience in identifying any possible dignity violation. One highlighted aspect of the 
client experience is the purchase of intimacy, which, as a motivation for buying sex is 
apparent from the general literature on the client experience in prostitution.575  
 
                                                          
570 See Wendy Hollway, ‘Gender Difference and the Production of Subjectivity’ in I Henriques, W Hollway, C 
Brown, C Venn and V Walkerdine (eds) Changing the Subject (London and New York: Methuen 1984) 
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Summary and Next Chapter 
This chapter has reviewed the sociology of prostitution, introducing the reader to the 
discipline, and the explanatory models. The reader has been introduced to the markets of 
prostitution. Motivations for entry into, and retention within prostitution were considered. The 
research pertaining to the client of prostitution was briefly reviewed, highlighting the pertinent 
issues the client faces. The chapter also considered what has been observed as the 
dominant legal attitude towards prostitution, which lies in criminalisation based on a moral 
reflection on the sale of sex. The newly constructed model of dignity, IPA, will now be 
applied to prostitution as refined through the lens of the GMV model of the sociology of 
prostitution. This, it is suggested will allow more thorough contemplation and analysis of the 
experiences of sex workers. As such, the IPA dignity as framed through Finnis will indicate 
an advance in legal approaches to prostitution, and highlight the original contribution this 
thesis makes. This chapter concludes Part Four of the thesis and leads into the final Part 
Five. In the next chapter and Part, the hypothesis will be addressed using phenomenological 
analysis of sex worker narratives. By doing this, the next chapter will present findings as to 
the hypothesis question “Does prostitution violate human dignity?” 
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12. APPLICATION 
 
This is a study about prostitution which breaks from the traditional social and legal 
approaches to the subject. As was discussed in Chapter 10, much social research in the 
field of prostitution has been conducted using empirical methods, interviewing sex workers 
and their clients to obtain accounts that express the raw experience of prostitution.576 The 
instant study has thus far used legal theory as a methodological approach to define human 
dignity. Now, this penultimate chapter will utilise the raw experience data from the 
sociological literature in collaboration with the theory of dignity, now modelled as IPA dignity. 
IPA dignity will now be applied to the prostitution encounter to address the study hypothesis; 
‘Does prostitution violate human dignity’.  
 
A Note on the Sources of Narratives 
The narratives discussed below have been selected from the empirical data of existing, 
peer-reviewed studies,577 located in the substantive literature.578 The selection of the sex 
worker narratives used is based upon locating narratives which are as balanced as 
possible,579 which provide experiences exclusively of the prostitution encounter, rather than 
other facets of the prostitution vocation.580 Future research, based upon the methods used in 
this study might conduct in-depth interviews with sex workers and clients of prostitution to 
explore narratives from many different demographics, including male and transgender sex 
workers, for example.  
 
                                                          
576 An observation made in Phoenix op cit 13 
577 It is important to note that the data from these studies is more reliable compared with interviews which might 
have been carried out purely for this study. This is so because, firstly, they are peer-reviewed studies and have 
been subjected to academic scrutiny, and secondly the researchers responsible for obtaining these narratives are 
experienced social workers and sociologists, able to extract relevant and detailed information from interviewees. 
This was an integral consideration for the outset of this study, and resulted in the decision not to conduct fresh 
interviews with sex workers, but instead to rely on existing work.  
578 Appendix B provides a table which indicates the sources of narratives as they are presented in the literature. 
See Chapter 2 which sets out the texts used with justifications. Appendix C sets out the dataset of the narratives 
for comparison between the texts. 
579 In Chapter 2, pp24ff 
580 The literature presents many different narratives taken from interviews with sex workers. Narratives follow 
common themes such as those which detail entry into prostitution, drug and alcohol use, relationships with pimps 
etc. Therefore the narratives chosen detail experiences of the prostitution encounter exclusively. The narratives 
are also importantly placed, it is asserted, in the GMV model of sociological research into prostitution. 
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A Note on Inductive Reasoning 
In Chapter 3, inductive reasoning was used to determine the nature of human dignity from 
the literature. It did so by identifying two central themes of dignity and ascribing these as the 
core ideas of the nature of dignity. As Paul Tomassi suggests, inductive reasoning, put 
simply, is reasoning ‘from the particular to the general’.581 Such a statement has been called 
an ‘ampliative’ statement – as ‘the conclusion goes beyond, amplifies the content of the 
premises’.582 The two core themes of dignity, that it is inherent and that it is related to 
autonomy, are amplified to determine that these are most likely to represent what dignity is.  
This application chapter will utilise inductive reasoning from the sample of sex worker 
narratives considered. The same inductive method is utilised in relation to the sex worker 
narratives presented. It will be induced from small samples in this chapter, that dignity is 
violated and also promoted by prostitution. Although not necessarily capable of providing 
support for a general conclusion that all prostitution violates human dignity, the results in this 
chapter are illustrative, and therefore valuable to show how IPA can be applied in reality.  
   
Application – Phenomenological Analysis of Sex Worker Narratives 
In this analysis, the se worker narratives will be analysed to ascertain language within which 
indicates that particular modes of dignity violation have occurred, in the experience of the 
narrator. As will be recalled from Chapter 2, the Wittgensteinian approach to language 
examines ‘family resemblances’. The narratives adopted will be grouped into three sections, 
each discussing dignity violation in the three elements of IPA dignity.  
 
1.  “It bothered me in the beginning that all I was, was a piece of meat someone was f**king.”583 
 
2. “If anything a prostitute treats herself like a chair for someone to sit on. Her mind goes blank. 
She just lies there. You become just an object. A lot of clients say ‘Respond, it doesn’t seem 
normal just lying there’. After a while it becomes just a normal thing. Most of them know – 
                                                          
581 See Paul Tomassi, Logic (Routledge 1999) 7-9. Tomassi refers to Charles Sanders Peirce - a ground-
breaking logician who founded and championed pragmatism and was particularly influenced by the work of 
Immanuel Kant.  
582 Ibid. Tomassi is referring to a famous idea of Peirce from his work. See Charles Sanders Peirce, Collected 
Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce Vol. 5 (Harvard University Press, 1974); Charles Sanders Peirce, N Houser 
The Essential Peirce: Selected Philosophical Writings Vol. 2 (Indiana University Press, 1998) 
583 ‘Katrina’ in Phoenix op cit 131 
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they understand it would be physically impossible. You don’t get excited. Some you like, you 
talk to them, you get to know them but it’s still the same turn off thing.”584 
 
3. “In the end, you hate yourself for selling your body. They [the punters] do what they want to 
you. Your body’s an object and you’ve got no control over it.”585  
 
This first narrative is given by female sex worker ‘Katrina’. Katrina speaks in context as a sex 
worker, explaining how she felt at the start of her profession in the sex industry. She 
expresses that she was ‘bothered’ in the beginning (when she first began performing sex 
work), that she was a piece of meat someone was having sexual intercourse with. This 
narrative suggests that Katrina viewed herself, if not now at some point in the past as an 
object – a piece of meat, rather than as a person, in the context of the sex work she was 
performing.  
The second narrative is given by Dee. This narrative shares some similarities with Katrina’s, 
but in the language used by Dee, we find much more detail about the objectification she 
experiences in prostitution. Also, this narrative causes us to ask the question of whether the 
sex worker can objectify herself. The language indicates this, since she refers to treating 
herself as like an inanimate object, like a chair for someone to sit on. She indicates that the 
sex worker becomes ‘like’ an object, but retains the sense of autonomous decision making 
about the process – a deliberate decision on behalf of the sex worker to devoid herself of 
conscious thought whilst the prostitution encounter takes place. It is reminiscent of the 
coping mechanisms of some sex workers, as described in the literature.586  
Dee also speaks about the disconnection between the sexual act and sexual gratification on 
the part of her, as the sex worker. In her experience, she doesn’t enjoy the prostitution 
encounter in a sexual way – it is merely a job. She goes further to indicate that she believes 
it to be physically impossible to obtain pleasure from the experience. Finally, the third 
narrative here is given by Lois. She explains that her body is an object, but that she has no 
control over it. This appears to differ from some other accounts587 in respect of the element 
of control and the sex worker’s agency in the prostitution encounter. All three narratives 
                                                          
584 ‘Dee’ in Frédérique Delacoste, Priscilla Alexander, (eds), Sex Work: Writings by Women in the Sex Industry 
(2nd edn Cleiss Press1998) 39 
585 ‘Lois’ in Phoenix op cit 133 
586 i.e. Graham Hart, Marina Barnard, ‘”Jump on top, get the job done”: strategies employed by female prostitutes 
to reduce the risk of client violence’, (2003) from Elizabeth Stanko (ed), The Meanings of Violence (London: 
Routledge 2002/3); Høigård & Finstad (n 65) 63ff 
587 Appendix B; Narratives xi and xv, for example, speak very much of control in the prostitution encounter. 
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mainly express objectification, dehumanization and exploitation, all of which will now be 
considered. 
 
Objectification 
Within the first narrative it can be interpreted that the sex worker has experienced the mode 
of dignity violation, objectification. Objectification was explained with reference to Martha 
Nussbaum’s taxonomy of objectification in Chapter 8.588 This section will now work through 
each mode of objectification in her model. Firstly, instrumentality; this is demonstrated when 
the objectifier uses the objectified person as a ‘tool of his own devices’. It is not possible 
from the narrative of Katrina to determine what the client has in fact intended, but it is 
possible to see that she has experienced instrumentality here.  
In Nussbaum’s taxonomy of objectification, the experience of the objectified person is not 
essential to proving objectification has occurred. Arguably, this is problematic because that 
in itself denies subjectivity to the objectified person. In a mode of objectification as defined in 
this study, the experience of the objectified person is entirely relevant to proving or 
disproving objectification as a mode of dignity violation. Inertness and denial of autonomy 
seem to be difficult to demonstrate based upon this narrative. The question to be asked to 
determine if inertness is invoked, is has this objectified person been treated as lacking in 
agency and also in activity. It may have been the intention of the client to objectify Katrina, 
but it might also be surmised from the narrative that Katrina was a willing party to this act or 
acts of prostitution, negating inertness, and retaining autonomous decision making.  
Fungibility is demonstrated where the objectified party is treated as interchangeable – like 
currency. Katrina likens herself to a piece of meat. A piece of meat is certainly 
interchangeable, since it bears none of the characteristic uniqueness of the human person 
that is so integral to human nature. It denies the ‘person’ within the outer body (this is 
dehumanization, as will shortly be discussed). Violability might be indicated where an 
objectified person is subject to a demolition or transgression of personal integrity (bodily or 
mental integrity). There is evidence on this narrative that bodily integrity has been 
transgressed, but perhaps through the permissive acts of Katrina as the potentially 
objectified person. She presumably consented to bodily integrity transgression, through 
intercourse with the client.  
                                                          
588 Martha Nussbaum, ‘Objectification’ (1995) 24(4) Philosophy & Public Affairs 249 
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Katrina makes no indication in this narrative of ever being or perceiving to be owned by the 
client, and this could not easily be inferred. The last mode of objectification is denial of 
subjectivity. Katrina indicates that her experience and feelings may not have been taken into 
account in her experiences during the prostitution encounter. When a review is made of 
these modes of objectification, we find that Katrina has suffered objectification through, at 
least instrumentality, fungibility and denial of subjectivity she experiences in the prostitution 
encounter.  
Dee expresses that objectification takes place, entirely through her own volition. It is Dee 
whom objectifies Dee herself in this narrative. It is, to her about how she treats herself, 
rather than necessarily how the client treats her. Instrumentality is demonstrated as she 
treats herself as a tool of the client’s devices. Denial of autonomy is harder to fathom. On the 
face of the narrative, Dee seems to make an autonomous decision towards selling sex to the 
client. As the reader will find from Appendix B, a number of narratives echo an approach by 
the sex worker to the prostitution encounter as an agent but not necessarily being 
completely willing towards the sale of sex.  
Inertness is more apparent from this narrative. Although Dee engages in the prostitution 
encounter, she is perhaps to some extent inert in her behaviour, by deliberately being 
‘vacant’ from the experience, although she presumably exhibits agency through the 
supposed voluntary nature589 of the encounter. As with Katrina’s narrative, fungibility and 
violability may be apparent, whilst ownership is probably not.590 Denial of subjectivity is 
created by Dee herself – she denies her own subjectivity in the sense that her enjoyment of 
the experience is not a consideration. For Lois, we see a similar expression over her 
perception of her body. In the context of the prostitution encounter, it is an object, and it is 
also an object over which she claims to have no control.  
 
Dehumanization 
Another mode apparent from these narratives is dehumanization, which, it was asserted in 
Chapter 8, has considerable overlap with objectification. In considering dehumanization 
against this narrative, and in line with Haslam’s research,591 (in conjunction with Kateb’s 
                                                          
589 All the narratives here used are from what present as experiences of voluntary prostitution from the source 
texts.  
590 Dee’s narrative appears to indicate the element of agency in the prostitution encounter which would rule out 
actual ownership, as per Nussbaum’s model. 
591 Nick Haslam, ‘Dehumanization: An Integrative Review’ (2006) 10(3) Personality and Social Psychology 
Review 252 
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approach),592 we consider two types of human-like attributes, as outlined in the violating 
dignity chapter, or human uniqueness and human nature. As will be recalled from that 
chapter, the denial of either set of attributes will result in one of two forms of 
dehumanization.  
The denial of human nature attributes equals denial of ‘humanity’, including emotionality, 
warmth and cognitive flexibility.593 Katrina’s narrative indicates that in her experience, if not 
in fact, her emotionality, warmth and perhaps cognitive flexibility is denied. This is evident in 
the narrative, along the same lines of enquiry as objectification as the two are inextricably 
linked. Reference to oneself as a piece of meat reduces one’s status to that of an object, and 
involves dehumanization. It might well be the case that the client/s she experiences this with 
actually do not treat her as a piece of meat as she states, but in her experience, she feels 
that this is the case. To Katrina, she considers herself dehumanized and objectified by the 
experience of prostitution, even if perhaps only in the early stages of her career.  
Dee’s narrative indicates a level of denial of human nature attributes sufficient to consider 
that dehumanization has, in her experience taken place. Again, it is Dee who has 
dehumanized herself in this account, and in fact, the client who seeks a more ‘human’ 
response from Dee by asking her to respond during the encounter. Whether a coping 
mechanism or otherwise, Dee’s choice not to respond or be aroused by the encounter, and 
instead to be ‘like a chair for someone to sit on’ is a clear indication of denying her own 
human nature attributes and thus exhibiting dehumanization. 
 
Exploitation 
Exploitation can occur even when there is no alternative to that exploitation.594 It is also clear 
that exploitation can be brought about and maintained by a socio-economic or a socio-
political status, as opposed to direct exploitation by one person to another.595 As has been 
expressed in the literature, economic need, and drug abuse are two interconnected drivers 
of women into prostitution.596 What is less clear is whether one can exploit oneself. In these 
three narratives, we cannot be certain that the client is the perpetrator of exploitation. But in 
                                                          
592 George Kateb, Human Dignity (The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press 2011) 113  
593 Ibid 296  
594 Sensat op cit 35 
595 Ibid 
596 The early commentator on the sociology of prostitution, Kingsley Davis, indicated that economic forces are to 
blame for both the presence and continuance of prostitution; Davis op cit 749 
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all three narratives, it appears that self-exploitation has taken place. In Dee’s account, she 
expresses self-exploitation. Katrina’s narrative is less clear on this self-exploitation because 
it is very brief. Lois does however indicate the presence of self-exploitation through the 
‘giving away’ of her bodily sovereignty to the client.  
The three modes of dignity violation, of objectification, dehumanization and exploitation 
violate inherent dignity according to IPA. They do so by violating the intrinsic human value of 
the person subject to objectifying or dehumanizing treatment, or where the ‘victim’ suffers 
such treatment in their own perception. Exploitation whether self-inflicted or perpetrated by 
another, treats a person as a means to an end. Therefore, in the narratives of Katrina, Dee 
and Lois, it can be reasoned that prostitution has violated inherent dignity according to IPA. 
The next selection of narratives gives an indication other modes of dignity violation. 
 
4.  ‘When you’re constantly having sex with different guys every night – up to six or even eight – 
and getting paid for it, you have to switch off and mentally say “It’s not me’ and ‘It’s my body 
he’s paying for”’597  
 
5. “I never let anyone touch my body. My body is my own, I’m in control of it. When I’m with a 
punter, I say what goes – what he can and can’t do, and they never ever touch me. I cannot 
stand anyone touching my body.”598 
 
6. When it comes to the actual sex I just blank my mind off completely. I pretend I’m someone 
else. I pretend I’m somewhere else. I don’t get any pleasure from the sex. Never. I always 
pretend I’m having a good time and that my client is brilliant because men have their egos 
massaged – you have to make them think they are brilliant – they pay us to make them feel 
better about themselves.599 
 
7. “Ugh, the whole thing is sick. I close my eyes and ears. I cut out everything to do with 
feelings. It’s never, never okay. It would be totally different with a lover. I’ll stop when I get a 
steady boyfriend”600 
 
8. [Narrating a conversation with a client] 
‘”You like to see a man come?” 
“Uh huh.” 
                                                          
597 ‘Helena’ in Phoenix op cit 133 
598 ‘Imogen’ in Sharpe op cit 87 
599 ‘Beryl’, Ibid 87-88 
600 ‘Lisa’ in Høigård and Finstad op cit 65 
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“I’d like to put it in, you know.” 
“Would you?” Greed and disgust wrestled within me…I undressed and we lay down on the 
mattress. I turned my head to my side so he wouldn’t try to kiss me.601 
 
 
The narratives in this second group indicate dignity violation of the second element of IPA, 
personal inviolability as dignity. The relevant modes as indicated in Chapter 8, are dis-
integration, intrusion and humiliation. The prostitution encounter is about the transgression of 
many boundaries, not only physical ones. This is evident in the way the narrators speak 
here. There is a recognition that certain measures have to be put in place to ensure the sex 
worker protects her emotions, her character and her own personal sexuality.602 This is 
commonly referred to in the literature as bodily dissociation, in an overarching theme of the 
GMV model of prostitution as violence to women.603 Bodily, psychological and emotional 
intrusion may all be relevant from these accounts. Each narrative suggests that the narrator 
is seeking to protect herself in the prostitution encounter. Whilst in these instances physical 
intrusion is allowed, she is trying to protect herself from an unwanted psychological or 
emotional intrusion.  
 
Dis-integration 
As Leslie Henry alludes,604 dis-integration will occur when the person subjected to it is not 
perceived as a fully constituted ‘whole’. There is a theme which is evident in the first 
narrative, in which Helena explains that she divides herself up into two parts – body and 
person. Her experience is that the body takes part in something her person does not. 
Whether this is actually possible is irrelevant, since it is the experience of the sex worker we 
are concerned with here. As far as her narrative suggests, this is the case. Helena dis-
integrates herself in the prostitution encounter. The second narrative is less clear. Is Imogen 
saying that she does not allow the client to touch her – her person; or her body? It seems a 
confusing narrative, given that in the prostitution encounter, the body of the sex worker is 
touched and intruded upon. 
                                                          
601 ‘Emma Marcus’ in Delacoste and Alexander op cit 25 
602 This is a theme evident in all the source texts. See in particular the commentary in Høigård and Finstad op cit 
74, and later, in a discussion about prostitution as violence to women at 114ff. 
603 J Raymond, ‘Prostitution as Violence Against Women: NGO Stonewalling in Beijing and Elsewhere (1998) 
21(1) Women’s Studies International Forum 1-9; M Farley (n 723); M Farley, ‘Prostitution and the Invisibility of 
Harm’ (2003) 26(3-4) Women & Therapy 247; Høigård and Finstad ibid 114ff 
604 See Chapter 6, Henry op cit 
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What dis-integration involves, is a breaking down of the person into parts, rather than the 
completed whole. It is this process which results in a violation of personal inviolability as 
dignity, since this element of IPA protects the bodily, emotional and physical integrity of the 
person. This process seems present in these accounts, and also in the fourth account by 
Lisa. Lisa’s narrative more overtly disparages the prostitution encounter, and explains that 
the disintegration she undergoes is a coping mechanism. The third narrator, Beryl, indicates 
that it is her tactic to pretend it is not she who is involved in the encounter. She pretends that 
she is somewhere else. Is this dis-integration? It is perhaps less clear with Beryl’s narrative, 
since she does not speak explicitly as the former two do of a breaking up of parts of herself 
into body and person as separate entities.605 
 
Intrusion 
In a criminal legal sense, intrusion might be determined as a physical or sexual assault, or it 
could also be, for example a burglary of one’s home. There are numerous ways in which one 
can feel a personal intrusion. Is the emphasis only upon a physical intrusion, though? What 
of emotional intrusion? Even where an intrusion has been made, is it still an intrusion if there 
is some consent leading to its occurrence? Whilst the first and third narratives here indicate 
a more mercenary attitude to the intrusive prostitution encounter, the second and fourth 
accounts are less so. 
In the second account, the narrator, Imogen emphasises the control she has over the 
encounter. She wishes not to be intruded upon beyond an agreed point. For any 
transgression beyond that point would clearly, on her expression here, amount to a breach 
of a part of her that would be unacceptable. Intrusion only occurs if the client goes beyond 
that which has been contracted for.606 Lisa indicates something different. It appears that she 
allows an intrusion across her boundary; (her boundary seems to be any sexual contact in 
the prostitution encounter), but she does so unwillingly. She may consent to the prostitution 
encounter, but the factors which push her to do so are not measured, and are indeed 
immeasurable in this study. The fifth account by Emma Marcus expresses that the intrusive 
nature of the prostitution encounter is met with disgust by the narrator. She finds the 
experience disgusting, and yet she continues nonetheless.  
                                                          
605 This is clearly an area of research which extends into psychology and beyond the expertise of the author. This 
analysis does point towards the need to consider such approaches. As mentioned in the above note, the GMV 
literature has investigated bodily dissociation in female sex workers. 
606 This might occur in the case of condom removal, for example, discussed in Chapter 11 and later in this 
chapter. 
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Humiliation 
When we speak of humiliation, we are referring to a degradation of the person. As Klein 
states,607 the experience of humiliation comes in a variety of forms, but results in intense 
pain through the degrading treatment of others. Lazare lists five key characteristics in a 
humiliating experience, which include being devalued or dishonoured.608 How does 
humiliation apply to these narratives? 
It seems immediately apparent that only two of these narratives; four and five refer overtly to 
a humiliating experience. Lisa uses language expressing disgust to describe her experience 
in the prostitution encounter, and even goes so far as to say that she wants to leave the 
vocation altogether. How is she humiliated? It is asserted that for Lisa, her self-respect is 
degraded by the prostitution encounter. By saying that ‘it’s never ever okay’ infers that she 
goes against her own basic principles - the process is disgusting to her, and yet she 
continues to sell sex. This is evidently a degrading experience. The same theme is evident in 
Emma Marcus’ narrative. The experience she describes is degrading to her, and is thus 
humiliating. 
These narratives express disintegration in the prostitution encounter. These narrators 
describe experiences of dis-integration, self-administered in order to cope with the repetition 
of prostitution encounters. Some also describe intrusion across physical and emotional 
boundaries. Some describe a degrading experience which amounts to humiliation. The next 
and final selection of narratives highlights autonomy as dignity in the prostitution encounter. 
 
9. It’s a business. There’s nothing in it for me pleasure wise – I fake and pretend a lot for the 
client – that’s what they pay for – but I never get any actual enjoyment. I get on with it and get 
it over with as quickly as possible. I’m not a criminal for doing this – I do what men pay for, it’s 
my choice.609 
 
10. “It gives you a feeling of power in your job too; everyone likes to be admired. So you could 
say there’s something positive about the job. When I was down there and lots of cars honked 
at me and I could say yes or drop it. I learned fast that I didn’t need to go down there as a 
beggar – it’s the woman who decides. After a while I learned that I was the one made the 
                                                          
607 See Chapter 8, Donald Klein, ‘The Humiliation Dynamic: An Overview’ (1991) 12(2) Journal of Primary 
Prevention 93 
608 See Chapter 8, Lazare op cit 
609 ‘Belinda’ in Sharpe op cit 87 
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rules; there were enough people to choose from. If people didn’t want to follow my rules that 
was it”610 
 
11. ‘Having a presence and physical body which men found sexually attractive was important to 
my self-esteem. Having men pay to get turned on by me was an affirmation of my sexual 
power…Men could want and need me’.611 
 
12. Would you like men using you all the time? I’m not ashamed of what I do – if I was then I 
wouldn’t do it. When I get depressed I need sex. Sex cheers me up, makes me feel better, 
that’s why I work so much.612 
 
 
Autonomy as dignity may be expressed as a freedom to make one’s own decisions about 
life, the direction in which they progress in work, family life, choices about marriage, 
relationships, religion, sex, friendships, job choice and so on. It may be in a negative 
iteration, the prevention of that which would seek to deny such agency. For many women, as 
we have identified, free agency and autonomous thought involves working as a sex worker. 
This choice can represent an autonomous decision, where that choice is uninfluenced by 
overarching pressures and dictates, such as financial need, or any obvious coercion which 
might lead to, at the extreme end, a trafficking situation.  
What is plain when we speak of autonomy in the context of prostitution, is the clash between 
individual and communitarian models of dignity.613 Autonomy can be restricted for the benefit 
of the communitarian dignity, and even for the dignity of the individual where the proposed 
behaviour offends that.614 In prostitution, we see an individual issue, but also a collective, 
communitarian one too. The lives and issues faced by sex workers are relevant to the 
community in which they are placed, and the same can be said for the clients of prostitution 
that make up that community.  
In this third group of modes we consider whether there is evidence of violation, or in fact 
promotion of autonomy as dignity. The types of mode which violate this element of IPA 
                                                          
610 ‘Eva’ in Høigård and Finstad op cit 83 
611 ‘Judy Helfand’, in Delacoste and Alexander op cit 101 
612 ‘Imogen’ in Sharpe op cit 88 
613 The reader is directed back to the discussion of the views of O’Mahony and Kidd-White in Chapter 3. Weitzer 
has written on the issues that affect the community due to street prostitution, whilst advocating a non-regulationist 
stance on ‘indoor sex work’; Ronald Weitzer, Legalizing Prostitution: From Illicit Vice to Lawful Business (New 
York University Press 2012) 
614 As in the facts of the Wackenheim (dwarf-throwing) Case discussed previously in Chapters 3-6 
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include restriction of agency, dependence and deprivation. As stated in Chapter 8, the 
causes of these modes may not be an individual per se, but also by other factors, such as 
economic need or drug abuse. In these narratives, we derive expressions of pride in the 
work the narrator does.  
 
Restriction, Deprivation or Dependence  
In these accounts, is there evidence of restriction, deprivation or dependence? Or is 
autonomy promoted in these narratives? The first narrator, Belinda, explains that it is her 
choice to sell sex. It isn’t a choice made for the enjoyment of the prostitution encounter, but it 
is in her words a choice nonetheless. A question we might ask, is how freely made is the 
choice? Are there any alternatives to the choice Belinda makes? Is she in some way 
dependent on drugs or alcohol, or raising a child and in need of money? As the experience 
is expressed to us in the narrative, agency is present and Belinda makes, what is at least a 
partially autonomous decision.615 The same theme is expressed in the second narrative, 
where the narrator, Eva states, in determining whether a prostitution encounter will take 
place, ‘it is the woman who decides’.   
Power and choice are used together by Eva to indicate that she exhibits agency and hence 
autonomy in conducting the various prostitution encounters in the course of her vocation. If 
she doesn’t want to sell sex to a client, she says no, and that is the end of the matter. Her 
autonomy is not, on this account, restricted, deprived of her, nor is she dependent (at least 
on the client). As before, issues of ancillary dependence lie undetected in these narratives 
so far. The agency possessed by the narrators is again voiced as a power or control over the 
client, in the third narrative, as Judy expresses her regard for the attraction men feel toward 
her. Is there a dependence upon this reaction from men, though? She says that it was 
important to her self-esteem that men were attracted to her; might this be an affront to 
autonomy, or perhaps a violation of another element of IPA?616 
This potential dependence is echoed far more loudly in the next narrative, by Imogen. She 
states that she needs sex. It is to her a means by which she copes with depression. This is a 
different consideration in this analysis, which has considered dependence on an external 
                                                          
615 We have to bear in mind that the source texts for these narratives (and all those used in this thesis) are from 
empirical data gathered in accordance with the ethical considerations stated in Chapter 2 for sex work research. 
As such, these narratives are not obtained from women in recognised trafficking situations, but are from a mix of 
prostitution markets.  
616 For instance, the degradation of self-esteem is akin to humiliation, as discussed here and in Chapter 8. 
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factor, leading to prostitution. Here, Imogen is stating that she is dependent on sex, provided 
in the prostitution encounter, to manage her psychological state. 
 
Summary and Next Chapter  
This chapter has addressed the hypothesis, ‘Does the prostitution encounter violate human 
dignity”. It has also considered, in the context of autonomy as dignity, a contrasting 
hypothesis; that the prostitution encounter might also promote human dignity. In conclusion, 
it appears that the narratives presented demonstrate the presence of modes of dignity 
violation in the experiences of these sex workers. These modes of dignity violation in turn 
violate respective elements of IPA dignity, and so it is reasoned that the prostitution 
encounter, as presented by the sex workers in these narratives, can violate human dignity 
according to the IPA model.  
The next chapter concludes the thesis, by assessing the findings in this application chapter, 
and providing considerations for reform and future research in the fields of study within this 
thesis. Finally, and returning to the quote of Mary Honeyball, the thesis will once again 
review the statement of the Honeyball Report, with some comment as to its veracity given 
the findings of this study. 
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13. CONCLUSIONS 
 
Summary of Key Points 
This thesis has endeavoured to answer the question, “Does prostitution violate human 
dignity?” and the hypothesis was developed to interrogate the comments of the 2014 
‘Honeyball’ Report.617 The report’s lack of objectivity and its unbridled use of the language of 
human dignity for policy analysis and direction caused concern for those researching the 
field of prostitution. This thesis has explored the core themes of human dignity and 
developed a descriptive model, IPA dignity. That model was then aligned with a normative 
framework which was used to indicate why it is wrong in a normative sense to violate dignity 
as constituted by IPA.  
The study began by introducing the concept of human dignity with core themes in the 
literature, in Chapter 3. As discussed, the concept, often considered as an idea rather than 
any concrete quasi-legal device has been criticised for vagueness and has been written off 
by some academics. However, as the ensuing chapters unfolded, they presented human 
dignity as prevalent in international law, and a foundational concept specifically for human 
rights law. In Chapter 4 it was explained that natural/moral rights form the basis of legal 
rights in these international legal provisions, and those natural rights arguably stem from the 
central theme of dignity as inherent in human beings qua human beings. In Chapter 5, the 
language of dignity was then identified in Article 3 of the ECHR and a discussion revealed 
that the courts consider, even if at times implicitly, the dignity of the individual when 
determining if inhuman or degrading treatment has taken place. In Chapter 6, dignity as it is 
utilised in American constitutional law and cases before the US Supreme Court was 
explicated through examinations by leading US scholars, and their individual conceptual 
models of dignity were presented and explored. This led to the construction of the model 
which was at the heart of this thesis; IPA dignity, in Chapter 7. Thereafter, the thesis 
considered the violation of human dignity, and decided upon various modes of dignity 
violation which could be grouped against respective elements of the IPA dignity model, in 
Chapter 8. Of the modes addressed, objectification and dehumanization were very 
prominent, as violating inherent dignity – the most integral element of IPA dignity.618 
Alongside this, dignity violation as apparent in Article 3 jurisprudence was also considered to 
                                                          
617 Mary Honeyball, Report on sexual exploitation and prostitution and its impact on gender equality 
(2013/2103(INI) European Parliament Report (3rd February 2014) 
618 The assertion that Inherent dignity is the most integral part is made in Part 2 
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enhance the argument for the development of IPA as a legally recognisable model of dignity, 
in Chapter 9. 
It was then the task of the thesis to provide a normative framework for the IPA model of 
dignity. Since the purpose of the thesis was to engage with the comments made in the 
Honeyball report and indicate why it is important that some objective criteria be utilised when 
using the language of dignity to adjudge a course of action such as the prostitution 
encounter, it was essential to indicate why dignity ought not to be violated. In chapter 10, the 
normative natural legal theory of John Finnis was propounded as the framework which would 
be used in conjunction with IPA to meet this end. This brought to an end the first substantive 
half of the thesis which explored dignity, modelled it into IPA and applied normativity thereto. 
The second half of the thesis moved from the legal and philosophical to the sociological, 
beginning in chapter 11 with a review of the literature in the sociology of prostitution. Salient 
points were analysed, with an exposition of the main explanatory models used to 
‘understand’ prostitution in the discipline of sociology. The chapter indicated that prostitution 
is an enormously complex subject to be studied, and therefore reduced the scope of this 
study towards it to the ‘Gender and Male Violence’ (GMV) model. The scope of the analysis 
was specifically in the prostitution encounter as the central issue in prostitution, and the 
issue at the heart of the Honeyball report – the sale and purchase of sex.  
Once the sociological element of the thesis was grounded in chapter 11, the hypothesis was 
addressed using a unique approach. In chapter 12, narratives of sex workers from the 
dataset outlined in chapter 2 and Appendix C were analysed for language which indicated 
modes of dignity violation. Where such modes were identified, it followed that dignity was 
violated in respect of the elements of IPA that they aligned with. This produced an indicated 
conclusion to the hypothesis question. This final chapter now concludes the thesis firstly with 
a presentation of the findings of the application chapter and a conclusion as to the 
hypothesis. Thereafter, it discusses what the results might mean in respect of policy in the 
UK, and a fortiori Europe and beyond. Finally, and in conclusion to the thesis, next steps and 
future research will be suggested, with a mention of some ideas not presented here, which 
nonetheless may be of use in applying IPA dignity to other social issues in future.   
 
Does Prostitution Violate Human Dignity? 
Chapter 12 presented the results of the phenomenological analysis of sex worker narratives 
against IPA dignity. Potential dignity promotion via autonomy as dignity was identified. This 
dignity promotion was considered evident in the exhibition of agency by the sex worker in the 
prostitution encounter. Therefore the results of the application chapter were mixed. Firstly, 
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the narratives suggested that dignity violation can occur in the prostitution encounter 
according to the scope and methods used. Specifically, the prostitution encounter appeared 
to violate inherent dignity, by objectifying some of the sex workers and dehumanizing them. 
It was indicated that personal inviolability as it represents bodily integrity was invariably 
violated. Dis-integration occurred and yet the narratives presented that this was self-inflicted 
by the sex worker. A frequent theme was that the sex worker dis-integrated herself in order 
to ‘cope with the demands’ of prostitution upon her emotional wellbeing. This tied in with 
some issues such as bodily dissociation, as discussed by Phoenix and presented in the 
chapter. It was also indicated that dignity was promoted in respect of autonomy as dignity. 
This result lies in contrast to the hypothesis question. This study was an experiment in 
creating a normative model of human dignity and then applying it to a limited dataset from 
the GMV sociological understanding of prostitution. It has yielded the results discussed, but 
what do we now do with these results to make meaningful use of them? If we are speaking 
of dignity being violated according to the application, then a question which arises is why 
does that need to concern us? Why ought dignity violation be avoided? 
Chapter 10 considered and applied the normative theory of Finnis to the IPA model of 
dignity. The theory indicates that human agents should pursue a course of action which is 
practically reasonable, one which thus promotes human flourishing because it promotes and 
does no harm to the objective goods, as explicated. Finnis says that human flourishing; 
being the product of the combination of the basic goods and practical reasonableness, is 
more than simply ‘’happiness’. Instead it is personal fulfilment which does not necessarily 
rely upon an emotional aspect; ‘a participation in basic goods which is emotionally dry, 
subjectively unsatisfying, nevertheless is good and meaningful as far as it goes.’619 A course 
of action which violates IPA dignity because it involves a mode of dignity violation, once 
demonstrated can be considered to be offending the normative principles of natural law set 
out by Finnis, and is necessarily detrimental to human flourishing. The findings of the 
application chapter and the thesis indicate therefore that, firstly, prostitution violates human 
dignity because in the narratives reviewed the prostitution encounter, as a course of action 
involves a mode or modes of dignity violation which violates elements of the IPA dignity 
model. Secondly, the prostitution encounter, by violating human dignity fails to conform to 
practical reasonableness (which is the normative call to action not to act in a way which is 
detrimental to human flourishing). Finally, therefore the statements made in the Honeyball 
report could be grounded on this objective analysis. The result of this analysis is provision of 
objective criteria by which human dignity violation may be considered for policy 
                                                          
619 Finnis op cit 97 
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recommendation. The assertion that prostitution violates human dignity is affirmed by this 
study.  
 
Positioning the Thesis and its Results 
The results of this study, whilst theoretical, may have some bearing on policy-making or 
approaches to prostitution by policy makers. The study has highlighted a perhaps previously 
unnoticed element in the issue of prostitution - the human dignity of the sex worker. Whilst 
the findings of this study are only theoretical, the study might be considered as a means to 
open up routes into human rights considerations that were previously unconsidered, for 
instance into the realms of Article 3 and degrading treatment. From the case-law, discussed 
at Chapter 9, we know that until now, Article 3 has been reserved for severe acts of 
degradation, usually, in the sexual context, in cases of rape by officials in custody.620 This 
study has indicated that voluntary prostitution may violate human dignity, and that the 
violation of human dignity is necessarily related to Article 3. 
The recent policy towards prostitution follows a pattern of de/criminalization, legalization and 
regulation. In recent months, two reports have emerged which examine prostitution and the 
global sex trade, with exploitation in mind. The All Party Parliamentary Group on Prostitution 
and the Global Sex Trade produced a written report in March 2014 entitled ‘Shifting the 
Burden’.621 The second report, which has been introduced in this study was produced by the 
Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality, by Mary Honeyball (colloquially ‘The 
Honeyball Report’). Both reports explore models of dealing with the issue of prostitution and 
attempting to eliminate sexual exploitation, with three Models being suggested.  
Model A involves the criminalisation of associated offences, whilst prostitution itself – the 
sale of sex is not illegal for the seller or the purchaser. This model is adhered to in the United 
Kingdom, where exploitation of a sex worker, living off the earnings thereof and solicitation 
are all illegal. Model B is the Nordic model, an approach taken by Sweden in 1999, creating 
a criminal offence of purchasing sexual services. The seller is not prosecuted under this 
model, but the client is. It is this model which is promoted by both reports. This model is 
advocated for by both reports, in order to reduce the demand for sexual services. Alongside 
this approach, the APPG report suggests that women involved in prostitution should not be 
targeted by ancillary offences such as solicitation, which should instead be dealt with under 
                                                          
620 I.e. Aydin v Turkey op cit 
621 i.e. ‘Shifting the Burden’ op cit 
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anti-social behaviour measures.622 The third model, Model C is the approach adopted by the 
Netherlands, and involves decriminalization and regulation of sex workers. The models have 
a central aim to eradicate or at lease dramatically reduce sexual exploitation by cutting 
demand. Both reports champion the Nordic model as a means by which this can be 
achieved, reliant upon the purported success of Sweden’s anti-prostitution legislation.623 But 
the model, if introduced in the UK should arguably have regard not only to demand for 
prostitution and its reduction, but also to the rights and, as per this study, the dignity of those 
involved in the prostitution encounter, not only the sex worker.624 
It would appear from these two reports that the dignity of the sex worker is a key focus. They 
address a protection of the sex worker from perceived harm, whilst enabling a more 
uninhibited exit from prostitution for those wishing to leave. In this way, the Nordic model 
seems to promote inherent dignity, and personal inviolability as well. It also champions a 
Henry-esque ‘collective virtue as dignity’; since it promotes an according of dignity between 
individuals.625 But it cannot be ignored that by severely restricting the sex worker’s trade, her 
ability to work is affected, and this may ironically have a detrimental effect upon her 
autonomy as dignity, according to IPA. This is not the only concern about the introduction of 
the Nordic model, and the reader is directed elsewhere to numerous commentators who 
have argued that the imposition of criminality upon clients will actually increase the levels of 
violence suffered by sex workers.626  In this way, the very law which is geared towards 
dignity promotion, may in fact have a negative impact on the dignity of the sex worker. This 
section presented some recent ideas on how the law should deal with prostitution, and how it 
should be used to protect the vulnerable.627 In acknowledgement of the limitations of this 
                                                          
622 Ibid 9, 29 
623 The Act on Violence Against Women 1999 
624 I.e. as one sex worker remarks of some of her clients; ‘Some pay just to talk. They’re lonely. I feel sorry for 
them’; ‘Anita’ in Høigård and Finstad op cit 52. By criminalising the client, the law might be in danger of 
victimizing one half of the prostitution encounter whilst trying to help the other. 
625 Inasmuch as it paints a picture of prostitution as sexual exploitation being morally wrong, and promotes 
measures to limit the commodification of human beings. This is obviously challengeable by the sex worker lobby 
as being a broad-brush approach. 
626 There are a number of useful resources and links to many commentators in prostitution and sex work. See the 
following websites; English Collective of Prostitutes - http://prostitutescollective.net/; Global Network of Sex Work 
Projects - http://www.nswp.org/research-sex-work; International Union of Sex Workers - http://www.iusw.org/; 
Sex Work Research - http://sexworkresearch.wordpress.com/ 
627 A thorough analysis of current policy and research is not included here, but these reports represent a general 
movement towards considering the Nordic model in the UK. Whether this is going to be beneficial or not to those 
involved in prostitution remains to be seen. The effect on the client is also not considered here. Research might 
be conducted if a model is introduced which criminalises clients, to interview clients affected by that legislation. 
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thesis, we next consider future research involving IPA dignity, and how it could be used 
further in socio-legal research. 
 
Future Research Using IPA 
It is essential to consider at this stage what has unashamedly not been achieved by this 
thesis, and demonstrate that consideration has been made to certain other elements that 
could not be included in this research, and the thesis here presented. By providing this 
information here, this chapter presents an understanding of external research issues, and 
positions the research appropriately for others who take these themes and methods further. 
Throughout this document, where it has been appropriate and relevant to do so, mention has 
been made of possible further research that could be undertaken using IPA dignity. IPA 
dignity is aimed at being used in socio-legal applications, and so it may be used for issues 
such as homelessness, drug and alcohol addiction or healthcare. As alluded to in Chapter 6, 
dignity has been modelled previously in the healthcare and nursing context, and is 
particularly relevant in that sphere. IPA may be useful therefore directly in a healthcare 
context, in spite of it originating as a model for socio-legal application. It might also be a tool 
of some utility in legal adjudication, as a means by which to ‘fine-grade’ human rights 
violations by getting to a more intricate level of the alleged breach of rights. This has in some 
small way been demonstrated in Chapters 5 and 9 respectively, when talking about dignity 
and Article 3 ECHR. 
These represent some ideas of future research in a mixture of disciplines. What then could 
be considered in respect of human dignity and prostitution in further studies? This study has 
concentrated on one gender involved in the prostitution encounter, the female sex worker. 
Studies may consider male and/or transgendered sex workers. This study was also 
restricted because no interviews took place with sex workers.628 Future studies may pose 
questionnaires to current and/or former sex workers, which asks questions pertaining to the 
violation of dignity. Such questions would consider modes of dignity violation, and so could 
be tailor-made to elucidate such language as is necessary. Specifically, questions relating to 
the autonomy of the interviewees could be asked to ascertain the degree to which dignity is 
promoted through agency in prostitution as ‘sex work’. A very obvious gap in the knowledge 
which remains after this study is a considered analysis of the violation of the dignity of the 
                                                          
628 In Chapter 2, the reasoning behind the decision not to conduct interviews was made clear. The authority of 
this study is not harmed by this decision, although it limits the application to seminal texts which are subjectively 
chosen.  
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client to the prostitution encounter.629 How does prostitution affect the client, and what 
modes of dignity violation are possibly implicated in the exchange between him and the sex 
worker? It is suggested that an issue of particular interest might be the ‘purchase of intimacy’ 
apparent from the literature.630 Intimacy in itself is of course a large area of study, but it 
appears at the end of this study, that the client, who is often overlooked in the encounter vis-
à-vis his rights, may suffer a violation of his dignity.631    
 
Concluding Remarks 
The thesis began with a statement from the Honeyball report asserting that prostitution was 
‘a very obvious and appalling violation of human dignity.’ Having completed the study 
objectives and addressed the hypothesis, the findings suggest that prostitution may, indeed 
violate dignity according to IPA. It has indicated however, that the language of dignity is 
appropriate for such an assessment only where there is both an objective framework for 
saying what dignity might consist of, and a normative ‘call to action’ which determines why 
we that dignity ought not to be so violated.  
There is an additional problem which hasn’t been addressed in this study. Mary Honeyball’s 
assertions appear to be based on the commodification of sex, and on the exploitation of 
women and children that prostitution and human trafficking in tandem represent. As Weitzer 
and Doezema have highlighted, albeit from different perspectives,632 the conflation of 
prostitution with sex trafficking leads to broad-brush dismissal of prostitution as abhorrent 
and exploitative, without further analysis. It fails to account for the nuances of the prostitution 
encounter, considered in this study – the fine balance between objectification or other modes 
of dignity violation and autonomy. Both the promotion of autonomy and the right not to be 
objectified rest in a tension of respect for the humanity and the dignity of the individual.  
This then, is a broader discussion of balances between interests and there are different 
dialogues for that discussion to take place in. In rights dialogues it is either the right to sell 
sex or the right to protection from treatment which is degrading. In criminality dialogues, the 
                                                          
629 Whilst it was originally the intention to consider the client’s dignity in this study, this was rejected because 
much further study was required into ‘the client’ which exceeded the scope of the author’s expertise and the time 
available. 
630 In a leading text of its kind, Teela Sanders addressed the issue of purchasing intimacy. See Teela Sanders, 
Paying for Pleasure: Men who Buy Sex (Willan 2008); ‘Drawing from the empirical findings [she draws] out the 
range of emotions that male clients experience through the commercial sex experience, including 
heteronormative male sexual scripts, vulnerabilities and pleasures.’  
631 For more on intimacy, see, for example Lynn Jamieson, Intimacy (Cambridge: Polity Press 1998) 
632 See R Weitzer and J Doezema op cit  
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balance is between actions that cause harm and those that do not. Does prostitution harm 
the sex worker or the client? Does it harm the community in which it occurs? Farley et al 
would suggest the answer to be yes, but others who, academically speaking are also 
reasonably positioned in the GMV model, and who campaign for the legitimisation of sex 
work would disagree. In dialogues of morality, the balance lies between whether prostitution 
is right or wrong in the moral conscience of the society in which it takes place. Is it wrong to 
sell sex, or is it right to buy it? Is it wrong to prohibit the sex worker from plying her trade, or 
to stigmatise those who use their services as ‘johns’? 
In this study, the IPA dignity model was constructed and applied to prostitution. Wider 
answers to the question of the relation between dignity and human rights were not the 
explicit subject of analysis. Instead, an application of dignity as a normative model to the 
sociological issue of prostitution in this study has provided a fresh examination of the 
prostitution encounter, with consideration of the very human issues, feelings and 
experiences at its heart. By doing so, prostitution itself is more plainly seen as an organic 
issue. Its ‘players’ are identified, albeit here only the sex worker has been examined. There 
has been much said in this thesis about dehumanization and its mode of dignity violation 
affiliates. The attempt of this study has been to do the reverse and to ‘humanize’ the sex 
worker. It has achieved this by explaining what human dignity is, why it matters and how it 
applies to the sex worker. It is hoped that future research as suggested above will continue 
the process of humanization of sex workers as a stigmatised and often ‘at risk’ group of 
people, particularly at a time when issues surrounding the criminal status of sex workers and 
their clients is at a heightened state of consciousness. This study marks the beginning of a 
new approach towards the sex worker, not as an object of either moral outrage or 
paternalism, but as an autonomous person, possessing human dignity as presented in the 
IPA model, which should never be violated.  
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APPENDIX A  
TABLE OF REVIEWED CASES OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS – 
ARTICLE 3 CLAIMS633 
 
CASE TYPE VIOLATION OF ART 3? 
Abdulaziz v UK (1985) 7 
E.H.R.R. 471 
Immigration/discrimination N 
Adali v Turkey (38187/97) 
(2005) 
State 
harassment/intimidation 
N 
Aerts v Belgium (2000) 29 
E.H.R.R. 50 
Detention N 
Ahmad v United Kingdom 
(24027/07); 
Al-Fawwaz v United 
Kingdom (67354/09); 
Bary v United Kingdom 
(66911/09); 
Mustafa (aka Abu Hamza) v 
United Kingdom (36742/08); 
Ahsan v United Kingdom 
(11949/08); 
 
Extradition N 
Ahmed v Austria (1997) 24 
E.H.R.R. 278 
Extradition Y 
Ahmet Mete v Turkey (2009) 
49 E.H.R.R. 48 
Detention N 
Aksoy v Turkey Detention Y 
                                                          
633 Search Method and Criteria: On 4th February 2013, a search of the database Westlaw under the search term 
for cases of “degrading treatment” returned 816 results.  
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Alver v Estonia (2006) 43 
E.H.R.R. 40 
Detention Y 
Anguelova v Bulgaria 
38361/97 
Police brutality Y 
Athan v Turkey 36144/09 Military brutality Y 
Aydin v Turkey (application 
no. 23178/94) (1998) 25 
EHRR 251 
Rape in Detention Y 
Bader v Sweden (13284/04) Deportation Y 
Becciev v Moldova (9190/03) Detention Y 
Bekos v Greece 15250/02 Detention Y 
Berrehab v The Netherlands 
10730/84 
Deportation N 
Cenbauer v Croatia 
(73786/01) 
Detention Y 
Chahal v United Kingdom 
(1997) 23 E.H.R.R. 413 
Extradition/Deportation Y 
DG v Ireland 39474/98 Detention N 
Dankevich v Ukraine 
40679/98 
Detention (death row) Y 
Dizman v Turkey 27309/95 Police brutality Y 
Gurepka v Finland 61406/00 Detention Y 
Guzzardi v Italy (1981) 3 
EHRR 333 
Detention N 
HLR v France (24573/94) Deportation N (followed Chahal) 
Hulki Gunes v Turkey Detention Y 
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(28490/95) 
Indelicato v Italy (34442/97) 
[Commission Decision] 
Detention See Decision 
Lupascu v Romania (2009) 
49 E.H.R.R. 25 
Detention Y 
Kalashnikov v Russia 
(47095/99) 
Detention Y 
 
Karalevicius v Lithuania 
(2002) 35 E.H.R.R. CD146 
Detention Y 
Khudoyorov v Russia 
(6847/02) 
Detention Y 
Kudla v Poland 30210/96 Detention (mental health) N 
Labita v Italy 26772/95 Detention Partial 
Marckx v Belgium (1979-80) 
2 E.H.R.R. 330 
Laws of succession N 
McGlinchey v United 
Kingdom (50390/99) 
Detention Y 
Moldovan and Others v 
Romania 41138/98 
Living conditions Y 
MS v United Kingdom 
(24527/08) 
Detention (mental health) Y 
Muslim v Turkey 53566/99 Deportation N 
N v Finland (38885/02) Deportation Y 
Napier v Scottish Ministers 
2005 1 S.C. 229 
Detention Y 
Nevmerzhitsky v Ukraine 
(54825/00) 
Detention (force-feeding) Y 
Nita v Romania (10778/02) Police brutality Y 
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Novoselov v Russia 
(66460/01) 
Detention (overcrowding) Y 
Ocalan v Turkey 46221/99 Detention (death row) Y 
Osman v Bulgaria (2008) 47 
E.H.R.R. 48 
Police brutality Y 
Ribitsch v Austria (A/336) Police brutality Y 
Soering v UK Extradition (death row) Y 
Tarariyeva v Russia 
(4353/03) 
Detention Y 
Tomasi v France Detention Y 
Ulke v Turkey (39437/98) Detention/military service Y 
 
 
CASE TYPE VIOLATION OF ART 3? 
A (A Child) (Disclosure of 
Third Party Information), Re 
[2012] 3 W.L.R. 1484 (SC) 
Trial procedure, disclosure N 
A v UK (application 
no.25599/94) 
Corporal punishment  
Afanasyev v Ukraine no. 
38722/02 
Detention Y 
Akkum v Turkey (2006) 43 
E.H.R.R. 26 
Missing person/family 
members anguish 
Y 
Albert v Belgium (1983) 5 
E.H.R.R. 533 
Disciplinary proceedings N 
Avsar v Turkey 25657/94 Racial Discrimination N 
Bilgin (Yhsan) v Turkey 
(23819/94) 
Military brutality Y 
Campbell and Cosans v 
United Kingdom (1982) 
(application no’s 7511/76; 
7743/76) 
Corporal Punishment N 
Costello-Roberts v United 
Kingdom (1995) 19 EHRR 
Corporal Punishment N 
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112 
Cyprus v Turkey (2002) 35 
EHRR 30 
Missing persons/family 
members anguish 
Y 
E v United Kingdom (2003) 
36 E.H.R.R. 31 
Sexual abuse, Local 
Authority obligations 
Y 
Er v Turkey 23016/04 (2013) 
56 E.H.R.R. 13 
Missing persons/family 
members anguish 
Collates law on missing 
persons etc 
Gongadze v Ukraine 
34056/02 
Failed investigation, anguish 
suffered 
Y 
Herczegfalvy v Austria 
(1993) 15 E.H.R.R. 437 
Detention, mental health N 
Jalloh v Germany (54810/00) Detention, forced vomiting Y 
Kanagaratnam v Belgium 
(15297/09) 
Situational anguish N 
LCB v United Kingdom 
(1999) 27 E.H.R.R. 212 
Military service, radiation N 
Lopez Ostra v Spain (1995) 
20 E.H.R.R. 277 
Living conditions, smells N 
Nesibe Haran v. Turkey 
(application no. 28299/95) 
Family members’ anguish N 
Nsona v Netherlands 
(23366/94) 
Deportation  
Şeker v. Turkey (application 
no. 52390/99) 
Family members’ anguish N 
T v United Kingdom 
(24724/94); V United 
Kingdom (24888/94) 
 
Trial, mode of trial, children N 
Tanis v Turkey (65899/01) Missing persons/family 
members’ anguish 
Y 
Timurtas v Turkey 
(23531/94) 
Missing persons/family 
members’ anguish 
Y 
Toğcu v. Turkey (application 
no. 27601/95) 
Missing persons/family 
members’ anguish 
N 
Valsamis v Greece (1997) 24 
E.H.R.R. 294 
Suspension from school N 
Z v United Kingdom 
(29392/95) 
LA obligations to children Y 
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CASE TYPE VIOLATION OF ART 3? 
A v United Kingdom – (1999) 
27 E.H.R.R. 611 
Punishment Y 
Aydin v Turkey (1998) 25 
EHRR 251 
Police brutality, rape in 
custody 
Y 
   
Bensaid v United Kingdom 
44599/98 
Deportation, mental health, 
good statement on positive 
obligations on states 
Y 
Bulynko v. Ukraine 
(application no. 74432/01) 
Non-enforcement of a 
judgment 
N 
D v United Kingdom 
(30240/96) 
Drug trafficker, AIDS 
sufferer, care provision 
despite criminality 
Y 
Devrim turan v. Turkey 
(2006) (application no. 
879/02) 
Detention, gynaecological 
exam 
N 
Dougoz v Greece app no 
40907/98 
Detention, statement of 
degrading treatment 
Y 
DP v United Kingdom 
(38719/97) 
Sexual abuse, Local 
Authority knowledge 
N 
Iwańczuk v. Poland 
(application no. 25196/94) 
Detention, stripping 
unnecessary to vote 
Y 
Juhnke v Turkey (2009) 49 
E.H.R.R. 24 
Detention, gynaecological 
exam 
N 
Maslova v Russia (2009) 48 
EHRR 37 
Police brutality, rape in 
custody 
Y 
MC v Bulgaria (2005) 40 
EHRR 20 
Prosecution of rape as a 
crime 
Y 
   
SW v United Kingdom; CR v 
United Kingdom (1996) 21 
EHRR 363 
Marital rape, discussion of 
Article 3 
N 
Tremblay v France 
(37194/02) 
Prostitution, economic need, 
government implication   
N 
 
CASE 
 
CATEGORY VIOLATION? 
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Er v Turkey (23016/04) 
(2013) 56 EHRR 13 
 
Disappearance/family 
members’ anguish 
Y 
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APPENDIX B 
TABLE OF NARRATIVES 
 
 Narrative Commentary 
 
i 
 
 
 
 
“It bothered me in the beginning that all I was, 
was a piece of meat someone was f**king”634 
 
 
 
 
 
Expresses language of objectification, 
exploitation, disintegration and 
dehumanization.  
Also expresses issues of self-infliction of 
dignity violation and coping mechanisms 
 
ii  
 
‘It’s much easier these days. I just shut my 
eyes and think of something else – switch off. 
I’ve learned how to block it – it’s not me that’s 
there, it’s my body only’635  
 
 
Coping mechanisms; disintegration, bodily 
dissociation 
 
iii 
 
 
‘When you’re constantly having sex with 
different guys every night – up to six or even 
eight – and getting paid for it, you have to 
switch off and mentally say “It’s not me’ and 
‘It’s my body he’s paying for”’636  
 
 
Coping mechanisms; disintegration and bodily 
dissociation  
 
iv 
 
‘In the end, you hate yourself for selling your 
body. They [the punters] do what they want to 
you. Your body’s an object and you’ve got no 
control over it.’637  
 
 
 
Direct reference to objectification and 
dehumanization; exploitation 
 
 
v 
 
“If anything a prostitute treats herself like a 
chair for someone to sit on. Her mind goes 
 
Strong connotations of objectification, 
dehumanization; self-inflicted violation 
                                                          
634 ‘Katrina’ in J Phoenix, Making Sense of Prostitution (Palgrave 1999) 131 
635 ‘Katrina’, Ibid 
636 ‘Helena’, Ibid 133 
637 ‘Lois’, Ibid 133 
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 blank. She just lies there. You become just an 
object. A lot of clients say ‘Respond, it doesn’t 
seem normal just lying there’. After a while it 
becomes just a normal thing. Most of them 
know – they understand it would be physically 
impossible. You don’t get excited. Some you 
like, you talk to them, you get to know them but 
it’s still the same turn off thing.”638 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
vi 
 
 
‘In every room in the massage parlor [sic] 
there’s an oversized Barbie doll head which 
holds Kleenex. You pull a Kleenex out of the 
top of the doll’s head. The doll heads were the 
owner’s idea, but Pat and I hate them. Pat 
says that pulling out a Kleenex is like pulling a 
little bit of brains out of the doll’s head. At the 
rate we use Kleenex, I figure none of the dolls 
can have much gray [sic] matter left by now. I 
think much the same about myself sometimes. 
I feel this job eating at me until I wonder if I’m 
all hollow inside’.639 
 
 
Example of a PV narrative. Indication of 
disintegration, psychological harm and 
emotional distress. 
 
Self-infliction of MOV such as abjection, (i.e. 
failing to recognise one’s own worth, losing 
self-respect) 
 
vii 
 
 
‘Having a presence and physical body which 
men found sexually attractive was important to 
my self-esteem. Having men pay to get turned 
on by me was an affirmation of my sexual 
power…Men could want and need me’.640 
 
 
 
PV narrative; expressing autonomy as dignity. 
Contradictions between agency and dignity 
violation 
                                                          
638 ‘Dee’ in Frédérique Delacoste, Priscilla Alexander, (eds), Sex Work: Writings by Women in the Sex Industry 
(2nd edn Cleiss Press1998) 39 
639 ‘Judy Edelstein’ in Frédérique Delacoste, Priscilla Alexander, (eds), Sex Work: Writings by Women in the Sex 
Industry (2nd edn Cleiss Press1998) 67 
640 ‘Judy Helfand’, Ibid 101 
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viii 
 
“I think it’s a natural thing. We often discuss it 
in work and laugh about it, not laugh at the 
clients but the things you can be thinking of 
when you’re having sex with a client are 
ridiculous – like I’m thinking how many calories 
I’ve had that day or something totally the 
opposite. I’m definitely not thinking about sex. 
The nearest you come to thinking about sex is 
the money. You’re usually thinking, ‘it’s £20, oh 
good’ It sounds a bit mercenary but you’re 
usually thinking ‘This will meet that bill.’ That’s 
usually the closest you’ll come to thinking 
about the act”.641 
 
 
Coping mechanisms in the PE; language of 
agency 
 
ix 
 
‘What I never saw was that in basing my self 
worth [sic] on men’s desire I was far from 
developing a true sense of worth based on self 
love [sic]. I see this false sense of power as 
one way internalized oppression keeps us 
down.’642 
 
 
PV narrative; personal reflection on the 
narrator’s sense of self-worth. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
x 
 
‘Having a customer fondle a breast, for 
instance, may not be pleasant, especially if he 
is rough, but it doesn’t feel like being violated. 
It’s part of a job, and really no different than if 
he touched an elbow. It’s not sexual; its work. 
Using our whole bodies to earn a living makes 
it clear how much sexual feelings really come 
into our minds: a lover may touch the same 
 
Expressions of autonomy as dignity. This 
represents an apparent conflation of dignity 
promotion and violation 
 
 
 
                                                          
641 ‘Shirley’, in E McLeod, Women Working: Prostitution Now (London: Croom Helm 1982) 39 
642 ‘Shirley, Ibid 
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way a customer does, but produce an entirely 
different feeling’.643 
 
 
 
 
 
xi 
 
 
‘I’ve had a lot of different jobs. I’ve worked in 
canning factories, which is horrendous work. 
That’s why prostitution was so nice for me. 
Because you got a lot of money. You didn’t 
take harassment. You didn’t allow it. You were 
in control of the situation’.644 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
An account of the promotion of dignity through 
agency and thus promotion of autonomy as 
dignity 
 
xii 
 
 
‘…it isn’t fair! We should be proud! No one 
understands or respects us. I hate this secrecy 
and isolation.’645 
 
 
Stigmatisation towards the prostitution 
vocation. Pride in vocation. An example of a 
pro-sex work narrative. 
 
 
xiii 
 
 
 
‘At work, I don’t let myself get emotionally 
involved. I know that if I let myself get involved, 
I will have problems. I just do the job, get 
dressed and go home. When I go out there, 
I’m putting on an act. I’m not getting no rocks 
off, believe me. In all my years of working, I’ve 
never come on stage, with a girl, with a guy, or 
with myself. When I go out there, it’s just like 
putting on a business suit and going downtown 
to work.’646 
 
 
Coping mechanisms, freedom of agency, 
promotion of autonomy as dignity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
643 ‘Peggy Morgan’ in Frédérique Delacoste, Priscilla Alexander, (eds), Sex Work: Writings by Women in the Sex 
Industry (2nd edn Cleiss Press1998) 25 
644 ‘Debra’, Ibid 93 
645 ‘Carol Leigh’, Ibid 34 
646 ‘Samara’, Ibid 38 
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xiv 
 
 
[Narrating a conversation with a client] 
‘”You like to see a man come?” 
“Uh huh.” 
“I’d like to put it in, you know.” 
“Would you?” Greed and disgust wrestled 
within me…I undressed and we lay down on 
the mattress. I turned my head to my side so 
he wouldn’t try to kiss me.647 
 
 
 
Expressions of intrusion and abjection. Agency 
present, but conflated with dignity violation 
 
xv 
 
 
It’s a business. There’s nothing in it for me 
pleasure wise – I fake and pretend a lot for the 
client – that’s what they pay for – but I never 
get any actual enjoyment. I get on with it and 
get it over with as quickly as possible. I’m not a 
criminal for doing this – I do what men pay for, 
it’s my choice.648 
 
 
Language of agency and autonomy, power 
and control. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
xvi 
 
 
I never let anyone touch my body. My body is 
my own, I’m in control of it. When I’m with a 
punter, I say what goes – what he can and 
 
Mixed expressions; a dislike for the work, but 
using coping mechanisms to undergo the PE. 
                                                          
647 ‘Emma Marcus’, Ibid 48 
648 ‘Belinda’ in Sharpe K, Red Light, Blue Light: Prostitutes, punters and the police (Ashgate1998) 87 
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 can’t do, and they never ever touch me. I 
cannot stand anyone touching my body.649 
 
 
Expressions of agency. 
 
xvii 
 
Would you like men using you all the time? I’m 
not ashamed of what I do – if I was then I 
wouldn’t do it. When I get depressed I need 
sex. Sex cheers me up, makes me feel better, 
that’s why I work so much.650 
 
 
Mixed expressions of abjection and autonomy. 
Psychological and social issues expressed. 
 
xviii 
 
 
 
I’m not ashamed of what I do. I know people 
make remarks but I take a great deal of pride 
in what I do…I wear different wigs to cover up 
my real identity, I use them so I can disguise 
myself, block out what I’m really doing. When I 
put on the wig and the short skirt I become a 
different person. I try to fool myself, I 
suppose.651  
 
 
 
 
 
Conflicting language used, coping 
mechanisms. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
xix 
 
When it comes to the actual sex I just blank my 
mind off completely. I pretend I’m someone 
else. I pretend I’m somewhere else. I don’t get 
any pleasure from the sex. Never. I always 
pretend I’m having a good time and that my 
client is brilliant because men have their egos 
massaged – you have to make them think they 
are brilliant – they pay us to make them feel 
better about themselves.652 
 
Treating the PE as an act, and separation 
between the working version and the personal 
version of the self. 
 
 
 
                                                          
649 ‘Imogen’, Ibid 87 
650 ‘Imogen’, Ibid 88 
651 ‘Beryl’, Ibid 87 
652 ‘Beryl’, Ibid 87-88 
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xx 
 
“Never, never will he lie on my bed. He’ll lie on 
a special sheet, on a blanket, but not on the 
bed that’s my own bed. My sheets are my 
property, identity, that’s where I bury my head, 
that’s where I feel me, in my own smells. This 
might seem odd of course, since there’s 
contact between the clients and my skin; you’d 
think my skin was closer to ‘me’ than the 
sheet, but I can wash my skin afterwards. My 
body can be cleaned, and besides, this body 
isn’t the same body – the one the client gets 
isn’t the real one, it’s not mine. I never go to 
bed at night – even if I’m exhausted, worn-out 
– without at least having taken a shower or a 
bath.”653 
 
 
 
Efforts to dissociate working practices and 
personal space.  
 
xxi 
 
“You wouldn’t go into the jungle disguised as a 
lamb; it’s instinctive, but after all, it’s only 
instinct which prompts us to put a screen in 
front of our real personality, to shelter it.”654 
 
 
Justifying the defensive tactics used in the PE. 
   
                                                          
653 ‘E’ in C Jaget (ed), Prostitutes – Our Life (Bristol: Falling Wall Press 1980) 151 
654 Ibid, 150 
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xxii “Ugh, the whole thing is sick. I close my eyes 
and ears. I cut out everything to do with 
feelings. It’s never, never okay. It would be 
totally different with a lover. I’ll stop when I get 
a steady boyfriend”655 
 
 
Abjection, disgust. Disintegration and coping 
mechanisms. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
xxiii 
 
“It gives you a feeling of power in your job too; 
everyone likes to be admired. So you could 
say there’s something positive about the job. 
When I was down there and lots of cars 
honked at me and I could say yes or drop it. I 
learned fast that I didn’t need to go down there 
as a beggar – it’s the woman who decides. 
After a while I learned that I was the one made 
the rules; there were enough people to choose 
from. If people didn’t want to follow my rules 
that was it”656 
 
 
Expressions of agency and autonomy. Themes 
of power and control 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
xxiv 
 
“The worst is that it’s not as bad as people 
make out. Down there you block it all out, you 
get totally sexless, that’s a fact. But you can’t 
function with a man, it won’t work. It just won’t 
work. So Fredrik and I didn’t have a sex life at 
 
Psychological effects of prostitution, emotional 
issues, coping mechanisms, relational issues. 
                                                          
655 ‘Lisa’ in C Høigård, L Finstad, Backstreets: Prostitution, Money and Love (Cambridge: Polity 1992) 65 
656 ‘Eva’, ibid 83 
Page 229 of 232 
 
all. That’s the price you pay when you go 
there…even though I looked that 
professionally at the whole thing, it affected my 
sex life. It is something that touches you 
anyhow.”657 
 
 
xxv 
 
INTERVIEWER: Have you done 
[sold sex to] him more than once? 
 
ALISON: I have done him about 
four times, like this were t’fifth 
time maybe and it were just, we 
had done the business and he 
had had a shower afterwards. I 
got sorted out, got dressed, 
saying nice to see you again, blah 
blah blah, the next thing he just 
fucking attacked me. 
 
INTERVIEWER: How did he do 
that? 
 
ALISON: All of a sudden he says 
‘it would be good to see you 
again’ all of a sudden it were just 
like he…just like total change – he 
just punched me, just straight in 
my mouth. 
 
INTERVIEWER: There was no 
warning? 
 
ALISON: There was no warning at 
all, he just did it, he just did it…I 
was that shocked because I was 
on the floor then, like my God 
what’s going on…by this time he 
was kicking the hell out of me. He 
started kicking my body. I was on 
the floor, he was kicking me in the 
head, in my face. I mean the time 
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657 ‘Eva’, ibid 107 
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he finished with me there was 
lumps all over me head. The 
whole attack must have lasted I 
would say 30-40 seconds.658 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
658 ‘Alison’ in Kinnell H, ‘Murder made easy: the final solution to prostitution?’ in R Campbell, M O’Neill, Sex Work 
Now (Cullompton: Willan 2006) 144 
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APPENDIX C 
DATASET FOR NARRATIVES 
 
TEXT ERA LOCATION NO. 
INTERVIEWED 
MARKET/S 
C Høigård, L 
Finstad, 
Backstreets: 
Prostitution, 
Money and 
Love 
(Cambridge: 
Polity 1992)  
c.1980s-90s Norway 26 Street 
J Phoenix, (Ed) 
Making Sense 
of Prostitution 
(Palgrave 
1999) 
c.1990s UK 21 Mixed  
K Sharpe, Red 
Light, Blue 
Light: 
Prostitutes, 
punters and the 
police 
(Ashgate1998) 
c.1980s-90s UK 100 Street 
E McLeod, 
Women 
Working: 
Prostitution 
Now (London: 
Croom Helm 
1982) 
c.1980s UK >20 Mixed  
F Delacoste, P 
Alexander, 
(Eds), Sex 
Work: Writings 
by Women in 
the Sex 
Industry (2nd 
edn Cleiss 
Press1998) 
c.1970s-90s USA, France >20 Mixed  
C Jaget (ed) 
Prostitutes, our 
life (Bristol: 
Falling Wall 
c.1970s France >20 Mixed 
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Press 1980) 
 
 
 
